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CHAPTER I
General Introduction
Little is known about the socio-psychological processes that 
condition party behaviour during pre-election campaigning and post­
election negotiations. Competing parties communicate and interact 
with one another. They adopt specific styles of behaviour in an 
effort to influence the voters. Party behaviour expresses not only 
the ideology of a party but also its power position, namely its 
majority or minority character. Therefore, this study examines the 
different styles of behaviour adopted by parties which occupy a 
minority or a majority position. Do these parties behave in 
different ways? How does a party that has a majority position 
confront an opponent party which holds a minority position? How 
does a minority party resist to the influence of an opponent that 
occupies a majority position? These are the main questions 
addressed by this study.
Moreover, party behaviour is embedded in a nexus of 
ideological and political relationships which structure the 
political spectrum. Thus, the fact that a party has an ideological 
or political affinity or, on the contrary, is diametrically opposed 
to a given rival party affects the strategies that the party uses 
to confront the specific opponent. Therefore, party identity is 
examined as a factor that influences the strategies used by parties 
in campaigns and negotiations. Which strategies do parties that 
have common or opposed identities use to confront one another? 
This is the second major focus of the research.
The study aims to introduce a socio-psychological insight into 
party behaviour. To that end, different theoretical approaches to 
party behaviour in campaigning will be briefly discussed. Thereby, 
the originality of our approach will be highlighted by emphasising 
the different theoretical perspective that is implicit in our
model.
1.1 Theoretical approaches to party behaviour in campaigning
Party behaviour and especially pre-electoral campaigning are 
subjects that are discussed widely and frequently amongst political 
scientists. Various theories have been developed in an attempt to 
explain and, even more, to predict party behaviour. Indeed, there 
are three main theoretical approaches which attempt to analyse 
party campaigning and the concomitant strategies: behaviouralism, 
the communications approach and rational-choice theory. Moreover, 
there is also a managerial approach which aims at examining the 
problem in a pragmatic perspective, namely from the point of view 
of campaign organisers and politicians.
The theory of behaviouralism is composed of two primary 
approaches. The first approach which adopts a sociological dynamic 
was first introduced by Paul Lazarsfeld and his collaborators 
(1944) at Columbia University in the early forties. The basic 
assumption of this model was that voting intentions were mainly 
determined by a voter's social characteristics. Pre-election 
campaigning, therefore, had little impact on voting decisions since 
the latter depended on a voter's political predispositions, i.e. 
his/her long standing party-loyalties. Furthermore, political 
campaigning had a primarily reinforcing and predisposition- 
activating effect rather than a prominently converting and 
persuading one. This sociological approach underestimates the 
short-term changes that may occur during a campaign, focusing, from 
the beginning, on long-term explanatory variables such as social 
characteristics. Little attention is paid therefore to the 
campaigning itself and to the possibility of alternative stimuli 
for the existing predispositions of a voter if a different sort of 
campaign is run. Besides, the manifestation of, what might be 
called a conversion effect, may be seen in more subtle and covert
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ways than that represented by the voters' partisan preferences. 
Indeed, the campaign can produce changes in the way candidates or 
parties are perceived or the manner in which agenda of political 
issues is formed. As a result, such a phenomenon may significantly 
influence the outcome of the elections.
A second approach, within the framework of behaviouralism, is 
one thbt was developed at the Institute for Social Research of the 
University of Michigan (Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes 1960). 
Compared to the previous model, the main difference highlighted by 
this irtodel results from the importance given by the approach to 
socio-psychological variables. As a result, there are three types 
of "attitude" toward political stimuli which were distinguished: 
party-*identification, support for campaign issues and candidate 
appeal. The conclusions that were reached concerning individual 
voting decisions confirmed those that had been drawn formerly by 
the Columbia group. Indeed, the stability of partisan opinions and 
behaviour was emphasised. However, the explanation offered for such 
phenomena was different. Long standing loyalties were seen as 
relying on party identification. That said the role of campaigning 
was once again minimised.
Despite the fact that the conclusions of both these
behaviouralist approaches have been largely accepted in political 
science, there has also been a great deal of criticism levelled 
against them. The concern has focused upon both the degree of 
sophistication involved in the typical voter's decision-making and 
the possible influence of political issues rather than party
identification. Moreover, the neglect of the short-term impact 
resulting from the relationship between political events and 
voters' attitudes and behaviour has also been highlighted.
A second theoretical framework of party campaigning is the
communications approach. This approach emerged from the early work
of behaviouralists (Lazarsfeld P F, et al. 1944; Berelson b R, 
Lazarsfeld P F & McPhee W N 1954) and emphasises more the role of
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campaigning as political communication. A common perspective that 
is held by a large group of academics who have studied this model 
is based upon the premise that election campaigns are a form of 
persuasion. Thus, political communication is to be seen in that 
context.
A large proportion of studies relevant to this field focus 
upon the impact of the mass media on voting decision-making and 
consists mainly of a panel survey of intact communities (Kline G F 
& Tichenor Ph J (eds) 1972; Kraus S & Davis D (eds) 1976). Another 
part of communication research, however, turns this approach on its 
head by considering not what the media do to people, but rather 
what voters do with the media, i.e. as a mechanism for endowing the 
pub]ic with a more significant and pro-active role than had been 
witnessed hitherto.
The communications approach, as a result of these innovations 
has offered a new standpoint from which to view political 
campaigning for it has shown how important it is to understand the 
scope and the nature of mass communications which take place within 
political campaigning. However, the utility of this model with 
respect to the effects of political communication has been 
relatively narrow and limited for it has focused mainly on 
political conversion and, generally speaking, fails to distinguish 
between the effects engendered by different types cl media. 
Furthermore, it almost wholly ignores the power of personal 
contact. Moreover, a methodological weakness of the approach is 
its use of correlational data. As a consequence, the model runs
the risk that the causal sequence will be shown in reverse order,
i.e. changes in vote intention might precede relative discussions 
or changes in media habits.
Last but not least, in this brief overview, is the "rational-
choice", or "positive" approach. Within this perspective, which 
was originally developed as a model within the discipline of 
economics, candidates, political parties and voters are viewed as 
rational actors who are committed to the maximisation of their
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individual goals. Decisions and behaviour, therefore, stem from 
this objective rather than from any effort to be responsive to the 
environment.
Moreover, a variety of models have also been developed within 
this approach and they can be thus summarised: the "decision
theoretical model" which is based upon an individual's voting 
decision (Buchanan and Tullock 1965), "game theoretical models" 
which focus upon political coalition formation (Riker 1962), 
"spatial models" of party competition (Downs 1957) and "resource- 
allocation models" which concentrate upon the inherent dynamic and 
tension within campaigning decisions (Brams 1978, Kramer 1966)
Among these models, that of Downs has had a large influence 
upon political science, especially in the domain of party 
competition, and has led to the development of a number of "spatial 
models" of party-behaviour. However, these models often cannot 
produce robust results because they fail to match specific 
empirical data-sets to their basic theoretical assumptions. 
Thereby, their main virtue, i.e. their resistance to ad hoc 
explanations and their independence from structural elements is, at 
the same time, a fundamental weakness.
The relative independence of rational choice theories from the 
particularities and peculiarities of empirical case-studies has 
been brought into question by neo-institutionalist theories, such 
as those of March and Olsen (1984), Schlesinger (1984) and Shepsle 
(1979). More recently, however, attempts have been made to 
understand party behaviour by taking into account both 
institutional and organisational constraints while assuming that 
parties, or at least party-leaders, act rationally (Strom 1990).
Finally, in what has been an attempt to look at political 
campaigning and party behaviour from the point of view of 
campaigners and politicians, a pragmatic approach has been put 
forward. This approach has been characterised as political 
marketing because it focuses upon the managerial aspects of 
campaigning. To that end, the selection of campaign strategies
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depends upon the personal taste or style of individual candidates, 
as well as their pragmatic situation in terms of resource 
allocation, opposition and potential coalition formation.
Two elements are taken into account within this framework: 
first, the principal medium of communication (mass media or 
personal contact) and second the professional or non-professional 
organisation of the campaigning (Mauser 1983: 49-50). A typology 
of four basic types of political campaigning ha been formulated. 
They can thus be summarised: political marketing i.e. the
professional use of mass media; protest movements, i.e. the non­
professional use of mass-media; professional organisers, i.e. the 
professional use of personal contact; and party machines, i.e. the 
non-professional use of personal contact.
The pragmatic approach provides a different viewpoint from 
which to understand party behaviour in campaign situations and 
tackles important practical questions. Rarely, however, does it go 
beyond empirical observations and the simple description of 
political campaigns. Moreover, there is a significant gap between 
simply reporting these events and providing an analytical framework 
for the understanding of them and/or the predicting of party 
strategies whilst campaigning is taking place.
1.2 Political reality and socio-psychological theory
Political Science and Social Psychology are disciplines that 
are quite distinct in their development, having evolved along 
entirely different lines. Nevertheless, a socio-psychological view 
can be extremely useful in understanding political phenomena. The 
aim of this study, therefore, will be to apply a set of socio- 
psychological concepts to political reality. To achieve this goal, 
the direction of the research will be divided into two main 
sections. First, it will strive for a better understanding of 
party behaviour. Second, the research will propose a revised 
theory of applied social psychology.
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The theoretical model that is the rocus of the research
dynamic has analysed social influence and social change. The model 
is known as the "genetic model of minority influence" and its 
primary concern is the role of active minority groups in influence 
processes (Moscovici 1976). Moreover, the research that has taken 
place on minority influence has been conducted, almost exclusively, 
within experimental settings. As a consequence, there is a growing 
body of literature on the character of majority vs. minority
groups, as sources of influence, on the styles of behaviour and 
negotiation techniques and tactics that these majority and minority 
groups use, as well as on their strategies in confronting each 
other in influence situations1. This study will seek to highlight 
certain shortcomings that afflict this theoretical model on
minority influence which are, to a large extent, due to the 
inherent limitations imposed by laboratory research. In this work, 
the model is applied directly to political reality^.
Party behaviour in both pre-election campaigning and post­
election bargaining has been chosen as potentially rewarding 
territory for the study because such parties can be characterised 
as majority or minority groups. Furthermore, political parties 
engage openly in campaigning in order to influence the voters. 
Party campaigning therefore offers a real-life context within which 
specific social entities, namely political parties, try to
influence another social entity, i.e. the electorate, whilst at the 
same time, reacting to any attempts made by their adversaries to 
increase their influence. These processes of group interaction and 
influence can be represented in an experimental setting. However, 
such experiments normally fail to capture the external, and 
uncontrollable, factors that are inevitably and intrinsically 
involved in party campaigning. The international situation, the 
contingent character of a large number of campaigning events, the 
multiplicity of agents and, indeed, the complexity of the campaign 
itself, as an arena for influence discourse, these are all elements 
which cannot be formalised and manipulated in a laboratory. On the 
contrary, raw empirical material takes into account any factors
7
that inevitably interfere in party interaction and the influence 
process itself.
F i g u r e  1
Genetic model of minority influence (theory)
a socio-psychological model of political behaviour (theory revisited)
Party behaviour in campaigning (field for application of theory)
-------------------  1 ------
the case-study
Party campaigning and post­election negotiation of Greek political parties in the period between June 1989 and April 1990_____________
This limitation upon studies of minority influence is 
reflected in the development of analytical concepts. Analytical 
categories, such as the majority or minority character of a source 
of influence or the strategies of resistance to an adversary 
influence source, do not fully cover the phenomena and the 
activities of political parties in campaigning and post-election 
negotiations. This study, therefore, proposes some specific 
modifications of these analytical categories. Figure 1 (see supra)
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presents the structure and scope of the research in a schematic 
form.
1.3 A socio-psychological approach to party behaviour in 
campaigning and negotiation situations
The theoretical approach introduced from social psychology to 
politics offers an insight into the content and context of party 
communication that takes place in campaigning. Party campaigning 
and post-election negotiations are examined as a field in which 
parties develop their discourse and, consequently, engage in 
process of interaction. Thus, party behaviour is seen as 
contingent upon the socio-psychological mechanisms which contribute 
to the formation of party identity and which influence the 
relationships between the parties. These mechanisms are 
conditioned, on the one hand, by the power position of the party, 
namely its pragmatic resources and its status, and, on the other 
hand, by the specific party identity, i.e. the political tradition 
of the party, its ideology and its policy positions.
The socio-psychological concepts used in this analysis will be 
seen within a specific real-life context. The specific 
circumstances of pre-election campaigning and post-election 
government formation will be taken into account, as well as the 
content of the communication, which will be analysed thematically. 
Moreover, the social cognition embodied in the messages between the 
various parties/sources of influence will be examined by studying 
the framing packages mobilised by these messages. A framing 
package is an interpretative scheme based upon social 
representations that are shared by the large majority of people 
living in a specific society at a given historical time. These 
representations form an integral part of the (political) culture, 
the common knowledge and collective memory of a society. The 
direction of the communication between the competing parties will
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also be taken into account and related to the power profile2 of 
each party.
For the purposes of the research an analytical model will be 
proposed which organises the study of party interaction at two 
layers. The first layer of the model will examine the relationship 
between the majority or minority character of a party and its style 
of behaviour and negotiation. Moreover, the strategies of influence 
and resistance adopted by a party against its adversaries will be 
related to its minority or majority character. The second layer of 
the model will examine the impact of the common or opposed super­
ordinate identities that two adversary parties may have3 on the 
strategies they use to confront one another. The second layer of 
the model will take into account the framing packages and, 
consequently, the social representations that are mobilised in the 
campaigning and negotiation process. These will be considered in 
relation to party styles of behaviour or strategies of influence. 
The study of the framing packages embodied in the party discourse 
will contribute to a qualitative analysis of the results of the 
research.
The following chapter (Chapter two) provides an overview of 
the case-study undertaken whilst the theoretical base of this two- 
layer approach to party interaction and communication is developed 
in Chapters three and four. The hypotheses for the study will be 
presented in Chapter five whilst the method used for the analysis 
of the data will be presented in Chapter six. The elaboration of 
the data, together with the results obtained will be presented and 
discussed in Chapters seven and eight. Finally, some concluding 
remarks will be made in Chapter nine, regarding the application of 
socio-psychological theory to political reality. Furthermore, 
several new directions of research will be proposed which may help 
to capture the complexity of political reality.
The questions that will be addressed in this research will
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conc-artrate primarily on the relationships between parties and, 
consequently, on party interaction. The socio-psychological 
factors in inter-party relations and communication will also be 
used to analyse the campaign discourse and to reveal the mechanisms 
which organise communication. The prime interest of the thesis 
will be on party behaviour at the group level rather than at the 
level of the individual. To that end, the thesis will examine 
socio-psychological mechanisms in their capacity as a background 
for party behaviour and interaction between parties.
The theoretical approach proposed will be applied to Greek 
politics at a national level. The "micro-level" represented by 
sub-groups or sub-divisions of constituencies, as well as local 
factors conditioning the close environment of these sub-agents, 
will not be examined. Furthermore, for the purposes of this study, 
it will be assumed that parties as organisations act in a unitary 
manner under electoral competition conditions. These assumptions 
do not constitute a theoretical or normative viewpoint about 
parties as political actors, communicators or agents of influence; 
they are simply an assumption.
The institutional setting, in which the three electoral 
contests and two government formations take place, remained stable 
throughout the whole of the period under examination. The 
constitutional arrangements concerning the succession in government 
have remained unaltered, as has the electoral law. There have been 
no significant demographic changes in the country. In summary, the 
social, economic and institutional setting of the research offers 
a relatively stable framework for the enactment of the political 
game. This has allowed the research to examine party relationships 
from a socio-psychological perspective, with the assumption that 
they are not affected by significant institutional changes. 
However, in keeping with the above observations, variables 
referring to the afore-mentioned domains (the social, economic or 
institutional) will not be included in the analysis.
1 1
1.4 The case-study: the Greek governmental crisis in 1989 
1990
This study will focus upon an analysis of the behavioural 
styles and strategies of Greek political parties in the period 
between June 1989 and April 1990. The period 1989-1990 is 
characterised by the longest political and governmental crisis 
since the collapse of the dictatorship in 1974. During this 
period, three parliamentary elections were organised within only 
ten months (18th June 1989, 5th November 1989 and 8th April 1990). 
Moreover, two provisional governmental coalitions (July-October 
1989 and November 1989-February 1990) were formed during that 
period, however, no stable and fully responsible government emerged 
from these coalitions. Indeed, the three consecutive elections 
that took place in this period offer a particularly fruitful ground 
for research on party behaviour in pre-election campaigning and 
post-election negotiations.
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N O T E S
1. See bibliographical references for an informative account of literature on 
these concepts,
2. Power profile refers to the image of a leader or a party as a probable party 
incumbent, A large party which challenges the governing party, or the governing 
party itself disposes of such a power profile. The electorate perceives them 
both as parties which may acquire governmental office. On the contrary, a small 
party which enters the pre-election campaigning as an outsider, is not viewed, 
neither by its own supporters, as a potential incumbent of power. The 
vulnerability, though, of parties with a strong power profile disposition is that 
their rivals may attack, deny and discredit this image of theirs.
3. The concept of the majority or minority character of a political party as well 
as the party (super-ordinate) identity are discussed in Chapters three and four.
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CHAPTER II
Greece: a summary of the main political events in the period
between June 1989 and April 1990
2.1 The Socialists in crisis: at the threshold of the
elections
The Greek political spectrum in the 1970s and 1980s has been 
dominated by three political parties. The largest and most 
influential were the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PA.SO.K.) 
which was in government from October 1981 until June 1989, and New 
Democracy (N.D.), the main right-wing party. New Democracy was in 
office during the period between the democratic transition of 19 74 
(after the collapse of the colonels' junta) and 1981, when it lost 
the election.
The founder and leader of PA.SO.K., and Greek Prime Minister 
for the eight years before the election of June 1989, was 
Mr.Andreas Papandreou. However, the party went through an acute 
internal and external crisis during the winter of 1988-1989. 
Various scandals had been revealed in which Ministers, the General 
Directors of the public services and even the Prime Minister 
himself seemed to be involved.
Moreover, these scandals were two-fold, effecting both the 
private and the public spheres. Indeed, the private life of 
Mr .Papandreou was one of the main foci of criticism during that 
period. This was the result, primarily, of his recent separation 
from his wife and his unofficial engagement to an air-hostess, who 
was some 35 years younger than himself. Furthermore, these changes 
in the Prime Minister's personal life had serious political 
implications for, on the one hand, the moral correctness of his 
action became a topic for discussion, given that Mr.Papandreou was 
not married to his new companion whilst, on the other hand, the 
Prime Minister's ex-wife was the President of the Women's
Organisation that was attached to the Socialist Party. As a 
result, the importance of the matter was systematically and 
repeatedly emphasised by the main opposition party, New Democracy, 
to such an extent that it was turned into an electoral issue.
However, Mr. Papandreou's wayward private life was no the only 
problem that confronted the electorate in 1989. The so-called 
"scandal of the Bank of Crete" proved to be the most salient matter 
during the last months before the election. The "scandal" 
concerned the embezzlement of public money, public companies' 
finance (telecommunications, electricity, post etc.), as well as 
the acquisition of a large number of airplanes for the national Air 
Force, which were, subsequently, proved to be inappropriate. The 
political personality at the heart of the matter was the then 
Minister of the Presidency1 and vice-President of the government, 
Mr. A. Koutsogiorgas. He was presented as having been the go- 
between during the whole scandal and, as a result, was prosecuted 
for his allegedly illegal behaviour. In effect he served as a 
political scapegoat for the Socialist Party on the eve of the 
elections of June 19892.
In addition, Mr. Papandreou suffered from serious health 
problems during that period, which gave the Opposition the 
opportunity to claim that he was no longer able to accomplish his 
tasks as Prime Minister.
The main opposition party during the eight years of Socialist 
government was New Democracy. N.D. was the conservative right-wing 
party which had been in office from 1974 until 1981 under the 
leadership of Mr. Konstantinos Karamanlis. Its leader, who had 
been elected two years earlier, Mr. Konstantinos Mitsotakis, had 
re-organised the party at the decision-making level in order to 
establish what was, in effect, one-man-rule. Indeed, at the local 
and sectoral level, a significant development of the party 
organisation occurred. Local committees and what might be called 
"mobilisation nuclei", which had been virtually non-existent when 
the party was in government, were established. As a consequence, 
the electoral force of New Democracy was on the increase, according
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to the opinion polls and the general "feeling" of political 
commentators.
The third party, included in this study and the third largest 
electoral force is called 'Synaspismos tis Aristeras ke tis Proodu' 
(SYN.), namely Alliance of the Left and the Progress. It consisted 
of the allied communist and other left-wing forces. Its electoral 
force was mainly derived from the two Greek Communist parties which 
had formerly separated in 1975. The Synaspismos (SYN.) was 
provisionally directed by a General Committee chaired by the Greek 
Communist Party's General Secretary, Mr. Harilaos Florakis. The 
leader of the E.AR. (United Left, the second Communist Party, which 
followed the direction of "Euro-communism") was appointed General 
Secretary of the SYN.
The Alliance of the Left (SYN.) was one of the most widely 
discussed political events of that period. Indeed, negotiations 
between the two main participants were still going on when the pre­
election campaigning period started in June 1989.
2.2 The elections of June 1989.
The results of this first electoral contest were as follows:
New Democracy: 44,25% (145 seats in Parliament)
PA.SO.K.: 39,15% (125 seats)
Synaspismos: 13,12% (28 seats)
DI.ANA.: 1,01% (1 seat)
Ebistosini : 0,21% (1 seat)
Note: "Ebistosini" was the party created by the independent muslim
candidate in the constituency of Rodopi, a district in northeastern Greece, 
where the major part of the Turkish muslim minority lives.
16
The changes in electoral force of the three major parties are 
presented in figure 2.1 (appended).
Figure 2.1 
about here
A brief commentary on the results highlights the following 
points. According to the predictions of the Conservative party 
(N.D.), PA.SO.K. would, and should, have fallen to the lowest level 
of electoral power that it had held during the last ten years. The 
scandalous affairs preceding the election, its irresponsible 
economical policies and the lack of any substantial change in the 
economical and social sectors were, according to the opposition, 
valid indicators for an electoral defeat that PA.SO.K. was bound to 
suffer. However, the Socialists still managed to win a percentage 
that approached forty per cent of the vote thereby achieving a 
strong second position in the elections. Indeed, the Socialist 
rank-and-file characterised this result an electoral victory.
The Conservative party, whilst gaining the first place in the 
elections, failed to obtain a parliamentary majority. There was no 
doubt that they had gained a victory but it did not suffice to 
bring them into office. It is worth noting that with the electoral 
law that was in use until spring 1989, New Democracy would have 
obtained a large majority in Parliament. However, a quasi- 
proportional-representation electoral system had been introduced by 
the Socialists in Parliament a few months prior to the election. 
With respect to the Alliance of the Left, political commentators 
stated that it simply represented the total of the votes gained by 
the formerly divided communist forces. The percentage that the 
party obtained, 13,12%, represented the 11% of votes won by the 
Greek Communist Party (K.K.E.), plus the 2% of the Greek Left 
(E.AR.). The new political formation of the left, therefore, 
seemed not to have convinced the voters for it had failed in
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presenting itself as a substitute or alternative to the Socialists.
2.3 The formation of a provisional two-party "unorthodox" 
government
In the event of this 'hung' parliament, the normal procedure 
envisaged by the Constitution of 1974 had then to be followed. The 
term "catharsis" was coined to summarise the overall scope of the 
investigation of scandals in which the Socialist government 
appeared to have been involved. However, a problem arose, as a 
result of the Constitution, for under its terms any investigation 
of suspected public fraud had to be brought to a conclusion within 
two parliamentary sessions. If the investigations took longer 
there could be no further prosecution or investigation of the ex- 
Ministers involved. Given that the investigation had already 
started during the previous session of Parliament, the second 
parliamentary session, as foreseen by the Constitution, was that of 
the Parliament formed after the election of June 18th, 1989. The 
formation of a government was, therefore, absolutely necessary for 
those who wanted the suspected frauds to be investigated. It was 
this unsavoury reality that led to the governmental coalition of 
New Democracy with the Alliance of the Left, an alliance of legal 
convenience.
The new government was formed under the Chairmanship of Mr. 
Giannis Giannetakis, an important political personality of the 
right-wing although not one who belonged to the most powerful 
order. The new parliament held its first session on the 3rd of 
July 1989 and pursued its functions regularly until the 6th of 
October. The government declared its commitment to take on the 
catharsis and to take all the administrative decisions needed to 
run the state apparatus. However, it avoided taking any crucial 
decisions on financial or social matters.
This so-called "unorthodox" coalition caused severe internal
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conflicts in the Alliance of the Left (SYN.). Moreover, these 
conflicts led to the resignation of the General Secretary of the 
Communist Youth Organisation (K.N.E.) as well as the withdrawal of 
a large number of its members from the Alliance and the Communist 
Party.
Not surprisingly, a bitter post-election negotiation fight was 
run among the three parties before the formation of the government. 
The Socialists, who found themselves under political and moral 
attack by the other two parties, adopted a rigid and aggressive 
behaviour very soon after the election. They refused any 
collaboration with the N.D. and accused SYN. of being as "traitors 
who trade off their ideology for governmental office". The 
PA.SO.K. sustained that argument by saying that the motive of the 
leaders of SYN., in accepting the coalition with the N.D., was 
driven by their "revengeful attitude" and "jealousy" against Mr. 
Papandreou and his government.
On October 4th, 1989, Mr.Papandreou founded the Democratic 
Coalition which was constituted by the Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement and political personalities and intellectuals of the 
centre-left.
The government resigned on October 7th, as had been scheduled 
since its formation, announcing that its task had been 
accomplished. The leader of N.D. called for a unification of all 
liberal political forces before what was the imminent electoral 
contest. The administrative government of Mr. I. Grivas took 
office on October 12th, so that the pre-electoral campaign and the 
elections themselves would be executed properly. The second pre- 
electoral campaign started in a more hectic manner than ever for 
the three major parties. The two larger ones were both running in 
the election with the aim of achieving an absolute majority in 
Parliament and a single-party majority government3 (as opposed to 
a coalition). However, the polls predicted that no party would 
attain an electoral percentage that was high enough to obtain an 
absolute majority of MPs. Various scripts were put forward by the
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press in their attempts to foresee the election outcome and the 
chances of the adversaries achieving their respective goals. The 
SYN., on the other hand, merely aimed at a strengthening of its 
position and rejected any possibility of a post-electoral coalition 
with either of the larger parties.
2.4 The election of November 5th, 1989: the formation of a 
National Unity government
The results of the election were as follows (see also figure
New Democracy: 46,19% (148 deputies out of a total of 300
Note: The 'others' include the independent muslim candidate in the
constituency of Rodopi and the independent centre-left candidate in the 
constituency of Lefkas (one of the Ionian islands) who was supported by both 
PA.SO.K. and SYNASPISMOS.
All three major parties claimed to have won the elections. 
Soon after the elections (November, 8th) negotiations began between 
the PA.SO.K. and the N.D., with the hope of forming a national 
unity government (a "universal" government as it was called). This 
was in order to avoid political disorder and a prolongation of the
2 . 1 ) :
SYN. :
"Greens": 
Others :
PA.SO.K.:
members of the Parliament) 
40,67% (128 deputies) 
10,96% (21 deputies)
0,58% (1 deputy)
0,72% (2 deputies)
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governmental crisis. No more than ten days later (November, 17th- 
21st), key meetings between the leaders of the three parties (N.D., 
PA.SO.K. and SYN.) and the President of the Republic were held. 
The negotiations seemed to lead to a final decision for a national 
unity government.
The new government proposed by all three parties received the 
almost unanimous vote of Parliament in the session of November, 
23rd. Mr. Xenophon Zolotas was selected for the post of Prime 
Minister4. All the political parties considered him to be a 
respectable and trustworthy man, the right person for such a 
mandate.
A general plan for economic policy was then proposed and 
increases in the prices of primary goods and services were agreed. 
The government also declared that the country was suffering from a 
severe economic crisis and called upon all Greek citizens to 
sustain the government's efforts in return for substantial but 
long-term amelioration. At the beginning of January 1990 a new set 
of economic measures was proposed by the Prime Minister which was 
based upon an economic policy or restraint in all sectors. It is 
important to mention that all governmental measures were discussed 
and decisions were taken, by a cabinet that was formed by the three 
party leaders together with the Prime Minister. Moreover, this 
'peak' cabinet held its meetings regularly, almost every day.
The catharsis also continued. Many ex-Ministers of the 
Socialist Party, as well as personalities from the close social 
environment of Mr. Papandreou were questioned and some also 
prosecuted for embezzlement of public money.
In early February another political event gave rise to further 
change in the political situation, namely the presidential 
elections which were then close at hand. After three successive 
votes (on the 19th and 25th of February and the 3rd of March) in 
which the Parliament failed to elect a new President of the 
Republic, the Parliament had to be dissolved, as required by the 
Greek Constitution.
As a result, the third pre-election campaign started. Indeed,
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for all practical purposes it had never completely stopped since 
the summer of 1989 and the political climate was more intense than 
ever. New Democracy, whilst accusing PA.SO.K. of being responsible 
for the present difficult situation, claimed to be the winning 
party, having gained a margin of at least ten per cent.
On March 12th, 1990, the first public debate between the three 
main party leaders took place at the Panteion University of Athens. 
Thenceforth, the pre-election campaign was run very intensely by 
all the parties throughout the country. One week before the actual 
day of the elections, on April 1st, quarrels broke out between 
supporters of N.D. and PA.SO.K., during a public speech that was 
being given by Mr. Mitsotakis, in the city of Herakleion in Crete. 
This unfortunate confrontation caused the death of one person and 
severe injuries to five others.
2.5 The elections of April 8 th, 1990: the end of the
governmental crisis
The results were as follows (see also figure 2.1):
New Democracy: 46,88% (150 deputies)
PA.SO.K.: 38,61% (123 deputies)
Synaspismos: 10,28% (19 deputies)
"Creens": 0,77% (1 deputy)
DI.ANA.: 0,60% (1 deputy)
Independent
candidates : 1,02% (3 deputies)
Notes: "DI.ANA." was a small right-wing party produced by an earlier schism
of the New Democracy. The "Independent Candidates" were candidates 
supported by both PA.SO.K. and SYN. in the single-deputy constituencies.
The day after the elections, the leader of N.D., Mr. K.
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Mrtsotakis had a short negotiating meetinc with the leader of 
DI.ANA., Mr. K. Stefanopoulos. Mr. Stefanopoulos agreed to support 
a coalition government with N.D. and, thereby, offered to New 
Democracy the 151st deputy it needed to gain an absolute majority 
in Parliament. This was the only chance for the Conservative party 
to form a government. The only guarantees Mr. Stefanopoulos asked 
for were the general conditions that public money would be 
respected, that the state would not be subordinated to the 
governing party and that the principles of equality and meritocracy 
would be implemented.
On April, 11th, 1990, the new conservative government obtained 
a confidence vote albeit a marginal one, in Parliament, when 151 
out of the 300 deputies pledged their support. As a consequence, 
the catharsis procedure progressed. Fifteen ex-General Directors 
of the public services were prosecuted. However, the presidential 
elections were soon at stake again. Both PA.SO.K. and SYN. 
rejected the candidature of Mr. K. Karamanlis. However, he was 
proposed and supported by the governmental coalition and as a 
result won the presidential election.
The reactions of the two opposition party leaders to the 
formation of the new government differed significantly. The leader 
of PA.SO.K., Mr. Papandreou, at the first session of the party's 
General Committee, appointed a shadow cabinet of Ministers in order 
to maintain firm opposition against the new government. He foresaw 
wrongly, as it transpired, that the marginal parliamentary 
majority, which sustained the new government, would not last long. 
On the other hand, Mr. H. Florakis, President of the Alliance of 
the Left (SYN.), declared that the country was entering a new 
political phase, in which his party would do its best to play an 
active and decisive part, also in the role of opposition.
These events in Greek political life had a particular 
political significance. Indeed, repeated elections almost every 
three months is an exceptional case in Greek politics and enables 
a study to take place of the evolution of party behaviour and any
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consequent changes that took place in the relationship between the 
three parties. In addition, the coalition governments that were 
formed in between these elections signalled an important change in 
Greek political geography.
The governmental coalition of the summer of 1989, in effect, 
restructured the political spectrum. What had traditionally been 
called "the wide Left" or the "left-of-centre space" saw itself 
divided in two when its most radical element, namely the Alliance 
of the Left (SYN.), participated in a provisional government 
together with the N.D., the party of the right. As a consequence, 
the ideological and programmatic differences were no longer, at 
least for a limited period, expressed on a single left-right 
dimension. On the other hand, parties which until the mid­
seventies had not been recognised as legal political formations,
i.e. the Communist party, gained governmental office, even though 
only temporarily. The entrance into government of a small and 
ideologically extreme political party had a symbolic weight that 
could not be neglected.
In keeping with this first de- and re-composition of 
traditional political dimensions, the national unity government was 
another innovation for Greek inter-party politics. The
participation at the same decision-making table of the three 
competing party leaders and the adoption of common policies for 
three months represented a unique event in Greek politics5. 
Moreover, these governmental coalitions had several important 
implications for what might be called the "power character” of the 
parties. Formerly well defined and distinguished political 
categories such as between Left and Right, small and large 
parties, parties that were likely to govern and outsiders/minority 
parties, seemed to lose their significance during that period. 
Nevertheless, in each of the three pre-election campaigns examined, 
the parties ultimately returned to their previous positions, re- 
attributing, in effect, the distinction between Left and Right. 
Such an ideological and governmental mobility offers a particulary 
interesting opportunity to apply a model on inter-group relations
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and strategies of influence/resistance.
N O T E S
1.The ministry of the Presidency is an office of a particular character within 
the Greek cabinet. The duties of the Minister of the Presidency is to assist the 
Prime Minister in his functions and in the co-ordination of the government. S/he 
often prepares and checks the files issued by other Ministries and Parliament 
with the aim of facilitating and reducing the amount of work of the Prime 
Minister. A shorthand name for this Minister is the Minister ’next to the Prime 
Minister”.
2. The study seeks to remain neutral with respect to the aforementioned scandals 
and the involvement of one or other political figures in them. Besides, the 
validity of the accusations against Mr. Koutsogiorgas can hardly be discussed 
nowadays for two reasons. First, because Mr.Koutsogiorgas suffered a cerebral 
attack during the trial at the Special Court (a Court set up for judging the 
involvement of the Socialist government in the set of illegal affairs called 
altogether "the scandal of the Bank of Crete”), fell into a coma and died a week 
later, in April 1991. Second, because after a trial which lasted 11 months (it 
started in February and concluded in November 1991), Mr. A.Papandreou was 
released for lack of substantial evidence against him. Two important politicians 
of PA.SO.K. have, however, been prosecuted and received to one and a half and 
three years in prison respectively, and have also been deprived of their 
political rights for five years.
3. The concept of “self-reliance”, i.e. single-party majority government is of 
great importance in Greek politics. In the period between 1974 and 1989, no 
coalition governments had ever come into office. A single-party majority 
government has always (up to now) been considered as the only viable solution of 
an electoral contest and as the ultimate guarantee of political and governmental 
stability.
4. Mr. Zolotas is a Professor at the University of Athens in the department of 
Economics. He is a world renowned economist and a member of the Academy of 
Athens.
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5. The two larger parties are usually in bitter competition relations with each 
other. The following incident taken from the pre-election campaign of October 
1993 in Greece can serve as an example of the hostility and mutual resentment 
that the leaders of N.D. and PA.SO.K. sometimes express. During that campaign, 
the leader of PA.SO.K., i.e. Mr. Papandreou, when invited to meet in a televised 
debate with the (until the election) Prime Minister and leader of the governing 
party, Mr. Mitsotakis, refused to do so suggesting that it would be humiliating 
(I) for him to discuss politics at the same table with M r . Mitsotakis. The 
uniqueness of the National Unity government period during which the three 
leaders, namely Mr. Papandreou, Mr. Mitsotakis and Mr. Florakis, used to meet, 
discuss and make decisions every other day needs no further comment.
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Graphic representation of the electoral force (in%) (figure 
2.1a) and of the parliamentary representation (number of 
sears) (figure 2.1b) of the Greek parties in the elections 
of the last decade (1981-1990).
F i g u  r e  2.1
F i g u r e  2.1a
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■ mi H1985 ■  1989o □  1989b ■  1990
Notes:
1. The electoral contests took place on: October 18th, 1981; June 2nd, 
1985; June 18th, 1989; November 5th, 1989; April 8th, 1990.
2. The two Greek Communist parties, i.e. KKE and KKEs. and other leftist 
forces formed in January 1989 the Alliance of the Left and the Progress, 
(SYN.) The Greens only participated at the election of November 1989 
and April 1990 and the small right-wing party DI.ANA. at the elections 
of June 1989 and April 1990. The column "other party" refers to 
political formations which have gathered a significant percentage of 
votes in some election but have been dissolved afterwards: In 1981, the 
"other party" is the "Progressive party", of a fascist orientation and 
strong links with the colonels regime. In 1989a, pother party" is the 
independent muslim candidate at the constituency of Rodopi where the 
large majority of the Turkish-muslim minority lives. In 1989b and in 
1990 the category of "other party" covers the local and temporary 
electoral coalitions between the PA.SO.K. and the SYN. in single-deputy 
constituencies.
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CHAPTER Ills
The social psychology of inter-party behaviour: From the
genetic model of minority influence to the socio-psychological 
mechanisms of party campaigning
The assumption underlying the thesis is that socio- 
psychological theory on inter-group relations and the mechanisms of 
social influence can be applied to party communication and party 
attempts to influence the electorate. A two-layer model is 
proposed to study party interaction. The first layer concerns the 
interaction of the parties with one another during the campaigning 
and negotiation processes. The party discourse is analysed in 
terms of styles of behaviour, namely the ways in which each party 
introduces and represents itself in the field. Communication 
exchanged between parties in an effort to confront and discredit 
one another is examined in terms of strategies of influence and 
resistance. Both the styles of behaviour and the strategies of 
influence and resistance are analytical concepts taken from the 
active minority theory. Therefore, the analysis is based upon the 
fundamental distinction that was introduced by active minority 
theory, regarding minority and majority groups, which is applied in 
this study to parties. The styles of behaviour and strategies 
adopted by each party are related to a party's "power character", 
namely minority or majority.
However, party interaction is embedded within a wider socio­
political context, which conditions the relations between the 
parties. The second layer of the model concerns the socio­
political, ideological or other features that are perceived by the 
electorate to characterise a party and the ways in which these 
characteristics interfere with the organisation of inter-party 
behaviour and discourse. It is assumed that these features 
constitute a party's identity. They provide, therefore, the basis 
for a process of group/party formation as well as for a concept of 
socio-psychological identification of the individual with it.
Party identity is, therefore, a factor that influences inter-party 
behaviour and, consequently, inter-party relations.
The interaction process is inscribed within a specific socio-
cognitive system. Thus, the second layer of the model takes also
into account the social representations which prevail in a given
society at a given historical time, namely, contemporary Greece./The specific social representations that 'were mobilised in the 
party discourse are examined in order to understand better the 
meaning attributed to the specific styles of behaviour and 
strategies adopted by each party.
Our two-layered model may be represented schematically as 
follows :
Figure 1.0 
about here
The aim of this chapter is to provide the theoretical 
framework for the first layer of the model, i.e. to discuss 
concepts of active minority theory and any necessary modifications 
for their application to party behaviour. First, the analytical 
categories are presented which form the basic structure of the 
genetic model of active minority influence. These categories will 
be examined more fully within the context of party campaigning and 
post-election negotiation (chapters 3.1 & 3.2). The application of 
the categories will be investigated through examples taken from the 
empirical data on Greek party campaigning which took place in 1989- 
1990. The contribution of socio-psychological analytical
categories to a better understanding of party discourse and 
behaviour will also be discussed.
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F i g u r e  1.0 
A two-layer m odel for studying party  in te rac tion
socio/political and socio/cognitive context in which interparty relations and 
party discourse and behaviour are embedded
party (minority and majority) behaviour and discourse: 
styles of behaviour and strategies of influence and resistance that parties
address against each other
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3.1 The distinction between minority and majority groups in social 
psychology: The operationalisation of the two categories in
political reality.
The genetic model of minority influence views social reality 
as a three-dimensional field. The communication and interaction 
takes place amongst three social entities: the majority, the
minority and the population (Mugny 1982) (see figure 1.1, infra). 
These are social agents of a different character and function 
within society. The majority and the minority are the agents of 
influence and they are characterised by their effort to act upon 
the third social entity, namely the population. Their common 
feature is their direct relationship with power. The majority 
disposes of power and authority that has been legitimised by the 
population. Furthermore, it also sets the norms that are generally 
accepted within a specific society. The population follows these 
norms when engaging in social activities but it does not 
participate actively in their formation. The opinions and 
positions of the majority are established as the general rule and 
the standards of objectivity are set according to them.
Figure 1.1
c o n f l i c t
Majority group Minority group(s) j
control
relations
Social
influence
relations
Population
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The minority, on the contrary, is a social entity which is 
responsible for the phenomena of social change. It is deviant and 
in mo^t cases a conflictual agent. The minority positions do not 
possess of any de facto validity, especially when they are 
explicitly opposed to the beliefs of the majority. Indeed, the 
role of the minority is to introduce a possibility for change and 
to break any consensus regarding the status quo. An active 
minority (Moscovici 1979), i.e. a minority group which by its 
stable and consistent behaviour attempts to breakthrough the 
established norms is the social change agent par excellence.
"Il est presque certainement vrai qu'une minorité ou un groupe 
actif, face a une majorité anomique (inactive) agira comme source 
d'influence" (Moscovici 1979: 89)
The minority group is defined as the pole of influence which 
is opposite to the majority group. An active minority is, 
therefore, always understood in contrast to a majority. Thus, tiae 
support of alternative positions against those that are generally 
accepted necessarily places the minority in explicit confrontation 
with the majority. Conflict created by a deviant minority's 
position is usually the first step to exerting minority influence.
The numerical prevalence of the majority group has both a 
pragmatic and a symbolic value. On the one hand, the size of the 
majority guarantees its power. On the other hand, due to its 
numeric prevalence, the majority position is embedded within the 
so-called objectivity norm. According to this norm, which 
expresses a "common sense” attitude, what most people assert or 
believe is true, is true indeed. Truth is, therefore, the preserve 
of the majority. This attitude is based on a heuristic concept of 
consensus, according to which the idea considered valid is the idea 
that most people share (Chaiken 1986). In an influence situation, 
it is highly likely that people tend to be influenced by the 
majority message, and to deem it valid. This inevitably follows
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from such cognitive heuristics. The majority standpoint possesses 
of a superior symbolic status because of its large diffusion and 
acceptance within society. The minority position, on the other 
hand, when the objectivity norm i<s activated, is discredited by the 
mere fact that it is supported only by a limited number of 
individuals. Within this normative context, minority groups make 
themselves visible by their firm opposition to the majority.
The target/object of attempts to gain influence by both the 
majority and the minority group is the population (figure 1.1 
supra). The relationship of the majority with the population is 
based on the majority's pragmatic and symbolic authority. Deviance 
from the majority position, particularly when expressed in a public 
setting, has a social cost. Indeed, it puts in danger the validity 
of an individual's beliefs and entails a direct confrontation with 
dominant positions.
The relationship of the minority with the population concerns 
an attempt to gain social influence by a minority group which seeks 
to make its own point of view acceptable to a larger group. The 
population, however, is a highly diverse aggregation of individuals 
who share the beliefs that are generally accepted within the 
society, albeit with different levels of commitment. Indeed, there 
are various sub-groups within the population and an individual has 
multiple memberships, being active in more than one sub-group. 
Thus, in an influence process, interaction is not a series of 
linear sender-recipient relations for the multiplicity of audiences 
opens space into which a minority can manoeuvre.
Contrary to the negotiation margin that exists in a 
relationship between a minority group and the population, majority 
and minority relations tend to be absolutely and diametrically 
conflictual; the two agents of influence are *in rival positions. 
Moreover, the conflict that takes place between the majority and 
the minority also interferes with any relationship between the 
minority and the population for the latter accepts the established 
beliefs, even if it does not actively support them. Yet, the 
minority, according to active minority theory, is still able to
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exert some influence on the population. Indeed, its very minority 
position becomes its base of power, under specific conditions. 
This point will be analysed further in the following chapter.
The three-dimensional influence space can serve as an 
analytical scheme for politics. The population is identified with 
the electorate. The latter is formed by various sub-groups which 
share, to a greater or lesser degree, the ideas of one or other 
party or, indeed of no party at all. Political parties are divided 
into two categories, those of the majority and those of the 
minority. In the vocabulary of political science, the majority 
party is the one which has obtained the majority of the national 
vote or, at least, a majority in Parliament. Scholars speak, 
therefore, about single-party majority governments and coalition 
(majority) governments. The term minority party, on the other 
hand, has a double meaning. First, it refers to parties which 
express the interests and beliefs of minority groups such as those 
of an ethnic, religious, linguistic, gender or other nature; 
second, the term relates to opposition parties who are a minority 
within the electorate. Even a large party can, in this sense, be 
a minority party. On the other hand, a small party can participate 
in a coalition government becoming, thereby, one of the governing 
political agents. A small party in government implements, at least 
in part, its own programme and, thus, ceases to be a deviant and 
conflictual agent. However, such a small party holds beliefs that 
conform with the established order and, therefore, does not fall 
into the category of "active minorities" as defined in the genetic 
model. Active minorities, according to this model, adopt, by 
definition, beliefs that are against the status quo and the 
established social norms.
The theoretical distinction between majority and minority 
agents of influence that is proposed by the genetic model is 
insufficient for the field of politics. Indeed, the complexity of 
power relations that exists between political parties cannot be 
expressed in the dichotomy of majority vs. minority groups. In the
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social field, pro- and anti-normative positions can be identified 
and distinguished in a clear-cut way (Mugny and Perez 1986; 
Moscovici and Mugny 1987). In parliamentary democracies, on the 
other hand, the power position of each party is contingent upon a 
complex set of factors. On an ideological left-right spectrum, 
majority parties are those which conform to a dominant political 
orientation, whilst minority parties are those which adopt extreme 
positions. Parties which are close to the centre of the left-right 
axis (eg. Social-democrats, Socialists, Christian Democrats, 
Conservatives, Liberals) fall into the majority category of the 
genetic model with respect to their beliefs. On the contrary, 
Communist or Fascist parties, as well as other extreme leftist or 
rightist groups and movements of specific social categories (eg. 
gender or race movements or the Hunters' party) and which sustain 
extreme positions, are minority groups, according to the genetic 
model.
Leaving ideological concerns aside, office incumbency is, 
however, the most important expression of political power. Parties 
which are office-holders are thus the majority groups which possess 
and dispose of power and authority. Parties in opposition, even 
though their ideas may be convergent with those of the dominant 
political power still fall into the minority category. The "in or 
out of office" feature is linked but does not coincide with the 
size of a party.
The intersection of these elements leads to a more complex 
analytical scheme than that proposed by the genetic model of 
minority influence. In addition to the size of a group (numerical 
majority or minority) and the group's normative positions (pro- or 
anti-status quo), the incumbency of governmental office or not is 
introduced as a third criterion. Table *3.1 (infra) shows 
schematically the difference between the two theoretical 
propositions.
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Party or
group type: majority
Criteria 
for each type:
numerical
normative
govern.power
large
pro-norm.
minority incumbent challenger outsider
small large large small
anti-norm, pro-norm. pro-norm. anti-nann.
government opposition cfpositicn
The typology of parties that is generated, introduces three 
types of party. The incumbent party is one that possesses 
significant electoral force. It also possesses governmental power 
and the positions it adopts represent and follow the generally 
accepted pro-normative1 policy and/or ideological orientations.
A challenger party is an opposition party despite its large size 
and pro-normative positions.
Even though a challenger party and an outsider party share a 
common feature, i.e. their being in opposition, they also possess 
a fundamental symbolic/ideological difference. The outsider adopts 
anti-normative, extreme and conflictual positions which go beyond 
the field of acceptable divergence. The challenger, on the 
contrary, holds different but, nevertheless, convergent beliefs 
with the general norms, ideas and positions.
The Greek party system2, since the late seventies, has been 
constituted by two large (New Democracy, PA.SO.K.) and one smaller 
(K.K.E. and later SYN.) parties3. The election outcomes have 
sometimes led towards a two-and-a-half party system. However, the 
system has not functioned, up to now, as a typical two-and-a-half
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party system in which the third party plays a complementary role by 
forming coalitions with one of the larger two. The strict 
opposition policies followed by the Greek Communist Party (K.K.E.) 
and the existence of single-party majority governments account for 
the development of a bi-polar, N.D. vs. PASOK, system.
New Democracy, the major conservative party, has been in 
office for much of that period. Its high mean percentages (over 
35% of the national vote) and its long stay in office, both N.D. 
(1974-1981)4 and its conservative predecessors in the 1950s and 
1960s5, give to the party a dominant position in the Greek 
political spectrum.
The Socialist Party (PA.SO.K.), on the other hand, has also 
been a large party since 1977 6 and governed during the period 
1981-1989. During the years of the PA.SO.K. government, the 
socialist viewpoint and policies were imposed upon the State- 
apparatus.
The elections of 1989-1990 were also characterised by the 
presence of a third party, the Alliance of the Left (SYN.). The 
SYN. was constituted by the two Greek Communist parties and other 
leftist groups. Neither SYN., nor, indeed, any of its components, 
had ever been in government. The party represented the extreme 
left-wing in the Greek political spectrum. The orthodox
Communists, which were the major component of the coalition, had 
been, until 1989, closely attached to the Soviet Union, whilst its 
most moderate section, named E.AR. (United Left), had adopted a 
Euro-communist orientation, similar to that held by Berlinguer in 
Italy in the mid-to-late seventies.
According to the classification scheme presented above, the 
SYN. falls into the outsider category, while PA.SO.K. and N.D., 
before the election of June 18th, 1989, fall into the incumbent and 
challenger category respectively. However, the period under study 
evolves in an increasingly complex manner. Indeed, the electoral 
outcomes and the formation of two coalition governments have 
several implications for an attempt to classify either party into 
an analytical category. The situation is schematically represented
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in table 3.2 (see infra).
V; : . ■iyV -
y . T a b 1 e 3.2
>* :
the three elections 
studied :
June 18
party
character:
I incumbent 
! challenger 
outsider
P A .S O .K
N .D .
SYN.
Nov. 5 
N . D .
P A . S O . K .
SYN.
April 8
N . D .
P A .S O .K
SYN.
July, 2nd
government
formation
N.D.  & SYN.
Nov., 27th
government
formation
N.D.
PA.SO.K .
SYN.
The Socialists and Conservatives switched positions after the 
election of June 1989. The Socialist party lost the election and 
ceded the first position at the polls to New Democracy. The former 
incumbent party became, thus, the challenger, whilst the main 
opposition party gained a relative majority of votes and became, 
thereby, a potential office-holder. However, the electoral 
percentage that was gained by the Conservative party did not 
suffice for the formation of a single-party majority government. 
New Democracy, therefore, was forced to form a governmental 
coalition with the SYN. during the period between July and October
39
1989. The Alliance of the Left, therefore, came into office in 
spite of its small size and extreme ideology. However, the 
government of N.D. and SYN. was limited in duration and scope and 
was dissolved, as planned, in October 1989 and new elections held 
on November 5th, 1989. During the pre-election campaign, parties 
returned, in terms of programme positions and occupation of office, 
to those that had been defined by the electoral outcome of June 
18th. More specifically, the N.D. maintained its incumbent 
status7, given that it was the winning party, whilst the PA.SO.K. 
kept its challenger position, being the main opposition party. It 
is assumed that the Alliance of the Left maintained its outsider 
position despite the fact that it spent some time in government 
during this period. The Alliance of the Left does not acquire an 
incumbent power character because the governmental coalition in 
which it participated was of an explicitly provisional and 
exceptional character.
The results of the elections of November 1989 were not 
significantly different from those of the previous one. The N.D. 
and PA.SO.K. increased slightly their respective percentages and 
maintained their existing positions as incumbent and challenger as 
they were. The N.D., however, still did not possess the necessary 
electoral force to form a single-party government. The Alliance of 
the Left lost 2,2%, falling from 13,12% to 10,96% of the national 
vote, and remained, therefore, the outsider political force.
In the period between the November 1989 and February 1990, the 
three parties participated in a national unity government. It is 
assumed that during that period the Socialist party and the 
Alliance of the Left retained their challenger and outsider 
positions respectively despite their stay in office since the 
governmental coalition had an exceptional character and aimed to 
offer only a provisional administrative solution.
Finally, during the last pre-election campaign the 
classification of N.D. as the incumbent party, PA.SO.K. as the 
challenger and SYN. as the outsider remained. Moreover, the
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parties retained these positions after the elections. New 
Democracy eventually formed a single-party majority government, 
whilst PA.SO.K. became the main opposition party and SYN. 
maintained its electoral force (albeit with a small loss of 1%).
As noted the coalition of the SYN. with the Conservative party 
did not upgrade its position from an outsider to an incumbent 
party. It modified, however, its relationship with the Socialists, 
with whom SYN. entered into an explicit confrontation by the mere 
fact of its cooperation with the N.D.
The typology proposed, i.e. the incumbent, the challenger and 
the outsider party, has sought to broaden the genetic model 
analytical framework in order to take into account the 
particularities of political reality. Furthermore, the notions of 
styles and strategies of group behaviour will be introduced. The 
styles of behaviour and negotiation and the strategies of influence 
and resistance to the adversary influence constitute a set of 
fundamental conceits within the framework of active minority 
theory. These concepts are used to analyse the conflict generated 
between the majority and minority group, the ways in which each 
group handles this conflict and the implications for the image that 
people form about the minority and the majority in the given 
influence context. The next chapter will introduce styles and 
strategies of behaviour as analytical categories, how they relate 
to the concept of incumbent, challenger and outsider party, before, 
and, finally, locating them within the context ot party behaviour. 
Specific instances of party discourse will be used as examples of 
party styles of behaviour and strategies.
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3.2. The styles of behaviour and the strategies
3.2.1 Consistency as a style of behaviour of the influence
source
The genetic model of active minorities is concerned with 
factors which give a specific social group potential to influence. 
The population, which finds itself subject to a process of 
influence develops a relationship of dependence, internal or 
external (Faucheux & Moscovici 1967), with the groups which possess 
majority status. Indeed, it is this domination-dependence 
relationship which offers the majority groups the possibility to 
influence. However, numerically small and deviant groups, namely 
minorities, often succeed in introducing their ideas and in 
obtaining some influence, into the population. Thes^ groups are 
conflictual and represent an opposition to the status quo. Their 
influence is derived, according to the genetic model, from their 
conflictual character.
Conflict can be managed and even manipulated in different ways 
by a deviant group in order to obtain a stronger, weaker or 
sometimes even no effect on the beliefs of the population. The 
concept of styles of behaviour is an analytical category that was 
introduced (Faucheux & Moscovici ibid; Moscovici, Lage & 
Naffrechoux 1969) in order to investigate conflict management and 
its implications for minority and majority behaviour. Several 
styles of behaviour are distinguished as factors which affect the 
influence potential of a group: autonomy, rigidity and flexibility 
and last but most important, consistency. The term autonomy refers 
to the perception that the group- or individual-source of influence 
forms its beliefs and acts accordingly, i.e. independently of other 
people's or groups' influences. Moreover, autonomy is not a 
feature of the content of opinion of the influence source. Indeed, 
it depends on the actions or discourse of the source which reveals 
an attitude of self-confidence and self-determination, namely an 
autonomous behaviour, and, thus, has a positive effect on the
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source's ability to influence (Nemeth & Wachtler 1974).
The focus of the research will be on the consistent style of 
behaviour of a source of influence and on the rigid or flexible way 
it has of negotiating its ideas. The reasons for this selection 
are two-fold. The literature that is relevant to active minority 
influence has developed these two concepts on the basis that they 
are central for the analysis of relations between a minority, a 
majority and a population. Moreover, consistency is the first pre­
requisite for a small deviant group to infiltrate a process of 
influence; indeed, consistency is a desirable feature for large and 
powerful groups too.
Consistency is considered as an indispensable characteristic 
for a minority to place itself as a (potential) source of influence 
within a specific context. The minority must insist on its 
positions, persist and not cede to the reaction of other social 
agents in order to be recognised as a distinctive, alternative 
social agent. The coherence and stability of the minority 
responses are perceived as features of a stable behavioural 
pattern, i.e. minority consistency. Therefore, its responses, 
throughout a series of questions, need to be coherent and not 
influenced by situational or conjunctural factors. People perceive 
reality and form expectations with respect to it by linking the 
temporary and spontaneous expressions of behaviour with stable and 
recurring patterns (Heider 1958). Thus, to the extent that various 
expressions of a specific attitude during different events are 
linked to a stable and persistent background (namely the consistent 
set of positions of the minority) the distinctiveness and 
consistency which characterise these positions becomes a point of 
reference for the population. The minority position, thus, 
acquires the status of an alternative solution.
The recognition of minority ideas as a possible alternative to 
established beliefs represents an important first victory for a 
minority. Indeed, the acceptance of the established social order 
is, to a large extent, often based on little more than lack of an
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alternative. Moreover, the social order is presented as unique, 
i.e. it cannot be substituted by a different one (Asch 1959: 380- 
1). The minority, however, puts this order into question through 
the firmness of its opposition. Furthermore, the consistent 
repetition of its beliefs guarantees its firm conviction and its 
continuing adherence to a set of beliefs.
The minority needs to stick to its point of view even though 
it is opposed to the established norms and in spite of the fact 
that it is, thus, brought into explicit confrontation with the 
dominant group. Indeed, the minority's decisiveness accentuates 
the conflict because it puts forward the minority beliefs and 
positions as of an equal value to those of the majority. The 
consistent, non-random pattern of the minority response is, 
therefore, made visible and even prominent for the population.
Given that a minority position is irreconcilable with a 
majority one, it introduces a socio-cognitive dilemma for the 
population. Experimental research (Moscovici, Lage & Naffrechoux 
1969) has shown that this dilemma can cast doubt on the validity of 
an explicit rule, i.e. a rule perceived as a quasi-natural law as 
is for instance the perception of colours. The validity of this 
rule is based on a spontaneous and unanimous agreement about it 
(Moscovici, Lage & Naffrechoux ibid: 354). The insistence and
consistency of the minority in sustaining its diverging opinion, 
namely in "seeing" a different colour than the colour that the 
majority perceives, can undermine the validity of the majority 
opinion and influence the population.8 The findings of the 
Moscovici experiment support the assumption that the consistent 
style of a minority endows it with a power to influence which 
initially it does not possess because of its marginal and deviant 
position (Papastamou 1989: 272). .
Within the same line of argumentation the studies of Asch 
(1956) are reviewed and re-interpreted from a different perspective 
than that of their author (Faucheux & Moscovici 1967; Mugny 1984). 
The Asch experiment9 was said to confirm the view that individuals 
tend to comply with a majority group even when the majority
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opinions are of a manifest arbitrariness and in opposition to what 
would be called an objective judgement of the situation.
A re-examination of the Asch study, in light of consistency as 
a fundamental characteristic of a minority influence source leads, 
however, to a contradictory conclusion. The influence of the 
subjects in the Asch experiment was not due to the pressure 
exercised by a majority but to the consistent behaviour of a 
minority. The wrong judgement expressed by the group of two people 
was a deviant judgement produced by a minority. Even though not 
represented in the experimental setting, the majority of society 
would support the subject's initial correct accomplishment of the 
experimental task. The latter involved the evaluation of the length 
of lines drawn in paper. The visual perception of a natural 
dimension represents an established norm. It has the validity of 
a natural law. The judgements of the vast majority of people 
concerning space dimensions (length, width, height) are unanimous. 
For this reason the two-people group, which insisted in its 
incorrect judgements was, in fact, a minority group which succeeded 
by its persistence and stability in changing the majority responses 
with respect to the specific task. The specific circumstances of 
the experiment, i.e. isolation from the social environment and 
intense adversary propaganda in which the subject found 
him/herself, account for his/her change in attitude10. In 
conclusion, therefore, the experiment of Asch offers another 
example of the significance of a consistent style of behaviour by 
a minority group with respect to its influence potential.
Furthermore, consistent behaviour is validated on two levels, 
synchronic and diachronic (Moscovici 1976). The first level refers 
to the consistency and coherence of the responses given by the 
various members of a group. Synchronic consistency reaches its 
peak when there is unanimity within the group. The group, thus, 
shows a stable and decided attitude towards the object at stake in 
a specific interaction situation. Diachronic consistency, on the 
other hand, guarantees the stability of the group and the firm and
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resolute support of its beliefs in the course of time, as well as 
under different sets of circumstances.
The distinction between the two expressions of consistency 
indicates that consistency has not a value per se as a style of 
behaviour of a source of influence because its power is activated 
only when it becomes salient or prominent as a feature of the 
attitude of the source of influence. The actual features of 
behaviour can vary, to a certain extent, and yet still enhance the 
perception that the group behaviour possesses a stable and 
congruous character. In fact, the mere repetition of a group's 
beliefs and its insistence upon giving exactly the same responses 
under different circumstances is not the best expression of 
consistent behaviour. On the contrary, a certain variation of the 
positions adopted, structured, however, around the same organising 
principle and in agreement with each other, leads to a clearer 
perception of a group's consistent attitude (Nemeth, Swedlund & 
Kanki 1974). The minority group, therefore, highlights the focal 
point of its influence attempts for it does not stick to a 
mechanic, imitative repetition of its beliefs. Indeed, the various 
instances of a minority discourse and action are the means by which 
it communicates its ideas. Its behaviour being a means to 
communicate the content of its specific beliefs and attitudes. Its 
consistent, although non-repetitive behaviour, shows its 
responsiveness to situational elements which, however, do not 
modify its positions. Thus, the minority group presents itself not 
only as a supporter of deviant opinion but also as an exemplary 
agent of socially divergent attitudes11. The perception of the 
minority as an autonomous, self-confident agent of influence, 
together with its consistent style of behaviour, result in a 
mutually reinforcing impact (Nemeth & Wachtler 1973).
Furthermore, the consistent style of behaviour of a group 
acquires major significance in an influence situation in which a 
decision has to be made and the population seeks for a group that 
adopts a lasting and firm position (Moscovici 1979). In this
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sense, consistency and stability are not notions alien to the 
literature on party behaviour. This is particularly so with 
respect to behaviour in party campaigning. Party credibility 
before an electoral contest is largely a function of the popular 
perception of its former behaviour and of its programme positions 
as being consistent and coherent. Indeed, voters seem to reward 
parties whose positions are consistent over time and whose pre­
election promises are not forgotten when they take office (Downs 
1957). Consistency is related also to the size and power character 
of a party. A party that has been in office or which has been a 
significant electoral force or has had a long political tradition 
may derive its credentials from various pragmatic and symbolic 
resources. However, a relatively new, small or extreme party is 
dependent on the perception of its behaviour in pre-election 
campaigning alone, given that its resources from the past are 
limited. On the other hand, the mere existence of a political past 
poses several constraints on the ability of a party to manoeuvre. 
A slight change in its policy positions or ideology risks being 
perceived as a sign of inconsistency. The manoeuvring of small or 
new parties is, therefore, easier as the party possesses a larger 
margin of acceptable variation (Mauser 1983). These observations 
are in agreement with the findings of socio-psychological research 
on the meaning of consistent behaviour in processes of influence. 
The incumbent or challenger type of party possess symbolic and 
pragmatic power which makes the principles that organise their 
positions more visible than those of outsider parties. A large 
part of the electorate is likely to have been concerned with the 
policy positions of a large party which is a potential power 
incumbent. Thus, recent policy choices of the party are often 
compared and tested against its earlier ideas. Nevertheless, 
outsider parties also need to present a stable and coherent set of 
positions. The difference lies in the fact that a consistent style 
of behaviour by an outsider may concentrate more on a synchronic 
level than on a diachronic, as its political past is relatively 
short and/or a limited number of voters have been concerned with
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its programme positions.
Social interaction takes place within a specific social field 
that is structured by the power relationships between various 
groups that are active at a specific point in time. Collective 
memory and experience, as well as references to shared values and 
symbols organise the understanding of inter-group relations and 
communications. Politics, as an important expression of social 
life, is also situated within such a context of social 
representations12. Furthermore, these condition the perception and 
understanding of party behaviour in a specific way making it a 
salient feature amidst alternatives. Thus the consistent behaviour 
of a political party is embedded in the social environment in which 
party campaigning and interaction between parties take place. Not 
surprisingly, a perception of consistency is contingent upon a 
normative context being salient in a specific environment at a 
given point in time. Stable and divergent behaviour by a social 
group or party can be interpreted as being consistent and coherent 
or as stubborn and narrow-minded. The position the party sustains 
may be understood as an alternative solution or as deviant and 
abnormal behaviour which is in complete disaccord with social 
reality.
The interpretation of a minority opinion in terms of deviance 
or, in contrast, in terms of originality has been proved to alter 
significantly the influence potential of the minority group (Mugny, 
Rilliet & Papastamou 1981; Mugny 1983). Studies on active minority 
influence change the normative context prevailing in the 
experimental situation by activating a specific norm for the 
evaluation of divergent positions. This being a norm of deviance 
or of originality. Furthermore, the argumentation used to support 
an opinion is also manipulated in these experiments. References to 
arguments of a conflictual nature, such as socio-political and 
class interests, which accentuate the confrontation between a 
majority and a minority group, are alternated with arguments based 
on universal values; humanistic principles for instance, around
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which there is general consensus13 (Mugny, Kaiser & Papastamou 
1983). Both socio-political and humanistic types of argumentation 
are used to support one and the same position. These changes in 
the normative context and in the type of argumentation used in the 
experiment have an impact on the type of influence, i.e. direct or 
indirect14, exerted on the subjects who participated in the 
experiment. Indeed, the degree of conflict intensity perceived, 
and the legitimate character of the minority positions recognised 
by the population, vary as a function of the values and norms 
activated.
The phenomenon of dissimilar or even antithetic 
interpretations of a position or attitude can be observed in 
politics. The extreme or moderate character of a policy depends, 
to a considerable degree, upon which party supports a specific 
policy. Indeed, the power position of a party acts as a distorting 
lens through which one or other feature of a policy issue is 
selectively emphasised. Furthermore, the argumentation a party 
uses to put forward its position and the ideological 
preconstructions embodied in it, affect the positive or negative 
representation that an electorate forms about a specific policy 
issue. An example of party behaviour taken from the period 
analysed serves to highlight the functioning of such normative 
contexts, which condition the perception of consistency as a 
feature of the behaviour of a specific party.
The example chosen concerns the outsiders of the Greek party 
system, namely the Alliance of the Left (SYN.), and its choice to 
support a temporary coalition government, in conjunction with the 
Conservative party (N.D.) in the summer of 1989 instead of forming 
a long-term governmental coalition with the Socialist party 
(PA.SO.K.).
The Socialist party maintained that the acquiescence of SYN to 
a governmental coalition of the "wider Left" was required by the 
SYN.'s political tradition and conformed with the popular will 
which "had given an absolute majority of votes to the forces of the 
Left”. Moreover, the Socialists stressed that the consent of SYN.
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to this "wider Left government" would be a legitimate action, 
consistent with the party's ideology. The Conservatives, on the 
contrary, evaluated this very same attitude as a "betrayal of the 
principles of Greek parliamentary democracy" and "proof of 
compliance with the immoral and dishonest attitude of the departing 
government of shame". Such a "lack of courage", they asserted, 
would be "inconsistent with the promise that SYN. had given before 
the elections" and "it would be politically unjust" because "it 
would ignore the will of the Greek people, as was expressed by the 
national vote of June, 18th". The participation of SYN. in a long­
term governmental coalition with the Socialists was subject to a 
range of contradictory interpretations that were based on competing 
normative contexts. These included justice vs. criminality, law 
and order vs. disorder, and transparency and popular control of 
government vs. authoritarian and dishonest practices on the part of 
State authorities. The same behaviour was simultaneously an 
ideologically consistent, lawful and courageous strategy and an 
inconsistent behaviour, deviant from the political norms of Greek 
society.
As if it were by means of analogy, the ultimate decision made 
by SYN. to support, at least for a limited period, a governmental 
coalition formed by the Conservatives, was judged as being 
"inconsistent", "politically dishonest", "illegitimate" and "an act 
of betrayal" by the Socialist party. Whilst, according to the N.D. 
(Conservatives), it was "an act of courage", "a moral obligation 
that the SYN. had to fulfil" and "respectful to the principles of 
democratic rule". The contrast between consistency and loyalty to 
the democratic rule vs. dishonesty and deviance served again to 
highlight competing interpretations of one and the same attitude.
The interest of the Alliance of the Left was to render more 
prominent the norms that activated a positive evaluation and 
justification of whichever decision they eventually took. The line 
of argumentation stressed, therefore, by the Alliance of the Left 
(SYN.) was, briefly, the following: the main political task of the 
Parliament at that moment was to investigate the scandals and to
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prosecute those public officials and ministers who were found 
guilty. Only by taking this indispensable first step would Greece 
escape from the governmental crisis. Moreover, the ideal agent for 
such "a nationally significant task" was a national unity 
government which possessed as large an electoral base as possible. 
The prospect of such a three- or more- party government was, 
however, prevented by the firm decision of the Socialists not to 
participate in any governmental coalition with the Conservative 
party. The Socialists countered the national unity government 
proposal with a demand for a stable governmental coalition that 
possessed long-term objectives that were based on a set of common 
policies. It is worth noting that the promotion of stability was 
paramount in the rigid negotiation line that was adopted by the 
Socialists. The Conservatives had not been very fond of the idea 
of a national unity government themselves emphasising thexr 
resentment towards the "immoral and corrupted Socialists". Under 
these circumstances, SYN. failed to overcome the dilemma through 
the introduction of a third possible choice. The Alliance of the 
Left, therefore, had to (and could only) justify its eventual 
choice as being one that was between two evils it chose the lesser 
one, thereby embedding itself within the appropriate normative 
context.
The prominence of a normative context is contingent upon the 
power position of a party that endorses it. Besides, the 
composition of the population to which the normative appeals are 
addressed is also highly relevant. The population concerned in 
this example, i.e. the electorate, was not homogeneous. Socio­
political predispositions, ideologies, individual interests and 
situational or other factors organised the party preferences of the 
voters and conditioned their responses to political norms, values 
and ideologies. Moreover, the symbolic power and pragmatic 
resources that SYN. possessed in order to impose its interpretation 
were limited. Indeed, its resources were quantitatively and 
qualitatively inferior to those of either of its opponents, 
PA.SO.K. and New Democracy.
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On the other hand, the effect of the appeals launched by each 
of the three parties was differentiated. The supporters of the 
Socialist, Communist or other leftist parties were sensitive to 
references about a "wider Left government" and shared, at least to 
a certain extent, a reluctance at the prospect of a coalition with 
the right-wing party. The assertion, put forward by the 
Socialists, that SYN. would commit "an act of betrayal" if it 
allied with the Conservative party was a strong impulse amongst the 
supporters of the Left. Its inconsistency with respect to the 
political and ideological tradition of the Communist and leftist 
parties was felt in those quarters to be more pronounced than the 
inconsistency perceived if SYN. allied with the Socialists. This 
being in spite of the fact that the former had been accusing the 
latter of mismanagement and public fraud. In contrast, it is 
likely trat conservative voters attached greater importance to the 
norms of justice and honest practices in governing rather than to 
any perceived need for ideological consistency with the values and 
beliefs of the Left. Any appeal to a feeling of a shared common 
super-ordinate identity amongst "the wider Left", and to a common 
political tradition, was meaningless for a right-wing voter and its 
effect on him/her (the voter) was practically nil.
The Alliance of the Left (SYN.) chose to adhere to a 
provisional coalition government, working in conjunction with New 
Democracy. The normative context which was mobilised to support 
and legitimate this decision was two-fold. On the one hand, they
referred to the principles of democratic governing, i.e. the
popular control of those occupying public offices. On the other
hand, they also stressed the courage and autonomy of parties and 
politicians who dared make choices outside the political 
mainstream. The appeal to the values of democratic governing was 
ideologically neutral and, therefore, capable of being perceived 
and understood by the whole electorate. The interpretation, 
however, of SYN.'s choice, in terms of realism and autonomy,
created a confrontation between an autonomous attitude, on the one 
hand, and the loyalty to its socio-political background, on the
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other. Indeed, the latter had been particularly stressed by the 
Socialists in what was a constant and intensive manner. The common 
political history and ideals of the leftist parties and the 
significance of the Right-Left cleavage might have made the norm of 
political autonomy negligible.
This account of the normative context and its resonance with 
specific parts of the Greek electorate was confirmed by the 
electoral results of November 5th, 198915. The Alliance of the 
Left lost approx. 2 per cent, i.e. 20 per cent of its electoral 
force. Whilst there is no survey evidence that this loss was due 
to its participation in the coalition government, that executive 
caused the withdrawal of a large number of members of the Communist 
party nad of the Communist youth organisation (K.N.E.) from the 
Alliance of the Left. If the decision of SYN. had been perceived 
in terms of consistency and autonomy by the members/supporters 
ofthe party its percentage would not have decreased further.
The example has been presented in order to underline the role 
played by normative contexts with respect to the perception of 
consistency in party behaviour. The validity of a normative 
context depends on the source that promotes it and also on the 
population to whom it is addressed. This link between the 
perception of consistency and the character of its source confirms 
that a more or less consistent style of behaviour possesses no 
validity as such. It is contingent upon the perception held of it 
by the population at large, i.e. the electorate. For this reason, 
the measurement of a level of consistency of the behaviour of a 
party should look at the representation of behaviour as consistent 
or inconsistent rather than at its actual 'objectively’ consistent 
character. To that end, this study uses the party discourse in the 
partisan press as the main source of information about the party 
behaviour. The analysis of the party discourse in terms of 
consistency concerns the party's judgements and its evaluation of 
its own actions. The party states its positions and asserts that 
they are stable, coherent, resolute or persistent or, on the
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contrary, unstable, inconsistent or contradictory. The evaluation 
of party behaviour as consistent or inconsistent is based on 
statements and judgements that are inherent in the party discourse. 
The analyst does not seek to evaluate the degree to which the party 
maintains its programme positions or is consistent and coherent 
within its overall policies; this is not the object of this study. 
The operationalisation of consistency as an analytical category, 
bears upon the party discourse through the press, with regard to 
its own behaviour. Therefore, the vocabulary and the expressions 
used in newspaper articles, the adjectives which characterise the 
behaviour and the overall representation of a specific behaviour 
within each paragraph of the text will be examined.
In conclusion, the fact that the Alliance of the Left as an 
outsider party was unsuccessful in imposing its opinion as an 
alternative solution does not imply that political outsiders and 
social minorities will always be losers. Social change and 
innovation does take place but not always by means of a totally 
conflictual and deviant attitude for the fundamental element of 
consistency, diachronic and/or synchronic, in minority behaviour is 
not sufficient for a minority position to be accepted. On the 
other hand, minority groups and outsider parties have scarce 
resources to control the normative interpretations of their 
actions. They possess, however, the possibility of creating 
conflict and, at the same time, of negotiating a resolution to this 
conflict. The outsider deviant group breaks the majority rule and 
starts a negotiation process with the population in order to make 
the latter recognise, if not actually accept and adopt its beliefs. 
It was Gabriel Mugny (1975) who first suggested the concept of the 
style of negotiation of conflict by a minority. Moreover, the new 
concept serves to distinguish the handling of a conflict against a 
majority, from the handling of a conflict with a population with 
which negotiations are to take place. This implies that minority 
consistency can inflict a decisive rupture in majority/population
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relations.
3.2.2 Negotiating the conflict: rigidity and flexibility
The concept of conflict is used as a heuristic notion to 
indicate the difference between the social role of a majority and 
a minority. The majority group represents the established order of 
things and the generally accepted rules and norms. Furthermore, a 
large part of the population is supposed to adopt the status quo 
and to conform with it. Hence, the relations between the 
population and the majority group are characterised by regularity 
and conformity. Conversely, the relationships of a minority group 
with other socxal entities are characterised by their conflictual 
nature. The majority cannot ignore the existence of the minority 
because the latter disturbs the regular function of the established 
order. It has either to absorb the minority, by forcing it to re­
align to the norms or to resolve the inherent conflict, in some 
way.
The rupture of any relationship between a majority and a 
minority introduces conflict and potentially breaks any relations 
that may exist between a minority and that part of the population 
that agrees with the majority ideas. The population to a large 
extent, shares th® majority beliefs even if it does not participate 
actively in their formation and establishment (Moscovici 1979). In 
the event that a conflict introduced by a minority is extremely 
intense, most of the population will tend to resolve it through a 
complete rejection of minority positions. Furthermore, the socio- 
psychological shock that people suffer because of a conflict will 
inevitably lead to a total block of any communication with a 
minority. Therefore, a minority has to negotiate its position with 
a population, so that the initial conflict will be settled by 
negotiation and, therefore, offer the former an influence "pay­
off" .
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This conceptualisation of the relationship between majority, 
minority and population can be useful with respect to inter-party 
and party-electorate relationships during pre-election campaigning. 
Parties adopt stable positions that are conflictual, to a greater 
or lesser extent, with one another. They tend to be reluctant to 
negotiate their programme positions, at least before the elections. 
Most often, opposition parties attack the government for the 
policies it has implemented. The opposition parties, namely the 
challenger and the outsider stick to their own positions so that 
the latter are perceived as alternative solutions to the relevant 
policy issues. They must not comply with compromises proposed by 
the governmental party16, otherwise they lose the possibility to 
influence the electorate in favour of their own position.
The incumbent party has a double interest to resolve the 
conflict on a policy issue. On the one hand, it seeks to ensure 
the acceptance and implementation of the measure(s) it has taken. 
On the other hand, an attenuation and absorption of a conflictual 
position tends to cancel the influence potential of its opponents 
and, thereby, strengthens the power position of the incumbent 
party.
During a pre-election period, relations between the incumbent 
and the challenger or outsider parties are highly conflictual and 
competitive. Indeed, for the challenger and the outsider seek to 
introduce their programme as a plausible and also preferable 
alternative to that of the previous government. However, a major 
part of the electorate is probably in favour of the governmental 
policies and some part is against them. Given that the incumbent 
party is, by definition, a large party with an electoral percentage 
often close to fifty per cent17, the challenger and the outsider 
are also interested in influencing that part of the electorate 
which agrees with and adopts governmental choices. The challenger 
introduces positions and ideas which are familiar to the 
electorate18. As a consequence, challenger beliefs tend to be 
moderate and conform with the generally accepted rules and norms. 
Therefore, the conflict Detween a challenger and the voters who
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support the incumbent party is of a moderate: nature. This enables 
the challenger to possess a relatively large degree of negotiation 
leverage19. On the contrary, the ideas of the outsider party are 
by definition extreme, anti-normative and deviant. Their 
conflictual character is their main characteristic. Their 
perception as a plausible alternative is to a large extent 
contingent upon successful negotiations with the voters who, at 
their vast majority, support the incumbent or the challenger party. 
By means of its negotiation style, an outsider party, just like a 
minority group, has to make patently clear its consistent but 
pluralistic and open-minded attitude.
The significance of the negotiation style is also supported by 
spatial models of party-competition. Political parties select 
their strategies in an issue-space with the aim of attracting 
electoral support. Moreover, a party programme consists of stands 
on issues of concern to voters. These positions are classified, 
not only along an ideological dimension (liberal-conservative), but 
also along a dimension of political style (extremist-moderate). 
New and small parties which aim to introduce new issues and/or new 
ideas onto the public agenda not only need to adopt a credible, 
stable and self-confident position but also to show a certain 
degree of flexibility.
The relationship between a minority group and a population is 
best analysed in terms of negotiation styles, namely in terms of 
rigid or flexible behaviour of a minority group towards that same 
population. The notion of styles of negotiation refers to the 
different ways of supporting one and the same opinion. Negotiation 
styles may vary, however, the opinion advocated remains unchanged 
(Mugny 1975). A rigid style in discussing an argument presents the 
latter as part of a strictly organised set of ideas and focuses on 
the repetition of an affirmative, uni-dimensional proposition 
(Papastamou 1989: 459). Rigidity stresses the unwillingness of a 
group sustaining a specific position to take into account the 
opposite point of view. A flexible style of behaviour, on the
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contrary, implies the good will of the rource of an argument to 
discuss a problem and identify points of dispute. A position can 
then be negotiated, at least to the extent that underlying values 
and ideas are respected and any new position is consistent with 
them.
The style of negotiation that an influence source adopts 
affects its influence potential. Experimental research (Mugny 
1975) has demonstrated that the style of behaviour remaining equal, 
i.e. consistent, it is the style of negotiation that facilitates or 
impedes its ability to influence. Indeed, Mugny20 (Mugny ibid.) 
demonstrated that when a minority group adopted a rigid style and 
rejected totally a position to which the population could be in 
favour of, instead of bringing the subjects closer to its opinion, 
it ended up creating the opposite tendency, a reaction that was 
probably caused by the absolute character of its stance. Indeed, 
the rigid version of the minority argumentation indicated that the 
socio-cognitive universe of the minority was organised in a 
monolithic way. Therefore, positions and arguments which were not 
derived directly from it were unacceptable. Conversely, when the 
minority expressed its beliefs in a subtle and flexible manner, it 
obtained some influence on the subject. The minority maintained 
the same anti-systemic attitude but adopted a less rigid viewpoint. 
Furthermore, the minority recognised a common basis for agreement 
and a mutual approach with the population.21
The influence effect produced by a minority is related to the 
image that a population forms with respect to a minority source 
(Ricateau 1970-71 )22. A rigid attitude adopted by a minority and 
the block on any communication that results from a total rejection 
of an opinion favoured by a population, affepts the perception of 
a minority's consistency (Mugny & Papastamou 1984). Thus, the 
perception of consistency is intertwined with the perception of 
rigidity (or flexibility) .23 Not only is a minority then
perceived as intolerant and authoritarian but it is also perceived 
as being less determined, less rational and less self-assured. The
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coirelation between the two dimensions becomes higher as the 
rigidity becomes more salient. The consistency of the minority is 
then distorted by the lens of rigidity. Indeed, the stable 
behaviour of a minority becomes an indication of its narrow-minded 
and obstinate viewpoint. What initially was perceived as self- 
confidence and determination is then considered as arrogance and 
authoritarianism. Conversely, when a flexible and cooperative 
attitude is adopted, the consistency of a source is perceived as 
being intact.
The misrepresentation of a minority caused by its rigid 
attitude is an indication of the close relation between the 
cognitive and the relational aspects of the influence process. At 
a cognitive level, a part of the population recognises the 
consistency and coherence of a minority's positions and is, 
implicitly or explicitly, affected by them. However, a refusal to 
negotiate by a minority accentuates a confrontation between itself 
and a population. The object of the influence is then translated 
into a dispute between two groups, a minority or its 
representatives (the spokesman in the experiment) and a population, 
namely the specific individuals concerned in the given instance. 
The relational aspect of influence becomes therefore more prevalent 
and the inherent dynamic usually leads to a dead end. Under these 
circumstances, the substance of the matter at stake is neglected, 
at least in relative terms. In its stead, a negative
representation of a minority group prevails and leads to a 
significant decrease in minority influence.
The question of rigid or flexible attitudes is posed also for
majority groups. The difference, however, with respect to
minorities is that they do not need a conflict to make their
position visible in the social field for a majority position is
already prevalent. The symbolic and pragmatic authority of a 
majority source is the credentials for such a position. The more 
or less effective control of the social field by a majority group
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is one of the fundamental means that a majority uses to impose its 
rule. Nevertheless, the introduction of conflict by a minority 
group obliges the majority to deal with such an occurrence. The 
majority can afford a refuse to negotiate and reject a minority 
position. When, however, the minority is persistent, it may be in 
a majority's interest to seek a compromise so that the minority 
opinion is integrated within a system. A majority possesses a 
large margin of manoeuvre ability between more or less rigid/ 
flexible attitudes. The success of its negotiating style, however, 
depends on the social representations that are activated and images 
of a majority and of a minority group that are formed by a 
population.
The last observation is particularly relevant to party 
campaigning. An incumbent party has an interest in discrediting 
its adversaries by embracing their beliefs to the extent that this 
does not undermine its own credibility. Specific circumstances 
often demand that an incumbent party shows itself intolerant to 
divergent positions. Furthermore, an incumbent party possesses 
privileged access to financial resources, employment opportunities, 
status positions and the mechanism of the State in order to render 
its position effective. It can, thus, afford not to take into 
account the opinion of the others. However, sometimes an incumbent 
party that adopts a moderate and understanding style of behaviour 
is closer to the ideal of a just and 'objective' governing party 
which can be relied upon to look after the "collective good", than 
if it demonstrated a fanatic and/or intolerant behaviour.
It has also been argued that outsider and challenger parties 
need to delineate their position and heighten the profile of their 
consistent and distinct characters. To that end, they seek to 
communicate with the electorate in order to pass their message on. 
To do this, they must in turn sustain their positions in more (the 
outsiders) or less (the challengers) flexible ways. Styles of 
negotiating, however, have no substance per se for their effects 
depend largely on relations between the parties and the symbolic-
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ideological structure of a political field. The degree of 
flexibility that might be considered suitable for an outsider or 
for a challenger under each set of circumstances is, therefore, 
contingent upon the social representations which organise the image 
of a party.
Moreover, each party carries with it a set of political and 
ideological "givens" that are derived from a party's own past and 
tradition and which organise the image of a party. Therefore, the 
effects of a party's flexible or rigid behaviour on the perception 
of its image varies. A Communist party, for instance, in a Western 
European parliamentary democracy (like Greece) is often perceived 
as intrinsically dogmatic and authoritarian. For that party, a 
rigid negotiating style may be useless, if not disastrous, because 
it casts doubt on it.:» consistency and creates a perception of 
narrow-mindedness. Besides, when an electorate is divided into 
polarised groups, any outsider party runs the danger of being 
discriminated against beforehand with the result that its 
consistency will be perceived as rigidity. However, when the party 
system is not characterised by clear-cut distinctions between the 
parties, an outsider party possesses a larger leverage within which 
to manage its conflictual disposition. Negotiating conditions are 
somewhat different for challenger parties. They can organise their 
behaviour according to the specific conditions and issues they are 
confronted with. Moreover, their relatively established position 
allows for a certain degree of closeness and a rejection of the 
beliefs of opponents.
In conclusion, perception of the behaviour of a challenger or 
an outsider party is conditioned by the interaction between party 
behaviour and the social representations that organise a party's 
image prior to an interaction situation. There is, however, a 
reciprocal effect: social representations affect the perception of 
a party's behaviour but also party behaviour may cause a change in 
a party's image.
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The evaluation of a party's behaviour, as represented in its 
discourse through the press, as either flexible or rigid, is based 
on the particular linguistic elements that might be found in the 
text. Such elements as the use of expressions which have an 
absolute meaning and which bear on dogmatic principles, tend to 
create impermeable barriers between one idea and another or 
emphasise a party's positions. Statements like "It is absolutely 
indispensable..", "It is unacceptable.. " or "We will never concede 
to..." are indicative of this phenomenon. The self-attribution of 
dogmatic behaviour and explicit reference to authority to justify 
a party's beliefs are also clear instances of rigid behaviour. 
Conversely, the fact that a party embodies its opinions in a 
discourse which concerns general values, democracy, the good of the 
nation or economic and cultural development, for instance, is 
considered as an instance of flexible behaviour. The explicit or 
implicit acceptance of negotiation and the recognition of the 
positions of the opponent as reasonable ones (as well as statements 
of self-critique) are regarded as signs of an open-minded and 
understanding attitude.
3.2.3 The strategies of influence and of resistance to the
influence of the opponent
The application of concepts such as consistent or inconsistent 
styles of behaviour and flexible or rigid styles of negotiating is 
the first step towards an analysis of party behaviour. Styles of 
behaviour and negotiating are related to the self-representation of 
a group which enters an interaction process and seeks to a degree 
of influence. A political party enters the campaigning field as a 
result of its behaviour, namely through the introduction, 
maintenance and negotiation of a set of distinct positions. 
However, an influence process also involves confrontation between 
competing groups/sources of influence. More specifically, a pre­
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election campaign or post-election negotiation carries with it the 
implication that each party must confront its opponents and if 
possible eliminate their influence potential. The study of 
communications and confrontations between parties during 
campaigning is based upon the concept of strategies of influence, 
as well as strategies of resistance to the influence of opponents. 
In the pre-election period the role of these strategies is to 
enhance the electoral power of a party and discredit rivals. 
However, during the post-election bargaining for the formation of 
a governmental coalition, strategies are used to undermine the 
opponents' position and enhance its own. Conversely, they can be 
used to facilitate or impede the formation of a coalition.
The strategies analysed here have been originally developed 
within the theoretical framework of the genetic model of minority 
influence. The strategies that were initially defined and studied 
were three-fold: categorisation, psychologisation and denial. This 
study will look at the applicability of these three strategies to 
party campaigning. In addition, a new strategy entitled 
"affirmation" will be introduced. The analytical purpose of 
affirmation is distinct but, nevertheless, complementary to those 
of the other three strategies.
3.2.3. a) The perception of category membership as a variable 
interfering in the influence process: Categorisation as 
a strategy against the influence of opponents
The influence process takes place within a specific social and 
political structure. The study of the influence potential of a 
social group or of a political party implies an investigation of 
the process of social categorisation. In other words, the 
classification of the individuals-members of a specific society as 
members of specific entities called 'social groups' or 
'categories'. All social units24 which take part in an influence 
process are perceived to be members of distinct social groups.
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Moreover, the formation of such group-categories is primarily based 
on the shared perceptions of two or more individuals that they 
themselves are members of the same social group or category (Turner 
1982: 15). Group membership, in this sense, concerns the
psychological, rather than the formal, institutional conditions of 
group formation. Awareness of membership to a group is a necessary 
and minimal condition for a group to be formed (Turner ibid.: 27).
The distinction between social groups or categories has 
psychological effects concerning mutual perception between the 
groups. More specifically, categorisation involves an illusory 
group-behaviour correlation which, in general terms, leads to an 
exaggeration of differences in beliefs between members and non­
members of a group.
"Results from the frequency estimation measure provide the clearest 
evidence that perceived group-behaviour correlations are influenced 
by the social percelver’s group membership. Unaffiliated subjects 
perceived illusory correlations that associated the minority group 
with infrequent, and hence distinctive, behaviours. Subjects who 
were assigned to a group perceived illusory correlations that 
favoured their own group, regardless of whether they were members of 
the majority of the minority group." (Schaller 1991: 33)
Furthermore, categorisation promotes an overestimation of any 
similarities that may exist among the members of the same group 
(Tajfel & Wilkes 1963; Tajfei, Flament, Billig & Bundy 1971; Turner 
1980; Schaller 1991). There is a growing body of literature on the 
effects of categorisation on inter-group bias. The question 
addressed here, however, concerns mainly how individuals structure 
a perception of themselves and others by means of relatively 
abstract social categories and organise their social behaviour 
accordingly. *
Therefore, the categorisation of the political continuum, at 
least in terms of parties as separate political groups influences 
the cognitive elaboration of a party's positions and also the 
voter's affective and evaluative orientations towards a party.
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Furthermore, the perception of a party as a separate and distinct 
political unit is based upon a set of political, ideological and 
symbolic elements. These elements are regarded as categorical 
attributes because they entail the positioning of a party along 
certain socio-political dimensions which, in turn, relate to broad 
political categories. A party is identified as a specific 
socialist or conservative party, the PA.SO.K. or the N.D. for 
example, a party of the leader X or Z, eg. the supporters of 
Mr.Papandreou or Mr.Mitsotakis. A party may also be classified as 
right- or left-wing, democratic or authoritarian, an ideology-based 
or catch-all party as well as along several other socio-political 
lines. Moreover, an electorate is usually aware of any specific 
features that have been assigned to each party. A correlation is 
then perceived to exist between these features and a party's 
programme. The messages of an incumbent, challenger or outsider 
party are mediated by the category features that are associated 
with it and, in particular, by those features which have become 
prominent within the pre-election campaigning and post-election 
negotiations.
The access of a source of influence to a target-population can 
be blocked by stressing categorisations which should be judged as 
negative and derogatory in the social field. Thus, the 
categorisation strategy can have a negative impact on the influence 
potential of a small party which suffers from low symbolic status 
and limited power. Clearly, an incumbent party and, to a certain 
extent a challenger one, are in an advantageous position with 
respect to the categorising process because of their symbolically 
dominant position and their large material resources.
The structure of a social space is more complex than a simple 
dichotomy between pro- and anti-normative groups or normal and 
abnormal ones, 'goodies' and 'baddies' so to speak. Social actors 
are subject to multiple and possibly overlapping categorisations 
and so, indeed, is the population. Categorisations may be of a 
different hierarchical order, group-specific or more general, even
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super-ordinate in their nature. The same party, for example, was 
perceived as the supporters of Mr.Papandreou, as PA.SO.K., as a 
Socialist party, as a left-wing party and as a democratic party. 
The category with which the party was associated being broadened on 
each occasion. Several attempts have been made within the field of 
political science to define a number of axes along which political 
parties can be classified (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Regardless of 
which axes represent political reality most cogently, the only 
conclusion that can be drawn is that parties are inevitably subject 
to "crossed categorisation".2S Such a finding has important 
implications for the understanding of the functioning of a 
categorisation strategy within party competition. Indeed, a number 
of different categorical memberships are available for each party 
as weapon with which to discriminate against opponents. The 
emphasis assigned to one or other dimension of the party character 
is, therefore, based upon the extremity of its positions, its 
progressive or conservative character, its more or less democratic 
nature, the economic and social profile of the voters of the party 
or the party's local or national character. Indeed, all are 
factors which can affect the positive or negative image associated 
with the party.
Furthermore, categorisation takes place within an already 
structured social and political environment. Dominant groups 
and/or incumbent parties establish their view of social reality by 
assigning importance to category features which naturally privilege 
themselves. Nonetheless, given the multiple categorisations that 
organise political reality, an outsider party may introduce an 
alternative categorisation dimension which actually renders its 
image more positive. An outsider party can accentuate, for 
example, meritocracy as a governing principle as opposed to 
clientelistic practices in public administration or the internal 
democratic organisation of a party vs. parties based on little more 
than a leadership's 'one man show'.
On the other hand, re-categorisation is possible and may, 
indeed, reduce inter-group bias. For example, a number of
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individuals who have been persuaded that they belong to two 
separate and distinct groups may be re-categorised as a single 
super-ordinate group. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that 
the introduction of common one-group membership induces change in 
the patterns of behaviour amongst the individuals-members of two 
groups (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell & Dovidio 1989). The same 
strategy, namely the introduction of a super-ordinate 
categorisation (which brings together two formerly separated 
groups) may also function in a party competition scenario. An 
outsider left-wing party may induce a change in how it is 
represented as a marginal extreme leftist party merely through the 
introduction of a different categorisation dimension, as an 
egalitarian party for instance. An incumbent socialist party may, 
however, re-categorise the political field characterising a small 
leftist party as dogmatic or unrealistic and, in contrast, promote 
its own image as an open-minded, realistic and successful party. 
The categorisation strategy is, therefore, an important weapon in 
the hands of all parties and which through the manipulation of 
features which identify a category and which organise political 
reality, can improve their social image. As a consequence, they 
increase their influence.
The relationship between categorisation and social or 
political influence is mediated by the behaviour of the influence 
source. A strategy of categorisation may be efficient when 
addressed against minority groups or small and marginal parties, 
given the low status of such groups. This does not imply thaL the 
effect of categorisation is automatic, however. Indeed, the impact 
of categorisation is contingent upon the styles of behaviour of a 
categorised minority group. The latter can get its message 
through, even if that same message is attributed as having 
derogatory category features. Furthermore, socio-psychological 
studies have proved that minority groups which share a common 
category feature with the population can afford a rigid and 
aggressive behaviour for that will eventually lead to the
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acceptance of beliefs that had, hitherto, been rejected (Mugny G, 
Perez J A, Kaiser C & Papastamou S 1984). By way of an analogy, an 
extreme leftist party may adopt a rigid style of behaviour towards 
voters with a left-wing orientation while espousing a more flexible 
attitude towards conservative voters. In the first case, its 
sharing a common feature as "left-wing" may render its intransigent 
behaviour more efficient. However, with respect to right-wing 
voters, a mild and moderate behaviour might help the party 
communicate beliefs and may, therefore, increase the party's 
influence potential.
In brief, categorisation can be used by a group or political 
party both as a powerful strategy of influence and as an efficient 
resistance towards the adversary groups. Furthermore,
categorisation has a number of different expressions within party 
discourse, at least within the context of party campaigning and 
bargaining. The operationalisation of the concept is based upon the 
detection of expressions which can make appeal to one or other 
social or political feature. The reference to specific or general 
social and political groups and the attribution of social or 
political characteristics to the allied or opponent party are the 
main indications of a categorisation strategy.
Instances of categorisation within party discourse are 
numerous and they have appeared on various occasions. In news 
reports, the reference to the different categorical memberships of 
each party is often provoked by a topical event. In political 
commentaries or interviews, on the other hand, categorisation is 
constructed to highlight specific aspects of reality and, thus, 
inevitably leads to biased interpretations. Naturally, each party 
promotes the category memberships favourable to itself and 
deprecatory for its opponents. The prominence, and the acceptance 
of one or other categorisation by an electorate has not yet been 
investigated. However, the impact of the power position of parties 
and of the inter-party relationships on the use of the strategy 
will be analysed.
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3.2.3.b) Psychological explanation of social beliefs: the strategy 
of psychologisation
The term "psychologisation" refers to the establishment of a 
causal link between the behaviour and the positions of a 
group/source of influence and its psychological characteristics. 
The latter are supposed to have conditioned the actualisation of a 
group's behaviour. The strategy of psychologisation functions in 
a way similar to that of categorisation. However, instead of 
linking the beliefs of a group to its socio-political features, it 
attributes them to a specific psychological profile that is shared 
by the members of the group. It does not act, however, by means of 
a mere individualisation but rather it acts in particular as a 
recognition of behaviour and ideas which are common to several 
groups to equally common psychological characteristics. 
Psychologisation, thus, relates the ideas of the source of 
influence to a psychological idiosyncratic dimension which is 
highlighted to the detriment of the objective aspects of the 
arguments (Mugny & Papastamou 1984).
Minority groups, because of their conflictual behaviour, are 
more likely to be subject to psychologisation. Their unusual 
positions are attributed to causes which refer directly to their 
idiosyncratic features.
"C'est qui se passe, par exemple, lorsque les "tares caractérielles" 
comme le manque de volonté, les "passions irrépressibles , 
antinaturelles, les croyances "égarées" ou rigides sont déduites 
lorsque l'on sait d'une personne qu'elle est (ou tout simplement 
qu'elle a été) alcoolique, mentalement dérangée, droguée, 
emprisonnée, chômeur ou d'extrême-gauche. C'est aussi ce
qu'induirait, en général, la rigidité du style de négociation 
minoritaire." (Papastamou, Mugny & Kaiser 1980: 451
Thus, psychologisation generates an explanation of the
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potentially alternative discourse of a minority group by 
attributing it to a psychological profile, composed by 
characteristics supposedly shared by the group members. 
Psychologisation accentuates the norm of 'objectivity' according to 
which the social consensus26 about the definition of an object or 
about an opinion is the ultimate criterion of validity and 
truthfulness. The socio-cognitive conflict introduced by the 
divergent, innovative positions of a minority is, thus, translated 
into a mere expression of its intrinsic psychological specificity 
(Mugny, Kaiser & Papastamou 1983). The ideological disagreement 
between a minority's and a majority's beliefs is reduced to a 
psychological differentiation and, consequently, deprived of any 
objective validity.
There is experimental evidence (Papastamou 1986) that people, 
whose beliefs are ideologically 'distant' from those of a minority 
group, tend 'spontaneously' to interpret a minority's behaviour in 
terms of psychological imbalance. On the other hand, when such a 
psychological determinant concerns the opinions of a majority group 
such negative effects have not been observed. The population (in 
particular, that part of the population which is ideologically 
'close' to the source) which is aware of the majority character of 
the source, concentrates on the validity of its opinion more than 
on any possible psychological imbalance or rigidity of attitude. 
The latter features prevail, however, in any image formed by the 
population about a minority group (Papastamou ibid.).21
The relevance of psychological elements and personality traits 
as factors explaining the behaviour of one or other political party 
or leader is quite common in politics. Often socio-political 
demands such as wage increases and social security measures are 
interpreted as syndromes of revenge by the 'poor' against the 
'rich', as extreme aggressiveness or as unrealistic and 
irresponsible behaviour. Psychologisation is often applied against 
party leaders. Indeed, in accordance with the experimental 
findings cited earlier (Papastamou ibid.), the personality traits
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of major political figures (such as lr. Papandreou or Mr. 
Mitsotakis in this case study) were highlighted as factors 
determining the party programme. The empirical data used for the 
analysis provided several examples in which the immoral character, 
senility or obsession with women of Mr.Papandreou, (alleged 
inherent characteristics of his personality) are supposed to have 
conditioned the policies of the Socialist party and government. 
Similarly, the policies of the leader of the Conservative party, 
Mr. Mitsotakis were dictated by the syndrome of revenge that he 
felt against Mr. Papandreou. The campaigning of the Alliance of 
the Left was represented as guided, either by the unrealistic 
attitude of its leaders or by their obsession with power and their 
feelings of failure. Moreover, the behaviour of SYN. was often 
represented as conditioned by little more than a syndrome of 
treason which had stigmatised the history of the extreme Left since 
the 1940s.
The strategy of psychologisation was introduced into this 
analysis of party behaviour in pre-election campaigning and post­
election negotiation in order to check the extent and forms of its 
use. The relationship between the power character of each party 
(incumbent, challenger or outsider), the ideological proximity 
between the opponents (i.e., its common or diverse superordinate 
political identity), their collaborating or strictly antagonistic 
behaviour (in terms of governmental coalition formation) and their 
reciprocal use of psychologisation is also investigated.
The operationalisation of the concept is not based upon a 
simple psychological description of a party or of party members or 
leaders but rather on an explicit reference to a direct 
relationship between the supposed psychological traits of a party 
and a party's positions or behaviour. The explanation of a party's 
policies or strategic moves, on the basis of the intrinsic 
psychological specifics of the leaders or supporters of the party, 
provides instances of the psychologisation strategy. Attempts also
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tc discredit a party as a potential government, in terms of 
psychological imbalance and inadequacy of its leadership, will also 
be studied as psychologisation. An additional psychologising 
argument will be the attribution of a specific psychological 
profile to the supporters of a party which justifies their 
political preferences or their actions.
3.2.3. c) Rejecting the validity of the arguments of the opponent: 
the strategy of denial
Categorisation and psychologisation as strategies of influence 
and resistance to the influence of the opponents share a common 
feature. They both establish a deterministic relationship between 
an intentional and, in most cases, cognitive object, such as 
specific behaviour or opinion, and a non-cognitive object, an 
uncontrollable but permanent factor such as a social or 
psychological feature. Moreover, they relate attitudes, behaviour 
and beliefs to specific characteristics of a subject who performs 
a series of actions or holds a range of relative beliefs. A socio­
political or psychological profile is built as an 'objective 
framework' around the social actor and is used by categorisation 
and psychologisation respectively, as an explanatory element. 
These similarities do not imply, however, that the nature or the 
impact of the two strategies are identical. Psycho]ogisation and 
categorisation function in distinct ways and are related in 
different ways with social and political reality. Their common 
features, however, distinguish them from another type of strategies 
of influence/resistance, the strategies of denial and of 
affirmation.
The mechanism of denial attacks directly an attitude or 
opinion for it involves a refusal to attribute the minimal truth or 
validity to an opinion opposite to one's own. The ideas and 
behaviour of a rival group are seen as deviating from a rational 
way of thinking. Moreover, they are contradictory to 'reality', as
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the latter has been consensually defined in a given society. The 
dissident thus sees its discourse turned down as incoherent and 
false. The social, political or psychological features of the 
source of the divergent opinion are not of interest. The target of 
the denial strategy is an opinion that is opposite to the 
established beliefs, that a group/source of influence sustains.
Opinions which diverge from prevalent, and generally accepted 
beliefs, are likely to be characterised as extravagant, unrealistic 
or simply wrong. In this sense, a minority group which holds 
beliefs that deviate from the established norms provides fruitful 
ground for the strategy of denial. A conflictual attitude is more 
vulnerable to statements denying its "rationality", its 
"truthfulness" and the suggestion that it is "contrary to the 
common sense". However, just as censure may sometimes make the 
prohibited object more popular, the denial of a minority opinion 
can actually increase its impact (Moscovici & Mugny 1987: 253).
Experimental research has revealed that a strategy of denial at a 
direct level discredits the specific position against which it is 
addressed. On the other hand, it often provokes an indirect effect 
for it leads to a re-examination of the general topic to which the 
opinion refers. Eventually, the opinion of the population is 
changed in the direction of the minority beliefs. However, this 
occurs at a later time and in an indirect manner (Moscovici, Mugny 
& Perez 1984-85; Perez, Mugny & Moscovici 1986).
Furthermore, beliefs and attitudes that are vested with a 
majority status, namely beliefs about which there is a social 
consensus, are unlikely to be rejected as either totally untruthful 
or false. Consequently, groups which sustain positions that 
conform with the established beliefs are less likely to be denied. 
The discourse uttered by large political parties with moderate 
positions is, thereby, less frequently subject to denial by the 
opponents than that of small and extreme parties. Moreover, an 
incumbent party vests its positions with governmental authority 
which puts pressure on the majority to accept that their realistic 
character and their conformity with common sense simply cannot be
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celled into question. Naturally, there can be different opinions 
about a policy issue. The second largest party which challenges 
governmental office may deny the validity of the incumbent's 
positions. Nevertheless, both types of parties remain within a 
range of moderate attitudes and generally acceptable beliefs with 
which a large part of the electorate is familiar. Besides, the 
truthfulness and rationality of the incumbent party is in some 
sense guaranteed by the very fact that the party has been in 
government and has, at least in part, implemented its policy.
On the contrary, an outsider party in an electoral contest may 
see the validity and rationality of its programme denied by its 
rivals. The divergent positions of an outsider and their 
innovative and probably extreme character, represent an Achilles' 
heel with respect to the strategy of denial making relatively easy 
for its well-established opponents to discredit its alternative 
views and impede any direct influence that might be exerted by the 
party. However, it is worth noting that whilst the latent 
influence that the denied opinions provoke (Moscovici et al., ibid; 
Perez et al., ibid) may be significant in a long-term process of 
social change, it seems to be of limited value with respect to the 
maximisation of votes in a national election campaign.
The varied and diverse linguistic expressions used in the 
press by one or other party to deny the opinion of a rival have 
certain features in common. The most usual form of denial involves 
an absolute statement. Denial is, thus, expressed either by a 
negative sentence with a positive adjective, eg. "Their programme 
is not realistic ( . . ) they do not have a coherent political 
programme" or by a positive clause with a negative adjective 
characterising the attitude of the adversary, eg. "Their promise 
for a true ' catharsis'28 process is untruthful (..). It is 
irrational to believe that those responsible for the embezzlement 
of public money will investigate and prosecute themselves ( . . )" or 
"their ideas are unrealistic and obsolete". Furthermore, the 
denial strategy can also be applied through a statement of absolute
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negation: "They cannot apply this policy" or "None of our rival
parties has a developed programme of economic and social policies 
(..) nor do they have any programme policies" or even "Mr. X (the 
Prime Minister, a party leader or a minister) is lying".
In brief, the denial strategy is addressed through simple 
clauses which include an absolute statement. The statement refers 
in an explicit way to the positions of a rival party and not to any 
features that characterise a party. Finally, such a statement does 
not involve any elaborate argumentation against the a rival's 
positions. Indeed, it mainly consists of a total rejection based 
upon the premise that they are contrary to reason, reality or 'the 
truth'.
3.2.4 When non-events become part of reality: the strategy of
affirmation in party-campaigning
Affirmation, in contrast to the three strategies discussed 
before, is not derived from the active minority theory. It is 
however hoped that it may be, to some extent, integrated into the 
theory as a result of this study. Still, at present, it is a 
strategy derived from, and which primarily refers to, party 
behaviour in campaigning and coalition negotiations.
A minimal definition of the strategy of affirmation involves 
false statements which present as 'facts' events which have not 
actually taken place. The strategy has a two-fold application. 
First, when it refers to the party that has issued it, it takes the 
form of a self-fulfilling prophecy and presents a favourable 
expectation as a fact, as an event that has already happened. 
Second, and on the other hand, when such a strategy is directed 
against a rival party, it concerns the statement of negative 
'prophecies'. False events or virtually non-existent events, which 
have a negative value for the opponent are stated and confirmed as 
uncontestable truths.
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Parties which are campaigning often have an interest in 
creating events. Indeed, for there is often a "flood of pseudo­
events", as Boorstin (1961) calls them, i.e. campaigning events 
organised specifically for the purpose of gaining additional 
publicity for a party. The object here, however, is not such 
organised pseudo-events, rather it is those parties who invent 
'false events' in their campaigns in favour of themselves or 
against their rivals. Affirmation, as a strategy, covers such 
declarations and/or announcements of events as well as facts which 
are little more than imagination, lies or, at best, wishful 
thinking.
Affirmation also appears in relation to various types of 
policy issues. Particularly fruitful ground for affirming gloomy 
events and criticising the policy of a rival party is the national 
economy. "The disaster is already on our doors", "the country is in 
deep economic crisis", "one more month of governmental instability 
and foreigners will take over all of our economic activities", 
"Greece has been bankrupted" are some of the statements addressed 
by the Opposition to the governing party. One can well argue about 
the validity of one economic policy in comparison to another, or 
foresee a deterioration of the national economic situation. 
However, presenting a possible outcome of actual policy as an event 
that has already passed is a wholly different type of 
'argumentation'.
Naturally, events are always presented as positive when they 
refer to the party behind them. The governing party explains to 
the electorate that their budgetary policy of the last years will 
produce "a re-valuation of the national currency after the 
election" and that their next mandate will give them "the 
opportunity to complete their plan for economic development". A 
re-valuation of the national currency after the election is, 
therefore, stated as a fact of reality two days before the 
election. A party by failing to restrain itself from uttering its 
belief in a clear affirmative way, it hopes to transform belief
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into 'fact'. The same thing happens with the "next governmental 
mandate" for it has 'happened' even before people have cast their 
votes.
Statements similar to those cited are uttered by all parties 
about all policy issues as a matter of electoral course. "All 
public hospitals are on the edge of bankruptcy" asserts the right- 
wing Opposition against the departing socialist government. The 
governing party fires back: "their public health and welfare policy 
signifies the end of any type of welfare system in Greece" or "With 
Mr. Mitsotakis in office, the National Health System will be 
dismantled in one day". Moreover, supportive or criticising 
opinions about the present or the future are stated as having been 
earlier events. According to the party which expresses them, these 
virtually non-existent events are part of 'objective' reality.
Such official and public 'lies' are also uttered in connection 
with issues that are more suitable for pre-election propaganda, 
such as an election outcome, the power profile of a party 
leadership or a specific issue such as the prosecution of several 
Socialist ministers for the embezzlement of public money. These 
types of issues are directly related to the image of a party and 
its leadership. Affirming that the party "has lost the election" 
and that "the power of the leader within the party is contested 
because he is held responsible for the party's electoral defeat", 
before an election, undermines the image of the party as a 
potential governing party and puts into question the capacity of 
its leader to become a Prime Minister. The statement that a rival 
leader is a "loser” and that his power is contested even within his 
own party, puts into question a leader's very capacity to lead. 
Furthermore, such messages tend to activate symbolic and affective 
responses that can affect the decision-making of a voter. 
Reference to the personality traits of a leader, his alleged fear 
and confusion because, "he knows his electoral defeat is imminent" 
or the characterisation of a leader as a, "criminal who is not yet 
in jail only because of the pre-election period" really consist of 
little more than emotive appeals to the voter. The terms,
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"criminal" and, "jail” are key-words which suggest to a "collective 
imagery" consciousness criminality, penal law and the attribution 
of justice. These events have not happened and may never do but 
their statement as 'facts' enhances their affective and symbolic 
potential, usually already strong in the social imagery that takes 
place prior to an election.
When affirmation concerns policy matters, the positive or 
negative connotation of a message engenders a form of cognitive 
elaboration of a specific policy problem. "The bankruptcy of the 
country", is a false statement, however, a party that announces it 
as an 'event', is referring to a specific problem, i.e. the 
national economy. Conversely, propaganda issues have no
substantive topic at stake for they do not refer to the suitability 
of a party programme or a party's ability to deal with certain 
problems. Propaganda issues primarily reinforce the issuer or 
contest the rival's power character, the personal characteristics 
of a leader or the political and moral values of the party and of 
its leadership. Thereby, they create an explicit relationship 
between an election outcome or the formation of a government and 
the image of a party. Affirming false events which in fact concern 
only propaganda issues acquires a particular significance. Stating 
that, "the government has already put us in a situation of deep 
economic crisis" has a negative value for the governing party. 
Declaring, however, that "the (rival) party leader is politically 
dead" while, "Andreas (the issuing party's leader) has been deified 
by more than one million people, who have entrusted him to govern 
the country again" puts into doubt the overall image of a rival 
party as a challenger to governmental power. That form of 
affirmation can result in a re-definition of the power and status 
position of each party. Nor does this form of re-definition involve 
cognitive elaboration for it concerns neither a party's positions, 
nor its programmes nor its previous work. The interest is focused 
rather on the social representations that have been attributed to 
the party. The discourse focuses on symbolic or affected elements 
instead of cognitive ones.
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The strategy of affirmation takes various forms in party 
campaigning discourse. An adequate operational definition is 
necessary to ensure the validity and usefulness of such a concept. 
One element which has already been identified is the issue to which 
affirmation refers. Issues are distinguished by two types: a)
policy issues, i.e. pragmatic problems, topics on which measures 
are to be taken (eg. the economy, foreign policy, labour policy, 
the environment and others) and, b) propaganda issues which refer 
directly to the election, the formation of a governmental coalition 
or the personality traits of a party's leadership. Propaganda 
issues include discussion of political norms, such as democracy or 
popular sovereignty and their relationship to topical themes, such 
as private or public scandals.
The second element is the party-source of the strategy. It is 
a party which utters the false statement activating, thereby, 
affirmation as a form of resistance towards its rivals. A party- 
source and a party-object (to which the message refers) of an 
affirmation strategy may be one and the same. A source seeks, 
through an affirmative statement, to enhance its own position, i.e. 
it makes a positive statement. On the other hand, affirmation is 
used to discredit the message and the image of opponents through 
statements which have purely negative connotations. The 'event' 
presented normally concerns an alleged opinion or action of the 
rival party.
The reference to a party-object is not always explicit in the 
text. If affirmation is expressed in one single sentence then the 
link between the 'event' and a party-object is direct: "Mitsotakis 
is dead", "Papandreou's political career is already finished", "We 
are surely at 48%", "The elections were won in the grandiose rally 
of last night" . The strategy can also develop within a whole 
paragraph reaching a peak only at the last sentence: "We are in a
deep economic crisis (..) it is uncertain whether the day after the 
elections the State can afford to pay salaries and pensions ( . . ) 
the other E.E.C. members are ready to kick us out if they do not 
see a radical improvement in our economic situation (..) the only
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par+iy able to lead us out of the crisis and into a path of 
prosperity and development is New Democracy (..) the people have 
already decided (..) Mitsotakis is the Prime Minister of Monday29 
( .. ) the program of the new government is (..)"• The situation was 
first described and then commented upon. Finally, a false 
statement is produced enhancing its symbolic power by its thematic 
opposition: crisis/disaster-Mitsotakis/saviour with full popular 
support.
The function of affirmation is in accord with the elaboration 
likelihood model of persuasion (Petty & Caccioppo 1980; 1986a;
1986b). People, depending on the conditions under which an 
influence attempt takes place, tend to use peripheral (non- 
cognitive) cues in elaborating a message. That means that in case 
of insufficient knowledge about a subject, lack of experience or 
lack of interest with respect to a problem, they base their 
decision making on non-cognitive elements. Petty and Caccioppo 
(1986a; 1986b) investigated a series of factors which conditioned 
the effectiveness of peripheral cues. What is of interest for the 
present argument is that voters often have a partial knowledge 
about politics and a limited understanding of topics such as 
economy, foreign policy, protection of the environment, 
organisation as well as of the educational system and many others. 
Thus, on several occasions, an opportunity is presented to parties 
for them to use impressive, but false, affirmative statements which 
offer the electorate e handy peripheral cue on which to make their 
voting decision.
All parties, irrespective of their power character, may be 
subject to such a strategy of affirmation, to the extent that the 
latter is used against their policy positions. Affirmation 
discredits their validity and consistency since it 'creates' new 
positions for a rival party which are contradictory to its previous 
ones.
This is a first elaboration of the role played by affirmation 
in group relations and influence. The nature of the potential
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outcome and the mechanisms on which it is based will be further 
analysed. Clearly, there are limitations to this form of analysis. 
Party campaigning offers empirical ground on which to test the 
concept of affirmation. The examples will be collected from 
primary sources (newspaper articles) and, thus, offer a close 
representation of reality. Contextual and conjunctural elements 
present in everyday reality situations will also be taken into 
account, to the extent that it is possible at least. Our main aim 
is to provide an adequate definition of the concept and its 
integration within the socio-psychological model for group 
interaction and influence. Bearing this aim in mind, it is 
contended that affirmation fills a gap and opens up new directions 
for research. It complements the discussion that was opened by the 
strategies of categorisation, psychologisation and denial. A 
group-source of influence, by means of these strategies, can 
attribute the message of influence to the character of the group 
that expresses it and to the political, social or psychological 
features of that group. A group that launches a false statement, 
about a non-existent event, undermines such image and the ideas of 
a rival party through the use of such a statement. Affirmation 
relates the beliefs of a group to its image but in a different way 
than either categorisation or psychologisation. The latter two 
attribute the opinions expressed by a group/source of influence to 
its social or psychological characteristics and, thus, manages to 
disprove the validity of that opinion. Affirmation transforms an 
alleged 'new' belief into a 'fact' through the use of a false 
statement and then uses it to discredit the image of a rival group. 
To some extent, affirmation functions in a way that is parallel to 
that of the denial strategy. The latter discredits the opinion of 
a group through totally rejecting the truthfulness and realistic 
character of that opinion. Denial, however, does not touch upon 
the image of the group/source of the opinion in the same way as 
that achieved by a process of affirmation.
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A P P E N D I X
T a b l e  1
Number of subjects showing a change of opinion in the direction of influence 
(+), by rejection of influence (-) and showing no change (0)
Direction of change 
(+) (0 ) (-)
Experimental situations N (n=20) 14 1 5
R (n=19) 9 0 10
Notes:
1. N = negotiation condition, R = rigid condition, n = number of subjects 
who participated in the specific experimental condition.
2. Source: Mugny & Papastamou 1984
• T a b 1 e 2
I I m a g e o f t h e s o u r c e
' Source Dimension
1 consistency/inconsistency flexibility/rigidity
i Flexible +3,90 +3,20
!
; Rigid +2,15 +1,35
■ Source: Mugny & Papastamou 1984
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N O T E S
1. The term pro-normative is used here as a shorthand version for the 
political/ideological beliefs which form the general rule in a given society. 
Beliefs and positions derived from this rule are also called pro-normative. On 
the contrary, ideas which deviate and contradict the general rule are called 
anti-normative. To give an example: the acceptance of both private and public 
education in Greek society and the co-ordination of the two types of schools 
following the same educational structure is the generally accepted rule in Greece 
nowadays. All policy measure following the above statement as a guideline are 
pro-normative. The abolition of private education and the substitution of 
private schools by public ones is an anti-normative position. Any opinion or 
policy sustaining the norm that only public education should be allowed is anti- 
normative, i.e. conflictual and deviant.
2. Additional information about the three parties studied, namely PA.SO.K., N.D. 
and SYN., their actions and electoral outcomes is given in chapter 2.
3. The most recent national elections of October 10th, 1993 resulted in four
parties in Parliament with the following percentages: PA.SO.K. 46.9%, New
Democracy 39.8%, Political Spring 4.9% and K.K.E. (Greek Communist Party) 4.3%. 
A fifth party, namely the Alliance of the Left obtained 2.92%, but is not 
represented in Parliament because its electoral force was below the national 
threshold of 3%. It is important to note also that the party "Political Spring" 
is a new centre-right party formed by the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
N.D. government, Mr.Samaras.
4. The electoral percentages obtained by N.D. in the period between 1974 and 1989
are the following: *974, 54,37%; 1977, 41.84%; 1981, 35.86%; 1985, 40.85%;
1989 (June), 44.25%.
5. Conservative parties in Greece have been in office since the second World 
War; E.S. (Ethnikos Synagermos) until 1956 and E.R.E. (Ethniki Rizospastiki 
Enosi) from 1956 until 1963. The short interval of the E.K. (Enosi Kentrou), a 
centre party, in 1963-1965 ended abruptly by the governmental crisis of 1965-1967 
and the coup d'état by the colonels in April 1967. New Democracy was founded in 
1974 by K .Karamanlis, former founder and leader of E.R.E.. A significant 
continuity can be traced between the two parties in terms of activists,
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supporters and ideological orientation.
6. The electoral percentages obtained by the Socialist Party in the period
between 1974 and 1989 were the following: 1974, 13.58%; 1977, 25.34%; 1981,
48.06%; 1985, 45.82%; 1989 (June), 39.15%.
7. New Democracy was not actually in government during the pre-election campaigns
of November 198 9, which was run under a provisional administrative government. 
It had, however, the status of officeholder, because it had been the main
component of the governmental coalition and was also the winning party of the 
previous electoral contest.
8. In the Moscovici experiment (Moscovici, Lage & Naffrechoux 1969), the
subjects of the influence participated in a game based upon colour perception. 
According to the findings, the subjects who at a control condition perceived a 
specific colour slide as ’blue", when faced with a stable minority who declared 
that the same slides were "green", saw more "green" slides than before. The 
influence of the minority, however, was not as strong in the explicit judgement 
of the colour of the slides as much as it was in the modification of the
subjects' code of colour perception. There was a change in their responses vis- 
à-vis which colour shade should be considered, MgreenM and which, "blue”. This 
effect demonstrated that minority groups generate an indirect influence effect. 
A further investigation of the image that the subjects formed with respect to the 
minority group showed that they considered the latter as being less competent 
than themselves in accomplishing the experimental task but more self-confident.
9. The task involved in the Asch experiment concerned the comparison in terms 
of length of one line with three others. Each line was of a different length and 
drawn on a piece of paper. The "majority", which consisted of two people, 
opposed an individual who represented the population. The majority, who were 
experimental accomplices, insisted in stating that the line in question was equal 
in length to a line that, actually, was either shorter or longer than the first 
one. As a result, the subject began making wrong judgements which, however, 
conformed with the majority responses. Asch interpreted this effect as being 
compliance with the behaviour of the majority. These findings were confirmed by 
a series of experiments that Asch conducted (Asch 1951; 1956) in which he changed 
the number of people which constituted the majority group or reversed the roles, 
thereby introducing a lone individual who insisted upon giving wrong responses.
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10. Fc.ucheux and Moscovici compare the situation in wh^ch the subject found 
him/herself in the Asch experiment with that of people submitted to specific 
treatment with the scope of their alienation from their previous social 
environment. The research of Stein ( 1957; 1960) on soldiers captured at war and 
people receiving special treatment in educational, religious and other 
institutions is cited in support of this argument.
11. The existence of a socially deviant agent who adopts a viewpoint different 
from that of the majority has important implications on the possibility and 
capability of the other agents participating in an interaction process, 
individuals or groups, to escape or ignore the majority pressures and adopt a 
deviant viewpoint themselves too, without on the other hand necessarily agreeing 
with the standpoint of the initial deviant agent (Kimball & Hollander 1974).
12. The term social representations here refers to the bits of collective memory 
and cognitive or bymbolic schemes which organise understanding and communication 
within a society. However, social representations are proposed further (Chapter 
four) as an analytical category which contributes to an in-depth analysis of 
inter-group behaviour and the image related to a social group or political party.
13. More than generally consensual, the humanistic values introduced in the 
experimental study of Mugny, Kaiser and Papastamou (1983) are perceived by the 
subjects as “socially objective”. The subjects themselves reported after the 
experimental manipulation: "tout simplement ils (the minority) ont raison, ils 
sont objectifs".
14. Within the literature on active minority influence, the term ‘’direct 
influence" refers to an effect expressed immediately after the experimental 
manipulation, publicly and on the same issue as that discussed in the experiment. 
The term "indirect influence", in contrast, refers to an influence effect that 
appears at a later time, in relation to private rather than public responses and 
with respect to topics that are related to the issue discussed in the experiment 
however not with respect to this same issue.
15. The analytic results of the elections of November 5th, 1989 and an account 
of the main events during the mandate of the N.D.-SYN. provisional government is 
given in chapter 2.
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16. Opposition and governmental parties together with o^her collective actors, 
such as trade unions, interest groups or corporate actors, may participate in 
formal or informal negotiation processes with the scope of finding solutions on 
various public issues. During the pre-election campaigning period, however, 
parties aim to influence as great an electoral force as possible and not to 
accommodate competing interests.
17. In the Greek political system, from which the case study is taken, 
incumbent parties have always had electoral percentages higher than forty per 
cent.
18. The term ’electorate" is used as equivalent to the term “population” in the 
context of inter-party relations and pre-election campaigning or post-election 
bargaining.
19. The margins of negotiation for each type of party are discussed later in 
relation to relevant literature on the styles of negotiation adequate for 
minority groups under different conditions.
20. The experimental study concerned attitudes towards an army, in this case 
that of the Swiss. Forty subjects participated in the experiment, all of whom 
were students at a technical school in Geneva. The experiment was divided into 
three phases. The first and the third consisted of 24 propositions about the 
Swiss army, which the subjects had to characterise as "RightM or "Left" opinions, 
i.e. of a conservative or progressive character. During the second phase, all 
the subjects had to listen to a speech, delivered by a young man with long hair 
and a beard, who was an experimental assistant. The speaker used a terminology 
generally identified as characteristic of political groups of the extreme Left. 
In two of the experimental conditions the speech remained unchanged. The rigid 
or flexible style in the speaker's attitude was introduced by specific slogans 
delivered after the first and second third of the speech. These slogans 
criticised "conscientious objection" as a means of resistance to the army and the 
military service. According to the results gained from a pre-test, students who 
participated in the experiment considered conscientious objection as one of the 
most effective means of bringing pressure to bear against the army. The slogan 
expressed after the first part of the speech was as follows:
"We think that revolutionary action against the army from the inside 
is the only effective means of weakening it; for us, for example, 
conscientious objection is an excessively personal method."(Mugny
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1975: 217)
The slogan introduced a conflict between the minority group, represented 
by the experimental assistant, and the population, namely the students. The 
minority created a conflict with the army as an institution, i.e. with the 
established rule of the State authorities and, at the same time, offended one 
of the fundamental beliefs of the population.
After the second part of the speech, the style of negotiation was
introduced by using two different slogans in two different experimental
conditions. The rigid one was:
MIn the struggle against ideological regimentation, we think that 
means such as conscientious objection are false, personal, “petit- 
bourgeois" and quasi-reactionary. As we said before, we think that 
it is necessary to fight the army from within." (Mugny 1975: 217)
Conversely, a flexible slogan reconsidered the criticism expressed
initially about conscientious objectors in the following way:
"I would like to come back to a consideration of our position on 
conscientious objection which 1 expressed badly just now. We think 
that conscientious objection which is collective and organized is a 
good and valuable way of fighting the army. I simply wanted to say 
that we also think it important to contend against the army from the 
inside." (Mugny 1975: 217)
21. The experimental results indicated a differentiated impact of the two
negotiation styles. The flexible minority influenced the beliefs of the subjects 
(+4.45 units approx. in the 24 questions-propositions). On the contrary, the 
rigid minority, instead of bringing the subjects closer to its opinion, it ended
upon creating the opposite tendency (-0.85 units approx., i.e. slightly negative
influence). Further analysis of the results shows that ti;e rigid style of the 
source had a bi-polarising effect (see table 1 in the appendix).
22. Ricateau (1970-71) showed that the differentiation of the social images of
a consistent minority in an experimental influence process resulted in 
differentiation of the degrees of influence obtained. More specifically, if a 
minority was perceived as dogmatic, it had a weaker impact on the population.
23. Measurement of an image of the source in the experiment presented above 
(Mugny ibid) shows the impact of a rigid vs. flexible style of a minority on the 
perception of a minority by a population along the dimensions of consistency vs.
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inconsistency and rigidity vs. flexibility (see table 2 in the appendix). The 
measurement of tlie image "of the source was based on forty adjectives spread 
evenly between the two poles of two dimensions, namely the dimension of 
consistency/coherence/stability called (K+) contrasted to the lack of these 
properties named (I-), and the dimension of a flexible negotiating attitude (F+) 
opposed to the rigid style of negotiation/rejection of the other's point of view 
(R-) . An example of the adjectives used for each dimension is as follows: 
confident, considered, determined, rational for (K+); changeable, confused, 
disorderly, immature, irresponsible for (I-); adaptable, cooperative, frank, 
tolerant, understanding for (F+); and arrogant, authoritarian, dominating, 
obstinate for (R-). The subjects who participated in the experiment were asked 
to put a cross beside any adjective which they felt to correspond with their 
image of the spokesman of the minority, whose opinions they had heard. Thus, an 
indices was calculated for each dimension based on the number of adjectives 
chosen in each category (Mugny 1975: 216). These indices are reported in table
2 (see appendix).
24. The term "social units’* here refers to individuals, groups and sub-groups 
taking part in a communication process. The process may be verbal or written, 
direct, in the sense that the Hinterlocutors" are physically present, or through 
a communication channel, such as the mass media. The individuals or groups are 
considered as unitary actors within the specific interaction process. They are 
"social" because any type of communication and influence procedure requires a 
basic set of shared meanings and symbols, internalised through a socialisation 
process.
25. Experimental studies suggest that multiple and intersecting social 
categorisations tend to attenuate inter-group discrimination (Deschamps & Doise 
1978; Vanbeselaere 1987). Brown and Turner (1979) following the assumptions of 
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979) suggest the opposite, namely that 
both simple and crossed categorisation conditions generate inter-group 
discrimination. Their findings have been, however, disproved in more recent 
studies (Vanbeselaere, op.cit.).
26. The use of social consensus as a criterion of objectivity of beliefs, 
attitudes, ideas and even individual or collective abilities has been developed 
by Festinger (1954) in his theory on social comparison processes.
27. Further experimental research has looked at the effects of psychologisation 
on the influence potential of a minority group leader. The attribution of the 
minority deviant behaviour to the idiosynchrasic features of its leader affects
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positively the influence potential of the minority. An unrealistic, imbalanced 
leader has been perceived as more independent, more courageous and firm in 
his/her convictions (Papastamou 1985).
28. Catharsis is the term coined in 1989 by the Opposition parties (New 
Democracy and Synaspismos) referring to the investigation of the embezzlement of 
public money by the Papandreou (PA.SO.K.) government. Catharsis has acquired 
both symbolic and pragmatic meaning as the ’'purification” of political life. It 
has signified the prosecution of those involved in the scandals and the 
introduction of a new ethos in government. In the election of June 1989, 
catharsis was a particularly salient issue within which ideological and moral 
questions, as well as policy matters, were addressed.
29. Monday is the day after the election since the election day is always a 
Sunday in Greece.
CHAPTER IV
Social influence and group/party membership: the socio-
psychological mechanisms underlying political communication
4.1 Introduction
The theoretical analysis undertaken in the previous chapter 
has concentrated on the behaviour of a group or party as a 
potential source of influence. The styles of behaviour adopted by 
a social group/political party have been looked at as the 
mechanisms through which this influence potential is activated. 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight certain socio- 
psychological mechanisms which contribute to a better understanding 
of inter-group and, more specifically, inter-party relations and 
attempts at mutual influence. The theoretical concepts discussed 
here examine the psychological organisation of the social and 
political context in which inter-party behaviour and communication 
are embedded. They concentrate on the second layer of our model, 
namely the wider social environment in which party interaction is 
located.
Research on voting behaviour and voter (re)alignment has 
focused on questions related to party membership, prior voting 
preferences and ideology. The impact of socio-political
predispositions and of contextual elements of the close social 
environment (family, friends or neighbours) on voter decisions have 
already been investigated. However, such studies have not 
considered the socio-psychological parameters which affiliate the 
voter to his/her party and mediate the impact of the social 
environment on the voter decision. This chapter is concerned with 
the relationship between party behaviour and the mechanisms of 
socio-psychological identification of the voter with the party. 
More specifically, this chapter concentrates on the socio- 
psychological mechanisms which underlie party identity and which, 
as a result, condition the relationships among parties and the
benaviour of parties towards one another.
4.1.1 The mechanism of socio-psychological identification with
a group or with a political party
In order to explain the process of socio-psychological 
identification with a social group, an adequate definition of the 
latter and, more specifically, of the party as a particular type of 
group needs to be given.
A group emerges when two or more individuals engage in 
cohesive and stable social relationships. A group structure 
develops through the interaction among members of the group. From 
this perspective, a political party is a group with organised, 
stable relationships among its members who occupy differentiated 
structural positions within the party. Moreover, a party is a 
group with well defined internal rules and procedures which shape 
the interaction among its members. Finally, a party is a political 
group whose main objective is to maximise its electoral strength 
and eventually to have access to governmental power. The 
institutionalised character of the party as a group includes the 
party organisation and the party rank-and-file. To a certain 
extent, it also includes those supporters who are formal party- 
members and participate regularly in party activities. However, 
such a restricted conception of the party as a political group 
excludes all the voters who (may) support the party at a given 
point in time in informal and irregular ways. Still, these 
supporters may perceive themselves as members, in a broad sense, of 
the party, identify with it and perceive the party's behaviour as 
the behaviour of their own political group.
An alternative view is introduced at this point to cater for 
a broader definition of the concept of the group and, thereby, of 
the political party as a specific type of group. A cognitive and 
psychological perspective is considered. It is proposed (Turner
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1982: 15) that "a social group can be defined as two or more
individuals who share a common social identification of themselves 
or, which is nearly the same thing, perceive themselves to be 
members of the same social category.1". This definition is not 
incompatible with the formal organisation that a group may have. 
Under either condition, namely, if the group is formally or 
informally organised, its members perceive themselves as a group, 
communicate and interact. The difference between the two 
definitions lies in the fact that the cognitive-psychological 
definition introduces the collective perception of the social 
existence of the group alone as a sufficient condition for its 
members to act as a group (Turner ibid.). The group membership is 
thus contingent upon the subjective sense of the individuals that 
they belong to that group, their conception of a 'we' as contrasted 
to some 'they'.
The socio-psychological identification with the group implies 
that the individual perceives him/herself as a member of the group. 
Furthermore, the individual links this membership with some 
emotional and value significance (Tajfel 1972). In this sense, a 
voter who perceives him/herself as a supporter of or a voter for or 
a member (in a broad sense) of a party identifies, to a certain 
extent, with that party. Moreover, the party supporter organises 
his/her perception of him/herself and others on the basis of 
his/her own and the others' specific party membership (Campbell, 
Converse, Miller & Stokes 1960: 120-136).
4.1.2 Identification with the ingroup and differentiation from
the outgroup: Ingroup favouritism and outgroup
discrimination
The self-assignment of group membership implies the self­
attribution of a set of flattering characteristics (Turner 1982). 
Mutual esteem among the members of the group is, thereby, produced.
92
Prestige, ability and any other desirable social characteristic 
and/or behaviour are reciprocally attributed on the basis of the 
common group membership. The own group or category membership is 
also assigned higher value in comparison to other categories or 
groups with which the individual does not identify. Eventually, 
both an intra-group and an inter-group evaluative bias is 
produced2.
Inter-group bias has been identified by several researchers 
(Sherif et al. 1961; Blake & Mouton 1961) as being a consequence of 
intergroup competition and conflict. However, group bias has also 
been activated in groups which were formed on a random basis 
following arbitrary criteria and whose members were not similar to 
each other in terms of attitudes or characteristics (Billig & 
Tajfel 1973) .
The effects of group bias involve an increased positive 
evaluation of one's own group and of fellow members of the group 
and an explicit ingroup favouritism when individual or group 
rewards are at stake (Tajfel, Flament, Billig & Bundy 1971)3. It 
should be noted, however, that ingroup and outgroup bias function 
selectively. The biased perception refers only to features that 
are regarded as being related to the distinction between the two
groups (Tajfel, Skeikh & Gardner 1964).
The concepts of ingroup favouring bias and discrimination 
against the outgroup are particularly useful for the analysis of 
party behaviour. Communication and interaction between parties who 
compete for electoral power are conditioned by the same kind of 
inter-group bias. Parties employ strategies against their 
opponents which tend to manipulate this inter-group bias. They may
enhance ingroup favouritism with reference to partisan voters and
diminish differences between opposite parties in order to reach 
ideologically 'distant' voters.
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4.2 Reducing inter-group bias by introducing a common super­
ordinate identity: The case of party coalition
Group interaction neither always nor necessarily concludes 
with inter-group differentiation. Situational and/or contingent 
factors may enhance the salience of features common between two 
groups. The introduction of a new categorising dimension which 
emphasises a set of common features between two groups may lead to 
convergence between them.
The introduction of a single group representation to the 
members of two initially distinct social groups reduces inter-group 
bias. Former outgroup members are perceived as more attractive 
when they are re-categorised as members of one's own group 
(Gaertner, Mann, Murrell & Dovidio 1989). To the extent that group 
formation is viewed as the internalisation of social categorisation 
in the individual identity, a re-categorisation implies a re­
definition of 'us' and 'them' (Turner 1982).
The introduction of a common super-ordinate group identity is 
a complicated process. Individuals may internalise a new super­
ordinate category membership if they assume that their goals are 
shared by former outgroup members and if they are also concerned 
about the objectives of the former outgroup. Common super-ordinate 
goals must not only be introduced but also recognised and perceived 
as ingroup objectives by members of both sides. In order to reduce 
inter-group hostility, it is necessary to reduce or, if possible, 
to remove salient inter-group differences (Worchel 1979). For this 
to occur, a set of common modal characteristics must become 
relevant to all members of the new super-ordinate group.
The problem that arises with respect to the formation of party 
coalitions concerns the extent to which a process of re­
categorisation can be introduced into party relations and the ways 
"in which this can be done. A competitive party system involves by 
definition inter-party differentiation which is in turn followed by
inter-party discrimination. Thus parties accentuate their 
differences and enhance their own positive distinctiveness and 
superiority over their adversaries. This assumption is particularly 
relevant for parties which share a set of beliefs and/or policy 
positions. Two parties that are ideologically close will tend to 
emphasise their distinctiveness which is their raison d'être as 
separate parties.
On the other hand, party ideology and positions are usually 
consolidated throughout the life of a political party. The party, 
as a relatively stable and institutionalised organisation, carries 
with it a set of political principles, practices and ideological 
traditions. These represent the modal features of the party as a 
socio-political group. Thus, re-categorisation of political 
parties seems to be a difficult enterprise. Still, under specific 
circumstances, parties themselves undertake a restructuring of the 
categorisation of the political field. This happens when an 
electoral or governmental coalition is formed.
This study is concerned with the latter type of coalitions, 
namely with post-election negotiation between parties aiming at the 
formation of a government. Governmental coalitions concern the 
cooperation of two or more parties in office. However, such 
cooperative interdependence, especially if it is provisional, does 
not necessarily imply a re-categorisation of the allies and their 
fusion into a single party.
One might expect that the resolution of conflict through 
cooperative tasks would remove inter-party discrimination. 
However, experimental research has demonstrated that the functional 
interdependence of goals is not a sufficient condition for group 
boundaries to be redefined. The conflictual or collaborating 
orientation of intergroup behaviour does not eliminate ingroup 
favouritism nor outgroup discrimination (Doise W, Csepeli G, Dann 
H D, Gouge G C, Larsen K & Ostell A 1972; Brewer & Silver 1978). 
Therefore, the provisional governmental coalition formed by the 
Alliance of the Left (SYN.) and the Conservative Party (N.D.) is
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not expected to overrule decades of mutual conflict and hostility. 
Neither is the provisional national unity government expected to 
eliminate hostility and bias between the collaborating parties. 
Indeed, in both cases, parties returned to their antithetic and 
antagonistic positions as soon as the government was dissolved.
On the other hand, situational variables also interfere with 
the perception of the coalition partner. The intensity and 
duration of previous conflict as compared to the limited, both in 
frequency and in duration, cooperative encounters impede the 
production of positive attitudes towards the cooperating group. 
Status and power disparities also prevent the fusion of the 
formerly divided groups (Worchel 1979). Incumbent party members 
who would adopt a common group membership with the supporters of an 
outsider party would endanger their own prestige and power.
4.2.1 Political and instrumental super-ordinate party identity
Coalition government is not sufficient for the redefinition of 
political identities. However, goal interdependence and
cooperative activity modifies party relations for a period of time. 
Therefore, it is assumed that coalition government introduces an 
common instrumental super-ordinate identity between coalition 
partners. Let us however elaborate more fully on the specific 
forms that a super-ordinate identity may take within the party 
interaction process.
Super-ordinate party identity has two different means of 
expression in politics. On the one hand, it is based on
ideological position and political tradition. Thus, parties may be 
located along a general dimension of left-right. According to a 
left-right division, the N.D. is situated at the right-of-centre 
side of the continuum, the PA.SO.K. is placed at the left-of-centre 
side and the SYN. is located at the left side of the PA.SO.K. 
(further on the left of the continuum). The three parties may be 
schematically situated as follows:
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Left Centre Right
j
SYN. PASOK N .D .
i
The SYN. and the PA.SO.K. share a common super-ordinate 
identity as parties of "the wider Left". The N.D., on the other 
hand, is the main representative of the right in Greek politics. 
Greek political history confirms the opposition in social, 
political and ideological terms between the SYN. and the N.D., on 
the one hand, and between the PA.SO.K. and the N.D., on the other.
The super-ordinate categorisation of the three parties along 
a left-right dimension is based on their political tradition and 
ideology. However, it also conforms with the concept of group and 
party identity as a feeling of belonging to a community of people. 
It is assumed that a feeling of we-ness between the party members 
and supporters of the PA.SO.K. and the SYN. may be activated with 
reference to their common identity as "the Left." Conservative 
party supporters, conversely, are assigned an outgroup identity; 
they are regarded as being opposed to the supporters of "the Left".
On the other hand, super-ordinate identity is expressed 
through cooperation and goal interdependence between parties. 
Parties that share a set of common goals and that are 
interdependent regarding the achievement of these goals, share a 
common instrumental super-ordinate identity. Their common super­
ordinate identity is not thus related to their ideology and/or 
political tradition but to the fact that they engage in co­
operative activity. This super-ordinate identity acquires thus a 
instrumental character.
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Common or opposed super-ordinate political identity is 
affected by the formation of coalitions between two or more 
parties. Coalitions may be built on the basis of shared 
ideological positions and policy programmes. The parties that 
participate in the coalition are eventually linked by both their 
common political tradition and their actual collaboration.
A governmental coalition, however, may also be formed between 
parties that are situated at opposite sides of the left-right 
continuum. Interdependent goals due to conjectural factors or to 
exceptional circumstances may lead to such coalitions (eg. the 
national unity government in Greece in November 1989). A common 
instrumental super-ordinate identity is thereby imposed on the 
parties participating in the coalition.
As noted, provisional governmental cooperation cannot break 
the ideological and socio-political barriers that traditionally 
separate two parties. Consequently, it is not a sufficient 
condition for the creation of a common political identity which 
would incorporate the formerly opposed party identities. However, 
our assumption is that a temporary governmental co-operation may 
dismantle a common super-ordinate political identity. More 
specifically, it is assumed that the fact that the Alliance of the 
Left formed a coalition with the N.D. destroyed the feeling of 'we- 
ness' between the two parties of the Left, i.e. the Alliance of the 
Left and the Socialist party (PA.SO.K.). The perceived ideological 
and political 'distance' between these two parties was increased. 
Thus, it is assumed that as long as the coalition held, the two 
parties, i.e. the PA.SO.K. and the SYN., no longer shared a common 
super-ordinate political identity. The change of the socio­
political dimensions structuring the party system seemed to phase 
out traditional party identities.
The national unity government is, however, assumed to have re­
activated a common super-ordinate political and instrumental 
identity based on ideological affinity and governmental co­
operation between the Alliance of the Left (SYN.) and the
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Socialists (PA.SO.K.). This common instrumental and political 
superordinate identity is expected to have affected the interaction 
between the two parties.
4.3 Modifying the image of the party in the course of party 
interaction: Social representations
The concept of inter-group bias refers to instances of 
discrimination against the 'other' social group, i.e. the outgroup. 
It consists of a discriminatory behaviour because it accentuates a 
negative image of the outgroup and an ever more favourable 
conception of the self and one's own group both of which extend 
beyond factual, objective evidence. The images of the two groups 
are based on the activation of relevant favourable or unfavourable 
social representations. The social representations linked to a 
social group or political party are likely . to affect the 
willingness or reluctance of the population to identify with that 
group or party. When the social representations lead to the 
formation of a positive social image of the group, the population 
is more likely to adopt the group positions. On the other hand, 
when the group is linked to unfavourable social representations and 
a negative social image is assigned to it, the population is more 
likely to reject the group's ideas and also potential group 
membership.
4.3.1 Social representations: a definition
"[Social representations are] a set of concepts, statements and 
explanations originating in daily life in course of inter-individual 
communications" {Moscovici 1981: 181)
"(Social representations are] cognitive systems with a logic and 
language of their own [..] They do not represent simply "opinions
99
about", "images of' or "attitudes towards" but "theories” or
"branches of knowledge" in their own right, for the discovery and
organization of reality" (Moscovici: xii, preface in Herzlich 1973)
Social representations acquire various forms and function at 
different levels of social reality; cognitive, ideological and 
psychological. However, they always maintain their main and 
characteristic function, namely they offer a particular form of
perception and interpretation of the world that surrounds us. As
Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) wisely argue, representative thought 
uses images and symbols to provide for explanations of empirical 
reality.
Social representations are the analytical category used to 
conceive and investigate the role that social cognition plays with 
respect to the mental and psychological activity in which 
individuals engage when dealing with reality (i.e. with situations, 
events, communication or simple objects). The cognition embodied 
in social representations is collectively elaborated and shared 
(Jodelet 1984: 360). It includes individual experiences but also 
knowledge, information and norms which are reciprocally transmitted 
among the members of a given society. Social representations are 
a 'practical knowledge'4 (Jodelet ibid.); they help individuals 
manage and (re)construct their social reality. In brief, social 
representations are conceived as the product and the process of the 
socio-psychological elaboration of reality. They involve a 
specific form of thinking about social events, objects and social 
relations which guides people's understanding of social reality.
A social representation is a branch of social cognition which 
fulfils the basic function of representing. It involves a subject 
and an object. The subject is the individual or group who applies 
a specific social representation to a given 'object.' The latter 
may be a task, an event, a personality, a problem, a behaviour or 
an attitude. The social representation reflects the role and
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position of its subject (Plon 1972; Gilly 1980). Thus, the social 
representation links the subject, which is socially defined through 
its position, role and status, with a social object. The 
representation is realised through the linking of the perceived 
object with a concept. This concept assigns meaning to the object 
and links it with specific symbolic elements through metaphors. 
The social representation has a constructive, autonomous and 
creative character (Jodelet ibid.: 365).
Several forms of social representations have been identified 
within different theoretical approaches. A social representation 
attributes meaning to social experiences (Kaes 1968; Herzlich 
1973). More specifically, it reflects the social position and role 
of the subject that uses it (Plon ibid.; Gilly ibid.) and/or 
expresses the group membership of the subject, namely the beliefs 
and values that prevail in the social group/category with which the 
subject identifies (Codol 1970a; 1970b). Consequently, social
representations also reproduce ideologies and, in particular, 
dominant ideas and established norms. It follows from.this that 
they also regulate, anticipate and justify the relationships 
between social groups (Doise 1979) and accordingly affect the 
attempts of the various groups to exert some influence.
The usefulness of the notion of social representations lies in 
their function of conventionalising objects, persons and events 
with which the individual is unfamiliar. Thus, social
representations help people to locate these objects within known 
existing categories. Social representations have a prescriptive 
power over people. They determine, through collectively shared 
knowledge, experience and ideas, what one perceives and conceives. 
The function of social representations comprises two processes; 
objectification and anchoring (Moscovici 1984). The process of 
anchoring concerns the integration of a new object or idea in the 
pre-existing cognitive framework. The new 'object'5 is inserted 
and becomes an organic part of the existing system of thought. For 
instance, the appeal to the necessity of investigating political 
scandals and of prosecuting those held responsible, i.e. the case
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of the 'catharsis' of the Socialist government scandals, link the 
specific event to existing norms about the use of public money or 
to past experience of corruption in the public administration and 
government. The new object or idea is positioned, through the 
anchoring process, within the given socio-cognitive order. Social 
representations thus contribute to the organisation of the social 
space.
Social representations create a link between the 'object' that 
is to be represented and a perceivable, material element. This is 
the function of objectification which transforms something 
abstract, i.e. an attitude, an opinion, a belief or a set of 
specialised knowledge, into something almost concrete; a person, an 
object or an image that represents a person or an object. 
Objectification takes place by means of personification and 
figuration (Moscovici & Hewstone 1983). Personification refers to 
the association of theories or ideas with an individual, designated 
by name; nuclear physics and Einstein, for example. The process of 
figuration substitutes complex and unfamiliar knowledge, eg. 
complex projects of modernisation and development, with images and 
simplistic metaphors, eg. young, well-dressed, smiling people in an 
office with modern furniture and equipment. Personification and 
figuration are used also in political campaigning. Political 
issues or values are very often identified with specific 
politicians. Policy programs are communicated through images and 
metaphors much more than argumentation and relative data.
4.3.2 Social representations and inter-group relations
Within an influence process, a group adopts styles of 
behaviour and applies strategies of influence and resistance that 
activate specific social representations. These representations 
lead to a favourable interpretation of the attitudes and image of 
one's own group and discredit the beliefs and the image of the 
adversary group. Unfavourable social representations may thus
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cancel the influence potential of the rival group. When the 
beliefs of that group are, for instance, interpreted through their 
linkage to psychological characteristics, eg. when a social 
representation of abnormality, deviance or psychological imbalance, 
is activated in relation to that group, its opinions are 
discredited.
Inter-party relations are conditioned by social 
representations in a similar way. The ideas and policy positions 
of the various parties are related to the social representations 
that they or their rivals activate. These guide the interpretation 
of the party beliefs and program. The same policy position, for 
instance, proposed by the Alliance of the Left (SYN.) or the 
Conservative Party (N.D.) may acquire a different meaning because 
it is linked to different and even contradictory social 
representations. Let us suppose, for instance, that both the SYN. 
and the N.D. sustain that the State should control the price of 
consumer goods. The SYN. embeds its position in a representation 
of social justice and equal allocation of fundamental consumer 
goods. The control over the prices is thus presented as a 
redistributive function. The N.D., on the other hand, vests the 
same policy position in a social representation of a competitive 
international market and in the need for the country to improve its 
position within it. One proposed measure for this improvement is 
the regulation of the national market. The regulation of the 
prices of consumer goods appears thus in both party programs as a 
positive measure. However, each party relates it to different 
socio-economic principles.
The prevalence of one social representation over several 
possible social representations is contingent upon the group or 
party that activates it. An incumbent party which enjoys power, 
authority, recognised competence and prestige has an advantageous 
position with respect to a challenger party that is out of office. 
The outsider party is even weaker in mobilising social 
representations because it is often regarded as an extreme or
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Each party uses the strategies of influence and resistance in 
order to assign derogatory social representations to its rival 
parties. The strategy of denial, for instance, produces an 
interpretation of the adversary positions in terms of falseness. 
lack of objective validity, inconsistency with respect to reality 
and so on. The Conservative party, for example, used the strategy 
of denial to discredit the proposal of the Socialist party that the 
national welfare system should be further developed. The 
Conservatives maintained that such a proposal, if implemented, 
would impede the country's growth and that the Socialist party 
leadership "[had] lost contact with reality and the actual needs of 
the Greek people." This is an attempt to deny the validity of the 
policy. The proposal of the Socialist party is represented as 
being untruthful and non-realistic.
Parties also use the strategy of affirmation, i.e. the 
utterance of false statements about events which have not taken 
place in order to discredit the image of the adversary party. The 
Conservative party maintains that the Socialists, although they 
have adhered to the national unity government, undermine the 
functioning of the government and tacitly prepare new elections. 
The Conservative party thus represents the participation of the 
Socialists in the common government as a dishonest and illegitimate 
competition practice.
Social representations of psychological imbalance may be 
activated against rival party leaders. The personal life of the 
leader of the Socialist party, Mr. A. Papandreou is interpreted in 
terms of senility, physical weakness and mental disorder. In this 
way, the rival parties put into question the capacity of Mr. 
Papandreou to accomplish the duties of a Prime Minister.
Categorisation is the strategy used par excellence to activate 
social representations. The same socio-political dimensions, eg. 
democratic vs. authoritarian attitudes or social equality vs. 
exploitation of the poor, are applied reciprocally by the parties. 
The left-wing parties, for instance, present their positions as
marginal political force.
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democratic and egalitarian and accentuate the conservative and 
authoritarian character of the ideas and practices of the right- 
wing party. The Conservatives, on the other hand, emphasise the 
progressive character of their beliefs and represent the position 
of their left-wing rivals as extremist, unrealistic or dogmatic. 
Thus, the social representations activated through the strategy of 
categorisation confirm the party opinions and lead to a negative 
interpretation of the ideas of rivals.
4.3.3 A typology of social representations interfering with
inter-group or inter-party relationships
It has been argued that social representations interfere with 
relationships between different and often opposed social groups. 
More specifically, inter-group behaviour determines the character 
of inter-group relations through the mobilisation of specific 
social representations (Sherif 1967). Rival group encounters have 
been proved to produce negative representations and mutual dislike 
between groups. It has been demonstrated that when two groups 
share a set of incompatible goals, namely both groups desire some 
objective which can be attained only at the expense of the other, 
competition turns to hostility and stimulates the creation of 
unfavourable attitudes towards the opposite group (Blake & Mouton 
1961). Hostility also generates negative stereotyped images of 
rivals. The latter are, thus, positioned at a certain social, 
ideological and psychological 'distance' from the ingroup.
Nonetheless, when conflicting groups face a common super­
ordinate goal, i.e. a series of activities which require 
cooperation and coordination of forces, inter-group relations show 
a significant improvement. Hostile outgroup attitudes and 
derogatory stereotypes gradually disappear and the perceived social 
or ideological 'distance' between the two groups is reduced. 
Future inter-group conflicts become thus less probable (Sherif et 
al. 1961; Sherif 1967). These experimental findings confirm that
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inter-group relations generate social representations which in turn 
affect the attitudes and the relations between social groups.
Alternation between incompatible and common interdependent 
goals is frequent in inter-party relations. Parties interact with 
each other in a competitive way. However, they may also engage in 
post-election negotiation with the aim of forming a coalition 
government. Social representations interfere with inter-party 
relations under conditions of competitive but also cooperative 
behaviour.
Social representations influence the relationships between 
groups or parties in various ways: they function selectively, they 
justify and anticipate group behaviour.
(a) Selective social representation
Interaction between two rival groups is embedded in a mutual 
construct of unfavourable representations. The attitude towards, 
and image of, the rival group is related to a negative 
representation. This representation does not affect the image of 
the outgroup in a homogeneous way. It functions selectively; the 
representation refers to the causes of action of the rival group 
rather than to its social characteristics or to the collective or 
personal abilities of the members of the outgroup (Avigdor 1953; 
Wilson, Chun & Katayani 1965). The outgroup is attributed negative 
characteristics, egoism, envy or aggressiveness for instance, which 
justify the hostile behaviour of the ingroup. The egocentric 
attitude of the ingroup is projected to the rival group (Wilson & 
Katayani 1968). The competing groups may behave in a similar 
manner. Still, they perceive each other as more aggressive, more 
competitive and less generous than themselves. Thus, each deems 
the other to be responsible for the intergroup conflict.
Negative social representations which particularly focus on 
the motives of action of the rival group are also identified in 
party coalition negotiation. An example from the case study of
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Greek parties highlights the selective function of social 
representations in inter-party politics. The example refers to the 
negotiations between the three larger Greek parties in July 1989, 
soon after the national election of the 18th of June 1989. The 
Conservative party (N.D.) and the Alliance of the Left (SYN.), in 
spite of their fundamental ideological and political differences, 
formed a coalition government. The Socialist party accused the 
Alliance of the Left of political opportunism. It, thus, blamed 
the SYN. for the breakdown of the negotiations between the two of 
them. The Socialist party sought to discredit the motivation of 
its opponent by relating it to unfavourable social representations. 
It is, however, arguable that the attitude of PA.SO.K. differed 
little from that of the SYN. The Socialists had negotiated, albeit 
without success, the formation of a coalition government with the 
Alliance of the Left. A few months later (on October 4th, 1989) 
they formed the "Democratic Coalition," which embraced several 
small parties and politicians of the Centre-left-wing, in an 
attempt to increase their electoral force. However,.the Socialist 
party projected its own political opportunism to the Alliance of 
the Left and, thus, deemed the latter party to be responsible for 
the conflict between the two of them.
(b) Justifying social representation
Specific social representations are used in group interaction 
to justify the behaviour adopted by the ingroup. Discrimination 
against ethnic or economic minorities, for instance, is justified 
by the development of negative stereotyped images. Thus
differentiation between black and white pupils in the U.S. is 
justified by a negatively biased estimation of the learning 
capacities of black children (Clarke & Campbell 1955). Social 
stereotypes are often used to justify social behaviour. Thus, 
reality is perceived through distorting lenses which interpret the 
same behaviour in different ways.
Ingroup favouritism and outgroup discriminating bias may lead
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to opposite evaluations of the same behaviour. a. type of behaviour 
performed by members of an outgroup is assessed in different ways 
than would be the same behaviour performed by members of the 
ingroup. Peabody's study (1968) on ethnic group stereotypes, for 
instance, demonstrated that Filipino and Chinese people regard the 
same action as being "thrift" ("generosity") if it is performed by 
a member of their own group and as "stinginess" ("waste") when it
is performed by a member of the opposite ethnic group. In general
terms, ingroup activity is vested with a positive interpretation 
while outgroup behaviour is embedded in a negative social 
representation.
Justifying social representations are also used in the context 
of elections. Commentaries on elections in the press provide a 
biased evaluation of the election results, the direction of the 
bias being dependent on the party affiliation of each newspaper. 
The example that follows concerns the Greek national election of 
November 5, 1989. All three parties interpreted the results as a 
victory for themselves and as a failure for their opponents. The 
N.D. maintained that it had won the electoral contest because it 
had increased its percentage of votes and it was the largest party. 
The fact that the party failed to achieve its main aim, namely
absolute majority in Parliament, was downplayed. The social
representation of power, authority and prestige focused on the 
electoral percentage more than on its consequences, namely the fact 
that the party could not form a single party government.
The PA.SO.K., on the other hand, claimed that the election 
results demonstrated that progressive voters wholeheartedly trusted 
the Socialist party. The PA.SO.K. represented itself as the winner 
of the elections because it had managed to slightly increase its 
electoral force. Furthermore, the election outcome was interpreted 
as a success for the Socialists because the N.D. did not succeed in 
obtaining a Parliamentary majority. The fact that the increase in 
voter support for the PA.SO.K. was smaller than that of the N. D. 
was ignored, as was the fact that the PA.SO.K. had also failed to 
achieve a parliamentary majority. The PA.SO.K. was represented as
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a left-wing, courageous and realistic party which "struggled 
against" the Conservatives.
The Alliance of the Left (SYN.), whose electoral power 
decreased (it lost approx. 20% of its votes), maintained that the 
party had successfully fought the electoral battle due to the fact 
that it remained faithful to its beliefs. The election outcome was 
interpreted as being absolutely favourable to the SYN. since the 
party succeeded in preserving its "significant political weight" 
which enabled it to influence political matters. Thus, even the 
absolute defeat, in quantitative terms, of the SYN. was interpreted 
positively. The SYN. was associated with a social representation 
of political honesty and ideological commitment which created a 
flattering image of the party.
In brief, all parties justified their claim to have 'won' the 
elections. The election outcomes were represented by each party as 
a success for itself as a failure for its opponents.
(c) Anticipating social representation
Interaction between social groups may be anticipated through 
the activation of social representations. Before an encounter of 
two groups takes place, an image of the 'other' group is formed 
which provides the grounds for group behaviour. The mere 
expectation of a future interaction between two distinct social 
groups increases the inter-group bias to the sane level as that 
obtained following inter-group behaviour (Doise 1969; 1972; Doise
et al. 1972). Thus, expected interaction leads to the activation 
of unfavourable social representations with respect to the 
outgroup. These representations anticipate the actual behaviour of 
the other group. They also justify the competitive or hostile 
behaviour of the ingroup towards the outgroup.
Social representations that anticipate party interaction are 
mobilised by means of inter-party competition and negotiation. 
These social representations may result in a moderation of 
aggressiveness among parties as these foresee or aim at a future
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collaboration in an electoral or governmental coalition. 
Furthermore, social representations change when expectations about 
the rival party behaviour are also modified.
The changing representation of the Greek parties in the period 
between the elections of June 1989 and November 1989 may highlight 
the part played by social representations which anticipated party 
interaction. The parties involved in the post-election bargain for 
the formation of government were the PA.SO.K., the N.D. and the 
Alliance of the Left (SYN.). The Socialists (PA.SO.K.), overtly 
hostile towards the Conservative party (N.D.) (no 'Grand coalition' 
was conceivable), adopted a flexible style towards the SYN. They 
emphasised the ideological proximity between themselves and the 
SYN. and represented the latter as a progressive left-wing party, 
courageous and honest in supporting its beliefs. The PA.SO.K. 
opted for a long-term governmental coalition with the SYN. and 
expected that the SYN. would react positively to their proposal. 
The Conservative party, on the other hand, did not engage in post­
election negotiations with the SYN.. It adopted a competitive 
style and accentuated its political and ideological 
distinctiveness. The SYN., however, rejected a representation of 
itself and the Socialists as the "wider Left" and refused to 
participate in a coalition government with the PA.SO.K. 
Consequently, the Socialists activated a different type of social 
representation; this would guide the interpretation of their own 
actions and the actions of the SYN. They represented the SYN. 
leadership as power-obsessed, revengeful and selfish. The hostile 
reaction of the SYN. was thus discredited without putting into 
question the identity of the PA.SO.K. as "left-wing". The leaders 
and/or supporters of the SYN. were represented as "the traitors of 
the Left." For their own part, the Socialist party vested 
themselves with the representation of a realistic, consistent and 
honest left-wing party.
The governmental coalition formed by the N.D. and the SYN. led 
to their reciprocal positive evaluation in spite of their 
ideological difference. The common dedication of both the SYN. and
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the N.D. to the principle of justice and their common willingness 
to struggle against public fraud were used as a kind of social 
representation that linked the two parties. Their cooperation was 
thus assigned a positive meaning.
4.3.4 Operationalising the concept of social representations in
the context of inter-party behaviour
Party discourse in the press is one method of public 
communication used by parties to express their attitudes and to 
explain their behaviour. Party discourse is related to social 
representations in two ways. It is embedded in social
representations and it simultaneously activates them. On the one 
hand, party behaviour is attributed value and meaning through its 
linkage with the collective knowledge of society, namely the social 
representations that are inherent in the given socio-cognitive 
system. On the other hand, parties use social representations 
purposefully. Social representations are integrated in the 
dynamics of party interaction and competitive or cooperative 
relations. Parties use favourable social representations when they 
talk about themselves. On the contrary, if the object of their 
discourse is a rival party they activate unfavourable social 
representations. The ingroup or outgroup identity of the party- 
object, its ideological proximity with the pa.rty-source, the 
perception of a set of shared characteristics and of crossed 
category memberships between the two parties and, eventually, their 
interdependent or conflictual goals condition the kind of social 
representations that is being used in inter-party relations.
The intertwining of social representations with the 
relationships between political actors makes them an important 
element of media discourse. Parties express their beliefs through 
the press, and, in particular, in Greece through the partisan 
press. Parties act as if the electorate interprets their behaviour 
in terms of social representations. Therefore, specific discursive
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'frames'4 are used to guide the understanding of a message and of 
the relevant image of the party-object of the discourse. These 
'frames' are schemes of interpretation which function as 'tool­
kits' of symbols, stories, rituals and world-views that people use 
to make sense of the world.
The "framing" packages that parties use in their discourse are 
provided by the socio-cognitive system of a given society. Each 
society disposes of a limited pool of "frames", i.e. a set of 
social representations that are meaningful within the given society 
and which may function as interpretive schemes.
For the purposes of the present study, the notion of social 
representations is operationalised in terms of framing packages 
inherent in media communication. A set of framing packages7 has 
been produced on the basis of contextual knowledge of Greek 
politics and on the basis of knowledge of, and material from, the 
specific period under study. The initial set of packages has been 
complemented by additional categories introduced during the coding 
of the raw material.
The framing packages which guide the interpretation of the 
content of the newspaper articles involve references to symbolic 
and ideological elements, to values or to psychological 
characteristics. They range from the positive to the negative pole 
of a dimension. Each dimension refers to a pair of antithetic 
social representations, eg. progressive-conservative ideas, 
peaceful/moderate - fanatic/violent people or honest/moral 
dishonest/immoral behaviour. The positive side of the
representation refers to the ingroup and the negative side to the 
opponent party. A message from a party source is associated by the 
party itself with a favourable social representation. The 
strategies of influence and resistance addressed against the rival 
parties are matched with negative types of social representations.
Parties polarise the discourse by positioning themselves at 
the one pole of the representation continuum and the opponent at 
the opposite pole. The Socialist party may thus emphasise 
ideological differences with the Conservatives by framing its
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economic policies in terms of social justice, i.e. a social 
representation of equal allocation of resources, of progressive, 
leftist policies. On the contrary, it relates the Conservative 
party to a social representation of exploitation and inequality.
However, parties may also emphasise ideological or political 
proximity by associating the same favourable representation to 
themselves as well as to potential collaborating parties. The 
formation of the governmental coalition between the Conservative 
party (N.D.) and the Alliance of the Left (SYN.) was framed with 
values such as fairness and honesty in politics. The SYN.
projected the same social representation both onto itself and onto 
its coalition partner. The political identities of both parties 
were included in a common super-ordinate category, namely the 
'incorruptible' parties. The discrepancy between their ideologies 
and policies was, therefore, concealed and overlooked.
In conclusion, social representations are an important element 
of party discourse. They assign meaning to the discourse and guide 
its understanding. They also contribute to the (re)definition of 
common or opposite super-ordinate identities between parties. 
Social representations are activated in the newspaper discourse 
through framing packages. This term is used to distinguish the 
methodological concept, namely the 'framing' or interpretive 
packages, from the general notion of social representations.
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N O T E S
1. A social category is a group of people who share or are perceived as sharing 
a common set of characteristics. These characteristics are typical to the 
category. Members of the specific group/category may be differentiated from 
members of other groups or categories on the basis of the characteristics typical 
to them.
2. The application of mutual ingroup favouritism culminates in intergroup 
discrimination and differentiation during processes of interaction between 
different groups. Intergroup discrimination concerns behaviour towards the 
outgroup while intergroup differentiation concentrates mainly on perceptions of 
and attitudes towards the outgroup.
3. Ingroup bias may also involve a differentiated perception of ingroup and 
outgroup homogeneity -the outgroup is perceived as more homogeneous than the 
ingroup- (Simon & Brown 1987; Brown & Smith 1989; Simon 1990; Simon & Pettigrew 
1990), an overestimation of belief similarity among the members of the outgroup 
(Simon & Mummendey 1990).
4. "Aussi est-elle (la répresentation sociale), par bien des côtés, une
connaissance socialement élaborée et partagée. Sous ses multiples aspects, elle 
vise essentiellement a maîtriser notre environnement, comprendre et expliquer les 
faits et idées qui meublent notre univers de vie (..) En d'autres termes, c'est 
une connaissance pratique. (..) elle forge les evidences de notre realité
consensuelle, concourt à la construction sociale de notre réalité“ (Jodelet 1984: 
360-361, emphasis in the original).
5. The term 'object' refers to events, personalities, attitudes, instances of 
behaviour or communication.
6. The notion of 'frames' refers to the everyday use of schemes of interpretation 
which render social reality meaningful (Goffman 1974). The concept is 
operationalised as a discursive device used in the media discourse in order to 
promote a specific interpretation of an action, situation or statement.
7. See appendix to Chapter six: Index of framing packages.
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CHAPTER V
Hypotheses
5.1 The impact of the party's power position upon its 
styles of behaviour
Introduction
In the previous chapters, a two-layer model has been 
developed which organises our approach to party behaviour. Our 
hypotheses link the model's first and second layers. The styles 
of behaviour and the strategies of the incumbent, challenger and 
outsider party are the dependent variables of the study. The 
independent variables are derived from either layer of the model. 
More specifically, the first set of hypotheses refers to the 
relationship between the power character of each party; namely 
incumbent, challenger or outsider, and the styles of behaviour, 
i.e. consistency/inconsistency and rigidity/ flexibility, adopted 
by each party. A second set of hypotheses is developed which 
examines the relationship between the power character of the 
parties and the common or opposed super-ordinate identities that 
two parties may have (independent variables) and the strategies 
of influence and resistance used by the parties against one 
another (dependent variables).
According to the first set of hypotheses, the power 
character of a party, i.e. its incumbent, challenger or outsider 
position, conditions the styles of behaviour that the party 
adopts, namely its varying degrees of consistency or 
inconsistency as well as its flexibility or rigidity. Differences 
in power position affect the ways in which parties develop their 
campaigning discourse.
The analysis is divided into three phases which correspond 
to three periods of time. The overall period studied includes
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three national elections (June 1989, November 1989 and April 
1990) and two provisional governments (July-October 1989 and 
November 1989-March 1990). The three periods of analysis are 
defined as follows:
1st period: before and immediately after the election of
June 1989
2nd period: before and after the formation of the first
government (July 1989) and before the election 
of November 1989
3rd period: before and after the formation of the second
government (end of November 1989) and before the 
election of April 1990
A set of initial hypotheses is proposed regarding the first 
period of analysis (see infra about the division of the analysis 
in periods). These hypotheses are related to the specific 
conditions under which the elections of June 1989 took place. 
A second set of hypotheses is developed concerning the evolution 
of the styles of party behaviour during the second period under 
study. Changes in the power structure and the reshaping of 
social representations with respect to the first period, due to 
important events which have taken place meanwhile, are, 
therefore, investigated. The analysis of the third period 
examines further changes in party behaviour with respect to the 
second period.
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5.2 Hypotheses concerning variation in styles of party 
behaviour
I. All types of political parties, i.e. of all three power 
positions, will tend to be consistent, but outsider parties 
particularly
The evaluation of consistency with respect to party 
behaviour is based on the way in which the party presents its 
opinions and policy positions. Consistency as a style of 
behaviour is measured by reference to party statements which 
assert that the party is consistent in its ideas and policies.
The incumbent and challenger party are expected to promote 
a moderate but clearly positive level of consistency in their 
behaviour. Their presentation of their ideology and policies as 
stable and coherent over time follows the general need of parties 
to confirm their electoral credibility. Indeed, political 
marketing approaches maintain that all parties have an interest 
in displaying relatively stable behaviour since voters tend to 
reward consistency (Mauser 1983).
The outsider party, in particular, which has at its disposal 
a low symbolic status and little power, is expected to use its 
consistent style of behaviour as a means to make its ideas 
salient in the political field. Outsider parties, just like 
minority groups, accentuate their stable and coherent behaviour 
so that they acquire a distinct and 'visible' position in the 
electoral contest. Consequently, the consistency score of the 
outsider party is expected to be not only extremely positive but 
also higher than that of the incumbent or the challenger party.
II. Both extremes of the power character (incumbent and outsider 
parties) will adopt rigid styles of behaviour. The intermediate 
power position (challenger party), on the other hand, will adopt 
a flexible style of behaviour
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The term 'intermediate' power character refers to the 
challenger party which although large and in conformity with the 
status quo, is excluded from governmental authority. Given this 
position of potential incumbency, the challenger is expected to 
display a flexible, consensual and conciliating style of 
behaviour in order to propose itself as an alternative to its 
predecessor. Its flexibility may help cover its possible 
weaknesses. On the other hand, a flexible style of behaviour 
contributes to the image of a governing party with realistic 
positions, a party that "looks after the good of the nation."
Parties that enjoy high authority and prestige or those 
which dispose of low power and status are expected to adopt a 
rigid style of behaviour. The motives are distinct for each kind 
of party. The incumbent is the "ruler of the game." It thus may 
display a high degree of intransigence. Given that the incumbent 
party occupies governmental office until the election day, its 
policy positions are salient and vested with governmental 
authority. The incumbent party is expected to support its 
opinions in a rigid way, and thus reinforce their validity. This 
rigidity is related to its 'superiority' in terms of size and 
authority. It holds power and does not accept any questioning 
of its ideas. The incumbent party thus emphasises its dominant 
position.
The outsider party, on the other hand, is also expected to 
show a rigid style of behaviour. Its rigidity, however, is based 
on different grounds than that of the incumbent party. The 
unconventional positions, the small size and the 'alternative' 
character of the outsider party attribute to it a conflictual 
character. The policy positions and ideas of the outsider party 
are contrary to those of the incumbent and challenger parties. 
They also diverge from the beliefs of a large part of the 
electorate. The small size of the party and its lack of 
authority cannot generate prestige and validity for its ideas. 
According to Moscovici and Ricateau (1972), the influence 
potential of minorities lies in their capacity of disrupting the 
social consensus and creating conflict. Therefore, it is argued
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that the "power" of the outsider parties is based on their 
rejection of dominant ideology. The outsider party is thus 
expected to adopt an intransigent and uncompromising style of 
behaviour in order to make its beliefs salient in the political 
field. Its rigidity accentuates the distance between itself and 
the larger parties and thus stresses its distinctiveness.
Both outsider and incumbent party are therefore expected to 
show higher levels of rigidity than the challenger party. The 
following table represents schematically the expected general 
findings:
! TABLE 1I -------Consist./Inconsistency Rigid./Flexibility
Incumbent + +
Challenger +
Outsider ++ +
Notes The symbol (+) indicates a tendency towards the left component of 
the dimension, i.e. it indicates a consistent (+) or very consistent (++)
behaviour and a rigid (+) or very rigid (++) style of negotiation. On
the contrary the symbol (-) indicates the tendency of the party to adopt 
I an inconsistent (-) or very inconsistent (— ) and a flexible (-) or very
| flexible (— ) style of behaviour.
Table 1 shows the predictions in terms of styles of 
behaviour adopted by parties with different power characters. 
These predictions are further developed: three sets of
expectations are provided which follow the evolution of the 
political situation in the three periods under analysis. The 
first set plays the role of a control matrix because it 
represents a regular election situation within the Greek 
political environment. The predictions referring to the first 
period of analysis (before and immediately after the election of 
June 1989) are represented in table 2.
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TABLE 2
Consist./Inconsist. Rigid./Flexibility 
Incumbent (PASOK) + +
Challenger (ND) +
Outsider (SYN) ++ +
Note: See table 1 for the meaning of the symbols (+), (-)-
The power character of the three parties was modified after 
the elections of June 1989. The Conservatives (N.D.) became the 
incumbent party since they possessed the highest electoral 
percentage, although that percentage was not high enough to 
secure them a par li ciment a ry majority. The Socialists (PA.SO.K.) 
were out of the government and thus became the challenger party 
while preserving the vast majority of their votes. The Alliance 
of the Left, i.e the SYN., remained the outsider.1
The aim of the second set is to examine the deviations from 
the findings verified in the first period. During the second 
period, the power position of a party is not the only factor that 
conditions its rigidity or flexibility. The strategic decisions 
of a party regarding its participation in a governmental 
coalition are introduced as a factor that influences the rigid 
or flexible style of behaviour of each type of party.
The formation of a provisional government during the second 
period is expected to have a significant impact on the styles of 
party behaviour. The analysis distinguishes party behaviour in 
terms of concrete action from the styles of party behaviour. It 
is assumed that a party uses the media discourse as a response 
to and as a mediator of its strategic choices. Therefore, 
significant events of the campaign and the negotiations such as 
adherence to or rejection of participation in a governmental 
coalition are taken into account as a factor that affects the 
party styles of behaviour. Thus, the following hypothesis is
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made:
III. Parties that act consistently with their power position 
will reinforce their strategic decisions by means of their rigid 
behaviour. In contrast, parties that take decisions which are 
contrary to their power position will tend to mediate their 
behaviour by reducing their rigidity or by increasing their 
flexibility.
More specifically,
III, a. The incumbent and the challenger party that act in 
accordance with their power position, i.e. the incumbent occupies 
office and the challenger remains in the opposition, will 
reinforce their strategic decisions by increasing their rigidity. 
The outsider party which acts contrary to its power position, 
since it participates in a coalition government, will adopt a 
less rigid/more flexible style of behaviour.
During the second period of the analysis, the SYN., although 
an outsider party, negotiated and eventually adhered to a 
provisional governmental coalition formed with the incumbent 
party / N . D . ) . The fact that the outsider party consented to 
participate in this governmental coalition was inconsistent with 
its outsider party character. As a matter of fact, its behaviour 
may be regarded as being contradictory with respect to its former 
positions. Therefore, the party is expected to guide the 
interpretation of its decision in terms of a generally flexible 
and conciliating attitude. The style of behaviour of the party 
will be in conformity with its decision to participate in the 
coalition and will attenuate its previously highly conflictual 
behaviour.
The challenger party, namely the PA.SO.K., was left alone 
in the opposition. The fact that governmental office was 
occupied by the joint forces of the incumbent and the outsider
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party is hypothesised to have caused a polarisation of the field 
of competition. The rivalry between the incumbent and the 
challenger was accentuated because the challenger party remained 
isolated. It is thus expected that the two parties adopted a 
style of behaviour less flexible/more rigid than in the previous 
period.
Furthermore, both parties made choices that were consistent 
with their power positions. The N.D. formed a governmental 
coalition in accordance with its incumbent character. Thus, 
according to the hypothesis that parties which act consistently 
with their power character, i.e. an incumbent party that occupies 
governmental office, will reinforce their decision by means of 
their uncompromising style of behaviour, the incumbent party 
(N.D.) will follow an intransigent style of behaviour in its 
press discourse. It thus will emphasise that it is the party 
that occupies the highest power position and governs the country.
The predictions of the second period of analysis are 
summarised in table 3 (see infra).
TABLE
Consist./Inconsist. Rigid./Flexibility j
IIncumbent <JJD) + ++ more rigid 1
than in the | f i r s t  ; 
period ,
Challenger (PASOK) + + less j
flexible than j 
in the first i 
period |
tOutsider (SYN) ++ - less rigid j
than in the j 
first period j
Tbe PA.SO.K., on the other hand, conform with its challenger 
position, refused to participate in a coalition government. The 
challenger party thus made a strategic decision that was 
consistent with its power character and is, therefore, expected
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to adopt a less flexible/more rigid styxe of behaviour than it 
did in the first period. A rigid style of behaviour will be in 
conformity with its determination to reject any provisional 
governmental solution. The challenger thus will stress its 
rivalry with the incumbent party and its decision to challenge 
governmental power.
During the third period the three parties formed a wide 
governmental coalition on the basis of national consensus. The 
formation of this national unity government does not imply that 
all parties became incumbent. This government provided a 
solution to what was considered to be a national emergency and 
was clearly of a provisional character. Therefore, the power 
character of each party during the third period is assumed to 
have remained the same as in the second period2. Thus, tne N.D. 
maintained its incumbent position, the PA.SO.K. remained at 
challenger status and the SYN. retained its outsider character. 
Therefore, in accordance with hypothesis III (see supra), the 
following prediction is made with respect to the third period 
under study:
m s  xncumueni.
power position, i.e.
party wnj.cn acts in accort 
it occupies office, will
aance wizn izs 
reinforce its
strategic decisions by increasing its rigidity. The challenger
and the outsider party which act contrary to their power position
since they participate in a coalition government , will adopt a
less rigid/more flexible style of behaviour.
Thus, the formation of the national unity government is 
expected to have different effects on the styles of behaviour of 
each party. During the third period, the outsider party (SYN.) 
consented to a governmental coalition with the two larger parties 
contrary to its dissenting beliefs. Therefore, the outsider 
party is expected to display a relatively flexible style of 
behaviour in order to 'justify' its behaviour.
According to hypothesis (Illb) (see supra), the challenger
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par ¿y (PA.SO.K.) will adopt a more flexible/less rigid style of 
behaviour than in the second period because during the third 
period the strategic decisions of the party are inconsistent with 
its challenger position. The participation of the PA.SO.K. in 
the national unity government is contrary to its character of a 
party that challenges the governmental power of the incumbent. 
Therefore, the party will support its decision by means of
attenuating its rigidity and emphasising its conciliating
attitude (no revanche politics) and, above all, its preoccupation
with the good of the nation. Furthermore, it will thus seek to 
reinforce its image as a potential governing party.
Table 4 represents the expectations of the styles of 
behaviour adopted by the parties in the third period under
examination.
TABLE 3 !
Consist./Inconsist• Rigid./Flexibility
Incumbent (ND) + ++ more rigid
than in the 
s e c o n d  
period
m o r e  
f l e x i b l e  
than in the i 
s e c o n d  j 
period ji Ie q u a l l y  , 
flexible as | 
i n  t h e  j s e c o n d  » 
period j
Finally, according to hypothesis (Illb) (see supra), the 
incumbent party whose decisions are consistent with its power 
character, is expected to maintain and further stress its rigid 
style of behaviour. The incumbent party will support its 
strategic choices with its intransigent style of behaviour thus 
enhancing its image as a powerful party most likely to form a 
single party government. The incumbent party is expected to 
demonstrate its determination and unwillingness to compromise on
Challenger (PASOK)
Outsider (SYN) ++
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any issue. Its rigidity will point to its high power and high 
status position.
5.3 The power character of the party and the common or opposed 
super-ordinate party identities: Implications for party
strategies
The second set of hypotheses investigates the effect of two 
independent variables, namely the power character of the party 
and the shared or distinct super-ordinate identities of two 
parties on the strategies that each party employs to confront its 
rivals. The confrontation between rival parties is analysed in 
terms of strategies of influence over and resistance to
opponents. The following strategies are used to analyse party 
communication and interaction: categorisation, psychologisation, 
denial and affirmation.3 It is expected that the strategies
that each party follows with respect to an opponent are
contingent upon the power character of the party and of its rival 
and also upon the perception of the party that it shares a common 
super-ordinate political identity with its rival or that the two 
of them have different and conflictual super-ordinate
identities.*
The power character of parties interferes with inter-party 
behaviour. Parties are aware of their different status and power 
positions when they communicate, compete or collaborate with each 
other. Their power and status differentials are hypothesised to 
influence the development of party relations during pre-election 
campaigning and post-election negotiation. This effect is 
reflected in the strategies that rival parties use to discredit 
the beliefs of one another.
On the other hand, the common political or instrumental 
super—ordinate identity or the opposed super—ordinate identities 
that two parties have is also expected to influence the 
strategies employed between parties.
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The following hypotheses are forwarded with respect to the 
effect of the independent variables, namely of the power 
character and of the common or opposed super-ordinate party 
identity on the dependent variable, i.e. the strategies of 
influence and resistance followed with respect to the 
adversaries. Hypotheses are presented separately for each 
strategy.
a) Hypotheses concerning the frequency of the use of the 
categorisation strategy in party interaction
I. Parties that share a common super-ordinate political identity 
will categorise more vis-à-vis one another than parties with 
opposed super-ordinate identities
The effect of the common or opposed super-ordinate identity 
on the application of the categorisation strategy is related to 
the mutual perception of parties in terms of 'us' and 'them.' 
Parties with opposite super-ordinate identities are expected to 
stress the difference between their beliefs and the beliefs of 
other parties. A left-wing party, for instance, will emphasise 
the differences between its own ideology and the ideology of a 
Conservative right-wing party. The ideological discrepancy 
between the two is already made salient by the name of the 
parties, by their ideology and also by their policy positions, 
however. The relationships between these parties may be
characterised by inter-group discriminatory bias. Both parties 
are expected to use the categorisation strategy to highlight 
their own superiority. However, each party holds a different set 
of values and beliefs on which it builds its political identity. 
Thus inter-party differentiation is not regarded by the party as 
being essential in order for it to make explicit its positions 
and justify its distinctiveness from the rival party.
In contrast, parties that share a common super-ordinate 
political identity, a socialist and an extreme leftist party for
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instance, have an interest in affirming their positive 
distinctiveness. They are expected to differentiate from each 
other in order to achieve positive superiority with respect to 
the relevant outgroup, namely the party with which the ingroup 
shares a significant part of its political identity. As a matter 
of fact, "the strongest competition might be expected to occur 
where in reality there is the least reason to prefer one group 
to the other" (Turner 1975: 22). Consequently, the less the
parties differ from one another, the more they will differentiate 
themselves from, and discriminate against, one another.
Furthermore, the (potential) party voters that belong to the 
same super-ordinate political category overlap. The parties 
compete, to a certain extent, for the same portion of the 
electorate. Each party is, therefore, expected to forward a 
claim of validity and uniqueness for its own party identity and 
beliefs which it in turn contrasts with the identities and 
beliefs of its adversary. Each party may thus seek, to discard 
the identity of the rival as 'false.'
In summary, parties that share a common super-ordinate 
political identity are expected to apply the strategy of 
categorisation towards one another more frequently than those 
with opposed super-ordinate identities.
A party uses categorisation to differentiate from and 
discriminate against its opponents. We shall argue that 
categorisation is related to specific socio-political 
characteristics which either refer to the party identity or to 
the common tasks that two parties share. Given that inter-group 
bias refers only to features that are regarded as being related 
to the distinction between two groups (Tajfel, Skeikh & Gardner 
1964), it is argued that categorisation as a strategy between 
rival parties will also stress those elements which play an 
important role in the relationships between the parties. 
Therefore, each party is expected to link the strategy of 
categorisation with specific sets of socio-political 
characteristics according to its sharing a common political or
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instrumental or both types of super-ordinate identity with the 
specific rival party towards which categorisation is directed. 
Consequently, the following hypotheses are formulated:
II. a) Parties that share a common instrumental super-ordinate 
identity will relate categorisation to dimensions relevant 
to political values and/or policy questions concerning 
their interdependent goals
b ) Parties that share a common political super-ordinate 
identity will categorise against one another along general 
political dimensions which do not explicitly refer to their 
ideological affinity
c) Parties that share both a political and an instrumental 
super-ordinate identity will categorise along political 
dimensions which, however, do not refer explicitly to their 
ideological affinity, and will also categorise with 
reference to policy questions concerning their 
interdependent goals
As noted earlier, a common instrumental super-ordinate 
identity does not unify former opponents. An instrumental super­
ordinate identity involves cooperative activity between parties. 
However, it does not cancel the ideological and policy difference 
between the cooperating parties. Therefore, an instrumental 
super-ordinate identity is not expected to increase the need for 
positive differentiation from a coalition partner. Consequently, 
it is hypothesised not to provoke an increased use of the 
categorisation strategy.
However, a qualitative shift is expected in the application 
of categorisation when an instrumental super-ordinate identity 
is imposed on two competing parties. These parties are expected 
to concentrate on dimensions relevant to their functional 
interdependence. Thus, their use of categorisation will be 
related to the decision-making of the coalition government,
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namely on policy questions or on the socio-political principles 
that guide policy decisions.
Parties that share a common super-ordinate political 
identity are expected to discriminate against each other in ways 
that accentuate their distinctiveness, however, without 
explicitly referring to their common beliefs. They are, 
therefore, expected to seek positive distinctiveness by 
categorising themselves and their adversaries in terms of general 
political values or practices or even in terms of psychological 
features. They may also seek positive distinctiveness from each 
other in terms of additional, 'new' ideological dimensions.
Finally, parties that share both an instrumental and a 
political super-ordinate identity are expected to stress policy 
questions as categorisation dimensions seeking thus to 
differentiate themselves from their coalition partners. 
Moreover, these parties are expected to avoid ideological 
dimensions which may make salient their common beliefs. They are 
rather expected to prefer categorisation along general political 
dimensions; namely dimensions regarding abstract political 
notions or principles, eg. democratic - authoritarian practices; 
which may create ideological 'distance' between them.
III. Parties with a high power position will direct 
categorisation towards parties with a lower power position more 
frequently than the latter are likely to do against the former.
The impact of the party power character on the application 
of categorisation against a rival party is conceptualised in 
terms of a mutual awareness of power relationships between 
opponent parties. It is assumed that parties 'know' the 
stereotyped characteristics of their own and of their rival 
parties and are aware of the categorisation of the social and 
political field. According to Turner (1982: 30'), an individual 
forms or learns the stereotyped norms of a social category and
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perceives the categorisation of social reality accordingly. 
Consequently, it is assumed that subjects involved in an 
influence situation are informed about the stereotyped 
characteristics assigned to the social groups participating in 
the influence process (Mugny & Papastamou 1982: 381). This
assumption may be further extended to political influence 
situations. Parties interacting and competing with each other 
can be assumed to be also aware of stereotyped images attributed 
to themselves and to their rivals. Therefore, those parties 
which enjoy high prestige and a strong power position are 
expected to prefer the use of categorisation as a strategy which 
highlights their superiority. Conversely, parties with a low 
power profiles are expected to demonstrate a less frequent use 
of categorisation against rivals which have at their disposal 
pragmatic and symbolic authority. Past experience and present 
knowledge makes them conscious of the unfavourable outcome of 
such a categorical distinction.
b) Hypotheses concerning the use of the psychologisation 
strategy in inter-party relations
The use of psychologising claims against rival parties 
modifies the focus of party competition. Political or social 
criteria concerning the party's capacity to govern are replaced 
by psychological features. The use of psychologisation between 
opponent parties is therefore independent of their relative power 
and status positions. However, psychologisation is closely 
related to the ideological proximity between the psychologised 
group and the population subject to the influence of 
psychologisation. Subjects ideologically 'close' to a group are 
those most sensitive to the attribution to group beliefs of 
psychological characteristics or emotional states. They perceive 
most intensely the lack of objective validity of the 
psychologised positions (Papastamou 1986). The correlation 
between the impact of psychologisation and the ideological 
affinity between the source and the subjects of influence leads
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to the following hypothesis:
J_:-- Psycho log is at ion is used by sets of parties which perceive
themselves as being ideologically and politically distant from 
Qllfi— another, i.e. by parties whose super-ordinate political 
identities are opposed. Parties that share a common super­
ordinate, instrumental or political. identity will use 
psychologisation against one another less frequently.
Following earlier research findings on the effect of 
psychologisation on subjects 'close' to the source of influence 
(Papastamou ibid.), it is hypothesised that competing sources of 
influence, i.e. parties, that are ideologically close will be 
sensitive to the psychologisation of their 'neighbours.' When 
the ideas of a group are discredited by being linked to 
psychological features, subjects who share, at least in part, 
these ideas run the risk that the validity of their own beliefs 
will be undermined. Consequently, parties that occupy adjacent 
positions along a relevant political or ideological dimension are 
expected to show little preference for psychologisation as a 
strategy against one another. Furthermore, the psychological 
factors used to explain the policy positions of their coalition 
partner may undermine the validity of the own positions as well. 
Therefore, parties that have a clearly distinct orientation are 
expected to apply the strategy of psychologisation against one 
another more often than parties that share a common socio­
political background or that are engaged in common tasks.
More specifically, a decline in the use of psychologisation 
between the N.D. and the SYN. in the second period is anticipated 
because of the fact that they formed a coalition government. A 
general decrease in the use of the strategy is also expected in 
the third period due to the fact that the participation of all 
three parties in the national unity government imposed on them 
a common instrumental super-ordinate identity.
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The following hypothesis is made with respect to the use of 
the denial strategy by an incumbent, challenger or outsider 
party:
I . The strategy of denial will be directed more often bv a 
party with a high power position towards a party with a lower 
power position than vice versa.
The strategy of denial is directly related to the power 
position of the parties that use it against one another. The 
rejection by a party of the truthfulness and of the plausible 
character of the ideas of its rival party is contingent upon the 
power relations between the two parties. Beliefs and policies 
vested with government authority are unlikely to be dismissed as 
contrary to factual reality. Parties which have never or at 
least not recently been in government, for example extremist and 
marginal political groups, provide, on the contrary, fertile 
ground for the use of the strategy of denial.
The statements uttered by a party are vested with the status 
and power character of their source. An incumbent party and to 
a certain extent a challenger party also can raise a claim to the 
truthfulness of their positions based on their consensual 
character. Indeed, a large part of the electorate approves of 
them. The outsider party positions are by definition deviant 
and, therefore, a suitable target for the denial strategy. 
Moreover, outsider party policies have not been implemented with 
the result that there is no factual evidence for their realistic 
and plausible character. Their character is divergent from the 
established beliefs and, given that 'reality' for an opinion is 
created through cohesion imposed by social forces (Schachter 
1951), the alternative beliefs of outsider parties may be 
regarded as false.
c) Hypotheses concerning the use of the strategy of denial in
party competition and cooperation
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The strategy of affirmation is related to the power 
structure which organises party relationships in a way similar 
to that of the denial strategy. That means that the use of 
affirmation statements is conditioned by the relative power 
position of their party-source and of their party-object. Thus, 
the following hypothesis is put forward:
I . A party that enjoys a high power position will apply 
affirmation against its lower status rival more often than the 
latter is likely to do against the former.
This hypothesis is based on the social construction of 
'objective' reality. False statements which claim factual truth 
for events that have not taken place at the time of the utterance 
of the statements seek to impose a 'new' reality on people. The 
prevalence of social definition over the perception of natural 
phenomena has been confirmed in numerous studies in social 
psychology (Asch 1951; 1956 but also Faucheux & Moscovici 1967; 
Moscovici, Lage & Naffrechoux 1969; and others). These findings 
suggest that the unanimous claim of a majority or the consistent 
and persistent opinion of a minority group may modify or, indeed, 
distort visual perception. Political reality is not about 
natural phenomena and, therefore, one should be cautious in 
extending the validity of the above results to political beliefs. 
Nonetheless, it is arguable that a positive statement which 
expresses and affirms the truthfulness of a non-event may have 
an impact on the perception both of social reality and of the 
relevant social actors.
Party campaigning and negotiation as situations 
characterised by intense antagonism and fluid outcomes create 
uncertainty about the definitions of 'objectivity.' Under these 
circumstances, social consensus is discontinuous^. Thus, the 
"affirmation" of events that have not happened or of statements 
that have not been said may affect positively or negatively the
d) Hypotheses concerning the use of the strategy of affirmation
in party interaction
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image of a party.
Different social groups promote competing definitions of 
social reality. A majority group occupies a privileged position 
in a competition due to its established position and pro-status 
quo character. Its opinion is supported by the majority of the 
people and therefore is perceived as correct and valid. 
Incumbent parties, and to some extent challengers, also enjoy 
such prestige. Their discourse is vested with a claim of 
truthfulness and validity because of their large size and high 
power position. As noted earlier, all parties are assumed to be 
aware of the modal features6 that characterise each of them. 
Thus, parties with high status and power are expected to apply 
affirmation more frequently against their lower status rivals 
because they 'know' that they benefit from an objectivity norm. 
This means that the claim for an objective truth with respect to 
social phenomena is based on the consensual majority opinion. 
The majority defines 'objectivity' and assigns the status of 
'real' and 'false' to social objects. Conversely, parties with 
low symbolic and pragmatic power, such as outsiders, are expected 
to use affirmation strategy against their high status adversaries 
only occasionally. The small size and the lack of power that 
characterise an outsider party do not provide the necessary 
credibility and prestige for the party to state and "affirm" 
falsely events that have not taken place.
The use of affirmation, however, is also hypothesised to be 
contingent upon the common or opposed super-ordinate identities 
of competing parties.
II. Affirmation is more likely to take place among parties that 
share a common instrumental suoer-ordinate identity than among 
parties that share a common political super-ordinate identity or 
parties with opposed super-ordinate identities
The strategy of affirmation 'attacks' the opponent party in 
an indirect way. It is not a straightforward rejection of the 
behaviour or ideas of the opponent. Affirmation discredits the
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opponent by disrupting the continuity and coherence of its 
positions. The rival party is portrayed, through the use of 
affirmation, as being self-contradicting, unstable or confused. 
Its influence potential is undermined by the introduction of non­
existent events as factual truth. These presumed events have a 
negative meaning for the adversary. The supposed ideas or 
actions committed by the rival group, which become a 'fact' as 
a result of the affirmation strategy, are inconsistent with 
respect to the actual beliefs and policies of that group.
The impact of the strategy is subtle and indirect because 
it undermines the overall credibility of the rival group in the 
campaigning or negotiation process. Therefore, parties are 
expected to use the strategy most frequently under conditions 
which constrain overt criticism and hostility. These constraints 
are salient when parties with divergent ideologies participate 
in temporary governmental coalitions. Conversely, when parties 
share a common political super-ordinate identity or have opposed 
super-ordinate identities, they need not use subtle, indirect 
ways to confront one another. These parties have no reason to 
prefer affirmation among other strategies since they are not 
subject to constrains regarding their overt and explicit 
confrontation with one another. Therefore, parties that share 
a common political super-ordinate identity or parties that have 
opposed super-ordinate identities are expected to use affirmation 
against one another less often than parties that share a common 
instrumental super-ordinate identity.
Two sets of hypotheses have been specified regarding the 
interaction between the independent and the dependent variables 
of our study. The first set of hypotheses, namely those 
concerning the effect of the party power position on the styles 
of party behaviour aim at investigating the role of these styles 
of behaviour in political reality. These hypotheses aim also at 
contributing to an understanding of the incumbent, challenger and 
outsider party as analytical categories. The second set of 
hypotheses refers to the organisation of inter-party discourse
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end behaviour. The power relations and ideological orientations 
which structure the political field are used to explain the 
strategies adopted by each party in its campaigning and 
negotiation. Overall we thus seek to integrate a socio- 
psychological perspective into the study of party behaviour.
N O T E S
1. The election results are given in Chapter two.
2. The participation of the three parties in a wide coalition government is
assumed to have modified the super-ordinate party identities by introducf?^ 
a common instrumental super-ordinate identity among the three of them.
3. The relevant analytical concepts and their operationalisation are discussed 
in Chapter three.
4. The concept of (super-ordinate) party identity is introduced in Chapter 
four.
5. The terms 'power character', 'power profile' and 'power position' are used
interchangeably- They all refer to the party power character, namely its 
incumbent, challenger or outsider position.
6.The modal features are inherent in the party identity and are regarded as
being shared among the party supporters.
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Methodology: From qualitative to quantitative analysis in
party campaigning discourse
6.1 Introduction
The point of departure in developing a discursive scheme for 
the coding of textual data has been the need to analyse the party 
campaigning discourse in the press. The study focuses on the 
three larger Greek parties and their campaigning strategies and 
styles of behaviour between June 1989 and April 1990, a period 
in which three national elections took place (June 18, 1989;
November 5, 1989; April 8, 1990). The data available consists 
of the commentaries and propaganda that each party addressed to 
the electorate or to its adversaries through the newspapers. The 
object of the methodology proposed concerns the coding and 
analysis of a large set of textual data maintaining both content 
and contextual information. The term contextual refers to the 
relationship between the content, the social actor-source and the 
social actor-object of a text. Content, on the other hand, 
refers to the meaning of the text but also to the social 
cognition embodied in it in the form of interpretative schemes.
The increasing volume of work on methodology in social 
sciences reflects the interest in and need for more effective 
methods for analysing data. Efforts to devise quantitative 
schemes suitable for measuring qualitative data began several 
decades ago. An important step forward has been made by the 
introduction of computers to aid in the process of data. Still, 
some crucial matters such as relational organisation of complex 
data and flexibility in coding remain problematic. Such problems 
have impeded the development of research on textual data, namely 
newspapers, magazines, books, personal notes or other forms of 
written communication. Our specific concern is with data taken 
from daily newspapers, namely news reports, interviews or 
political commentaries. These articles are analysed as 
expressions and instances of party behaviour given that they are 
published in partisan newspapers.
CHAPTER VI
Different methodological approaches are available for the 
analysis of the content and the context of textual data. 
'Classic' methods such as traditional content analytical schemes 
have been extensively used in the social sciences for the study 
of media communication. Content analysis has been applied not 
only to words or text segments but also with reference to 
'issues' addressed in the text or "cultural indicators" inherent 
in public communication. Some content analytical approaches 
relate the content of the text to interaction processes within 
small groups. Alternative approaches to text analysis have been 
developed recently, eg. semantic text grammars, with the aim of 
producing general linguistic schemes applicable to different 
types of text. Our aim is to retain some useful elements of 
these schemes and to apply them in a way which overcomes the 
difficulties and disadvantages of past methods.
6.2 An assessment of traditional content analysis
The methodology first used for the quantitative treatment 
of qualitative data was content analysis (Krippendorff 1980; 
Holsti 1969; Berelson 1952; Berelson & Lazarsfeld 1948). 
Semantic content analysis, namely subject-matter analysis 
(frequency counts of specific issues, problems, or simply 
character strings), assertion analysis (frequency counts of the 
link between evaluative assessments and specific persons or 
objects) and attribution analysis (frequency counts of specific 
social and/or psychological features), provides quantitative 
information on a text. Texts can be compared in terms of content 
analytical scores such as occurrences and co-,occurrences of words 
or segments of phrases. Emphasis scores have been introduced as 
indices of over- or under-emphasis of subject or idea categories, 
with respect to the norm of expected category use (Pirro & 
McTavish 1990). Emphasis scores have also been used within sets 
of related categories.
Content analytical schemes dispose of flexible structures 
allowing the researcher to build his/her own analytical
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fromework. Words or segments of phrases are classified into
subject or idea categories. These categories are determined 
either by the scope of the analysis or by information inherent 
in the text. They may also be created with the aid of a specific 
dictionary" developed in previous research.1 It is the 
researcher's task to draw the line between the data to be 
processed and the contextual information to be retained from the 
wider set of information available. Definition and
interpretation of the context builds upon general dimensions 
supposed to reveal the social meanings of the text. The emphasis 
on specific categories, for instance, is hypothesised to 
characterise such social contexts as institutions, social groups, 
organisations or other socially defined situations. In that 
case, however, the emphasis scores of different categories can 
explain everything and nothing. They may be all-encompassing and 
fit an overly large number of cases. On the other hand, if the 
explanatory dimensions bear on the interests of the specific 
research, there may be a bias in the results.
Content analysis has been developed to provide a solid and, 
after the introduction of computer-assisted techniques, handy 
methodological tool. Recently developed computing packages for 
content analysis2 carry out frequency counts of words or 
segments of phrases, classify them into categories, perform key- 
word-in-context or co-occurrence searches and also more complex 
statistical analysis such as cluster or factor analysis. For all 
their advantages, i.e. they require only simple preparation for 
the raw data to be entered and they are highly automated, content 
analytical methods remain descriptive in nature. They lack an 
explicit specification of the relationship between the categories 
in which the content is coded and the sources or objects of the 
message in the text. 'Context' is meant as the shared meaning 
and/or social definition of a situation. It provides orientation 
and makes possible expectations for subsequent action and 
interaction. However, there is no indication of the direction 
nor of the modes of communication between different actors- 
'interlocutors'.
Content analysis suggests that individuals or groups become
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avare of the meaning of a situation by the use of typified 
ideas/words/subjects. Thus, descriptive information on the text 
is used to create a link between the content (ideas, subjects, 
language features) and the context (character of the interaction 
but also actors participating actively or passively, directly or 
indirectly, relations of status and power among them). The 
information derived from the text on ideas, themes or different 
linguistic styles is assumed to characterise the specific social 
context and is subsequently used to analyse that context. 
However, the examination of co-occurrences between a theme or 
idea and a social actor does not demonstrate the nature of the 
relationship manifested by their simultaneous occurrence. 
Therefore, this type of analysis is not adequate for the study 
of party behaviour and inter-party relations through their 
discourse in the press.
This study investigates the communicative relationship 
between the source and the object of the text. Context ought not 
to be seen as a static set of conditions or features but as the 
link between the content and its production in society. The 
relationship between the interacting, competing or collaborating 
social actors plays a significant part in the production and 
communication of messages. These actors are the ones to be 
linked to the content and not any abstract, albeit 'social', 
definition of a situation.
Holsti (1969) has argued that the analysis of content refers 
to questions of communicative relations between a sender and a 
recipient. According to him, the operationalisation of content 
analysis can be based on three fundamental questions: a) what, 
how and to whom something is said b) why it is said and c) with 
what effects. However, it is unclear how these questions have
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been or can be answered by means of traditional content analysis. 
Holsti himself developed (1969) a computer-assisted model for 
evaluative assertion analysis3. The text is thus reduced to 
assessments of "complexes of qualities" and "complexes of 
performance" based on an initial syntax coding which indicates 
the agent-action-target relationship. The complexes of qualities 
and those of performance were operationalised in the following
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triplets: attitude object-connector-evaluative term and attitude 
objectl-connector-attitude object2. The relational structure of 
the scheme constitutes, without doubt, a considerable 
contribution to a more comprehensive analysis than the mere 
counting of content elements. Still it was grounded on a 
semantic differential dictionary which provided the tags with 
which to code the evaluative terms. Inevitably, the scheme was 
theory-bound. The coding norms reflected and were determined by 
the goals of the analysis. The need for a methodology based on 
the general, structural elements of discourse rather than on the 
scope of each specific study was not fulfilled by Holsti's 
contribution.
The level of aggregation of the analytical categories in 
content analysis is also determined by the theoretical 
assumptions of the research. Paraphrasing W.J.Paisley (1969: 
140) we would agree that
"if the goal of the analysis is simple description, then the 
analyst is bound by a cartographer's obligation not to omit 
significant features from his map. (...) If the goal of the 
analysis is inference, then the choice of content elements will 
be governed by the logic of any connection between them and the 
tagged categories. This is a validity problem, and content 
elements should be chosen provisionally, then tested against 
external criteria."
If alternative hypotheses emerge during the coding, the 
disaggregation of data may be impossible. The optimal method of 
coding and analysis should allow for the maximum flexibility so 
that the data collected can be used for investigation of 
secondary theoretical concerns.
In conclusion, content analytical methods allow for the 
quantitative treatment of words or short segments of text and 
prepare the raw textual material for further statistical analysis 
but they do not help to account for the relationship between the 
text and the social actor that produced it.
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6.2.1 Beyond traditional schemes in content analysis
Leaving aside the initial "simplistic reliance of content 
analysis on counting qualitative data" (Krippendorff 1980: 17), 
mass communication research (Lasswell, Lerner & De Sola Pool 
1952) has shifted to more sophisticated approaches such as those 
proposed by Gerbner (1969; Gerbner, Gross, Signorielli, Morgan 
& Jackson-Beeck 1979) concerning the cultural indicators to be 
found in media communication4. This approach refers mainly and 
almost exclusively to the media's effect on the public. This is 
traced via Institutional Process Analysis (IPA), via Message 
System Analysis (MSA), and via Cultivation Analysis (CAJ. The 
first (IPA), refers to the production of TV programmes examining 
both the pressure groups involved and their decision making 
process. The second, (MSA), concerns a thorough analysis of the 
content of those programs as indicators of the prevailing issues 
and points of view which attract public attention. Cultivation 
Analysis, taking as its starting point the results of the other 
two analyses investigates the impact of these programmes on 
attitude-, opinion- and preference-formation. It is obvious that 
the approach adopts a one-way, namely source-target, perspective. 
It relies on the deterministic assumption that "the media do 
things to people." Pressure groups involved in the mass media 
economy are viewed as external to the rest of the public. Power 
relations are investigated only among those pressure groups while 
the reactions of the public and the feedback from the public to 
the media are neglected. The approach does not cast any light 
on factors such as social cognition, social structure or inter­
group relations which influence the media impact on attitudes, 
tastes and preferences.
The subject of cultural indicators has been also addressed 
by Swedish scholars, more precisely by the Swedish Symbol System 
1945-1975 Research Program (CISSS) (Rosengren et al. 1977;
Rosengren 1980; Namenwirth 1969; 1973; 1977; Namenwirth & Bibbee 
1976; Weber 1979). The aim was to build a broad sociological 
approach and to address questions such as to the extent to which
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economic change influences social change and vice versa. For the 
change in social values and symbols to be measured, a set of 
standardised instruments, namely the cultural indicators, was 
created. These indicators were intended to measure important 
aspects of the symbol system in a specific culture and to relate 
them to each other and to broader economic, political and social 
trends. Some examples of this research are:
The project on domestic policy especially investigated the 
values of freedom and equality on the basis of content analysis 
of editorials of five leading Swedish newspapers. From this, it 
appeared that the policy developed from a liberal to a socialist 
one (at the end of the 60s) with, after 1975, a tendency to 
return to a liberal policy.
(..) With the aid of editorials from newspapers, the project of 
foreign policy investigated those geographical areas to which 
attention had been paid in Parliament during a certain period.
From this, it appeared that the distant areas orientation
increased drastically during the period from 1963 to 1965.
Before this period attention for these areas had been rather 
small, after that period the attention remained rather large.
This points to an internationalization of daily life.
(..) the project on advertising examined the way in which the 
public is addressed by advertisements; from 1965 onwards the more 
informal "du" has won grounds strongly, which is being reflected 
in spoken Swedish. This could be interpreted in terms of 
increased equivalence." (Reijnders & Bouwman 1984: 43, emphasis 
in the original)
The problem with such an approach rests with the
representativeness of the chosen cultural indicators. In other 
words, the extent to which the frequency of appearance of a value 
or idea in the print media of a specific type reflects a shift 
towards or away from that value or idea. The mere fact of paying 
attention to distant geographical areas does not necessarily
imply an internationalisation of policies. The correlation
assumed between such qualitatively different elements is 
spurious. Hence, the diagnostic value of cultural indicators as 
indices of social change is highly debatable. Furthermore, the 
approach does not take into account the discursive character of 
media communication, i.e. who utters the message, to whom the
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message is addressed and which social representations can be 
linked to which subjects. The contextual variables that 
influence the content and the style of the communication are also 
neglected.
Both cultural indicator approaches described above remain 
purely quantitative and insensitive to the communicative 
structure of the message. Consequently, they are inadequate for 
a socio-psychological analysis of party behaviour and interaction 
through media texts. Cultural indicators are handy,
methodologically robust instruments for sociological research but 
they end up as value or subject scores presumed to capture the 
substance of a specific cultural environment.
Psychological applications of content analysis have gone 
more in-depth using the Thematic Aptitude Test stories (tests de 
nature thématique) (Ghiglione, Beauvois, Chabrol & Trognon 1980) 
which relate the issues and their structure (co-appearances more 
frequent than if they were random) with the interaction
process5. Small group interaction processes have also been used 
to analyse the content of verbal communication (Bales 1950), with 
the analyst practically intervening in the process. Such methods 
are applicable only to small-scale research and provided that 
group interaction and study take place simultaneously.
Therefore, they are not suitable for the study of interaction 
among large groups such as political parties. Besides, the
interaction of the parties through the press discourse does not 
involve the physical presence of the social actors. Party
interaction through the media is of an indirect character. Thus, 
the Thematic Aptitude Test Stories or the Small Group Interaction 
approaches are not applicable to this study.*
6.3 One step forward: Semantic text grammars
The shortcomings of content analysis have recently been 
overcome by the creation of hierarchically and relationally 
organised coding schemes, the semantic text grammars. Their
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point of departure is linguistics. The latter have initially led 
to the construction of Sentence grammars which introduce 
syntactic structures as schemes for the analysis of the content 
of a text. The system of rules conditioning the phrase- 
structure6, i.e. a sentence grammar, is the platform used on 
which to code the various elements of the text without using any 
specific theoretical assumptions.
The same principle underlies the concept of semantic 
macrostructures (Van Dijk 1980; 1985), i.e. the fairly simple
bits of information which language users formulate in order to 
summarise larger and more complex units of discourse. Hence, the 
view of natural language as a set of words structured in phrases 
which can be constructed on the basis of a few prototypic 
schemes7 is applied to the text as a complete semantical unit 
made up of sentences organised around one or more topics. If one 
of these topics is characterised as being dominant for a specific 
text then it is assumed that sentences follow a specific 
relational structure within the text according to this main 
topic. Thus, sentences are to texts what words are to phrases.
A general structure is needed so that it may be applicable 
to all kinds of text just like syntax is valid for all phrases. 
In text grammars this structure is borrowed from semantics. It 
consists of the fundamental semantic triplet of subject - action 
- object (Franzosi 1989). Textual data such as that contained 
in narrative or action discourse can be adequately represented 
in that canonical form. Additional information on one of the 
three basic elements can be inserted as a modifier of the actor 
or the action. Comments or the verbal reactions of the actors 
which do not explicitly make up part of the semantic triplet fall 
into a separate category of "comments" or simply are not coded.
Semantic text grammars provide the structure and the 
functionally relevant categories which map the organisation of 
a text. The data falling into a common category is semantically 
equivalent irrespective of difference in their content or in 
their grammatical form. Text grammars have been used to date to 
develop coding schemes for collective action events (Franzosi 
1989, 1990) or for the content analysis of narrative discourse
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(Mandler 1978; Rumelhart 1975). However, implementation of the 
semantic grammar scheme in texts that do not refer to action or 
events is impossible. As has been pointed out by scholars who 
have elaborated semantic grammars8, texts which do not follow 
the rudimentary structure of actor (subject)-action -actor 
(object) can neither be coded nor analysed using semantic text 
grammars. Party discourse in the press does not always refer to 
action events. Campaigning discourse, in particular, which is 
meant to persuade the voters and discredit the opponent parties 
is most likely to take the form of political commentaries or 
interviews with party leadership. The same is true for inter­
party bargaining and negotiation. Bargaining discourse
anticipates future action. It does not, however, involve the 
realisation of this action.
6.4 A discursive syntax
The need for a different methodological tool when dealing 
with political or ideological texts (eg. news commentaries, 
editorials, public statements and declarations, personal opinion 
accounts) will be filled by the method proposed in this Chapter. 
The texts under consideration are particular forms of written 
communication. Their authors express opinions and beliefs and 
make comments about situations, problems, people, individuals or 
groups. When these texts are embodied in a situation of social 
influence they may be regarded as a means of interaction between 
the social or political actors involved in the influence process. 
Newspaper articles which refer to politics, in particular when 
they are published during periods of accentuated party 
competitions, eg. pre-election campaigning or post-election 
negotiations, are regarded as a means of communication between 
parties.
A piece of written communication is characterised by its 
source, namely its author, and by the message the author 
expresses. The message involves an issue, a problem or, more 
generally, a theme which, explicitly or implicitly, refers to
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another social actor who is the object of the message. Newspaper 
articles which address political issues are characterised by 
their author who may either be the party or a sub-actor within 
the party (eg. the party leadership, a candidate of the party, 
a journalist or political commentator who is a party 
member/supporter and so on). These articles may refer to an 
event, to a policy or to an ideological issue in relation to a 
specific political actor, i.e. a party or a sub-actor within a 
party (eg. the party leadership, the party rank-and-file or the 
party as government if the party is in office). The content of 
the article is, thus, related either to the same party that is 
the source of the article if the article forwards the ideas or 
positions of this party, or to another party whose positions are 
presented and/or commented upon. The party to whom the content 
refers represents the object of the article.
It is assumed that newspaper articles which refer to inter­
party politics represent a means of communicating party ideas and 
opinions to the electorate. These articles may also be regarded 
as representing interaction between parties given that each party 
supports or criticises the positions of the other through the 
medium of newspaper articles. This study examines the newspaper 
discourse as a form of party behaviour in pre-election 
campaigning. The relationship of the newspaper articles to the 
environment in which they are produced is determined by the 
parties as sources but also as objects of the text.
The newspaper article represents an incomplete dialogue 
between the party-source and the party-ob ject. The
unidirectional nature of the newspaper as a medium of 
communication does not provide the party object with the means 
for an immediate response. However, the party-object is 
simultaneously a source of messages via its own partisan 
newspapers. Each article contains one direction of the 
communication. Thus, party interaction is not completed within 
the boundaries of one newspaper article; the discursive 
relationship among the parties is realised through the 
simultaneous and reciprocal communication of opponent parties via 
newspapers with differing political orientations.
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The analysis of party behaviour through the party discourse 
in the press concentrates on the 'incomplete' communication 
embodied in each newspaper article. For this reason, two levels 
of analysis are distinguished. First, a global level is defined 
which refers to communication and persuasive messages exchanged 
between the parties. This general level of analysis involves 
different newspapers, affiliated with rival parties. The 
relationship between the parties is described in terms of sets 
of messages. Different messages are produced by each party. The 
object of these is either the party-source itself or a rival 
party. Within the overall exchange of messages during the pre­
election campaign or the post-election negotiation, parties play 
the role of the source and the role of the object alternatively. 
A party (party X or party Z) is a source of messages; i.e. it is 
the source of articles published in its partisan newspaper(s). 
The same party (party X or Z) is at the same time the object of 
the messages of its rivals. The communication network is 
schematically represented in figure 6.1 .
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The second level of analysis focuses on the uni-directional
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relationship between a party-source and a party-object within a 
newspaper article. The relationship is examined as a speech- 
action executed by the party source and referring to the party- 
object of the message. The content of the message is analysed 
in terms of socio-psychological behaviour categories, namely the 
styles of behaviour and the strategies of influence introduced 
earlier (see chapter 3).
This level of analysis of uni-directional communication is 
equivalent to the analysis performed by semantic grammars. The 
semantic triplet subject-action-object is replaced by the 
discursive triplet source-message-object. The message addresses 
a commentary or expresses an idea or belief which is related to 
the object. The triplet represents the discursive syntax of the 
text. It defines the three main elements of the discourse, 
namely the source, the message and the object. It also 
determines the direction of the relationship between them, i.e. 
that party X (the source) generates a message about party Z (the 
object).
This method aims at decomposing and recomposing the text in 
a way similar to that of a syntax which organises a language. 
A language syntax defines the basic syntactic structure of a 
sentence, namely the triplet subject-verb-object. Thus, the 
reader can recognise which word fulfils the function of the verb, 
for instance, and then examine the specific forms it takes and 
the various expressions in which the same verb may be used. The 
unsuspecting language user can always decompose a sentence into 
its syntactic elements and then study their relationships within 
the sentence as well as within the whole text. Similarly, the 
discursive syntax defines the fundamental discursive structure 
of the text, i.e. the triplet: source of the message - message/ 
content of the text - object of the message. Thus, the analyst 
can recognise which element falls into each category (source, 
content, object). The analyst can, thus, decompose the text into 
these three elements and study each of them separately. More 
complex structures identified within a text can be rewritten and 
coded on the basis of the fundamental triplet.
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The syntax assigns a functional role to each component of 
the discursive triplet. The elements falling in the source and 
object categories are interchangeable. As stated earlier, their 
roles may be reversed. The object of one message can become 
source of another, given the interactive nature of communication. 
Both roles are of the same nature since they link the text to a 
wider field of discourse where these actors are located. Not 
only the content of the text but also the power and status 
positions, in a given context, of the source and the object of 
the text can be analysed. These offer an understanding of the 
content as a link between two social actors engaging in a 
discourse. This is particularly significant for texts that form 
part of public discourse like news articles, editorials or 
political propaganda. Party leaflets, for example, used in 
election campaigning contain messages referring to the party or 
to its rivals. Messages may also be exchanged between a sub­
actor of one party and a sub-actor of the rival party, eg. the 
leadership and rival party activists, or between the party 
candidates and the supporters of the adversary. For all this 
variety of actors who are potential sources or objects of a 
message, their role in the discursive syntax may be c'lear'ly 
defined.
In content analytical terms a discursive syntax links the 
text to its context. Information on the source and on the object 
of the message allows one to locate both the source and the 
object in a broader social space and to form some idea about the 
discursive universe9 in which the message has been produced. 
Thus, the message is assigned some context-specific features and 
meaning. McTavish and Pirro (1990: 248) argue that different
social contexts are characterised by typical usage patterns of 
specific words and word groups. The social definition of the 
context gives us some guidance as to the activity likely to take 
place in a situation.
Discursive syntax goes beyond the shared meaning of a 
specific situation. It seeks to decipher and code the 
relationships between the actors communicating through the text.
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Contextual information is used to reconstruct the discursive 
structure of a message, i.e. the relationship between source and 
object through the message. Content and context elements are 
coded following the direction of the communication as it is 
represented in the raw text. Given that public discourse follows 
the general scheme described above, i.e. actor-source - message - 
actor-object (see Figure 6.1), this scheme can fit different 
types of situations and a variety of subjects. It captures the 
direction of the communication and it reproduces its basic 
structure.
The message includes the content of the text, i.e. the 
argument put forward or the opinion expressed and the actor who 
is the object of reference in the text (see figure 6 .2 ), namely 
the social/economic/political group or the personality about 
whose action and/or ideas the text gives information. The group 
or individual is attributed capacities or psychological features 
or is the object of evaluations.
The content of the text is subjected to thematic analysis. 
The issue addressed by the message, namely the policy issue, the 
situation, the problem or idea discussed is coded on the basis 
of a set of tagged categories defined by the analyst. These 
categories largely depend on the type of discourse represented 
in the text. A political or ideological discourse, for instance, 
may include policy issues, eg.finance, education or social 
welfare, event-issues, eg. government formation, or value-issues, 
eg. partyism of the State, revanche politics or corruption in 
public administration. Some previous knowledge of the material 
can be helpful in defining these categories. Spare categories 
may be left open for the addition of new categories during the 
coding.
The 'framing' packages inherent in the communication process 
are coded (see figure 6.2 infra). They are schemes of 
interpretation based on social cognition. 'Framing' packages 
organise experience according to prior knowledge and related 
social representations. The bits of social cognition and 
collective memory they activate generate the viewpoint of the 
actor, i.e. the party-source of the message, and guide the
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analyst in processing and understanding the text10. These 
socio-cognitive elements are organised as discursive frames 
(Goffman 1974) which attribute meaning to the textual data. They 
function as a "tool-kit" of symbols, stories, rituals and world­
views that people may use in varying configurations to answer 
different types of questions (Gamson & Modigliani 1989).
An interpretative scheme consists of a core, called a frame, 
which is its central organising idea guiding the understanding 
of whatever is at issue. The package offers a number of 
condensing symbols that suggest the core frame and positions in 
shorthand (Gamson & Modigliani ibid.). Thus, the package may be 
displayed as a whole with a metaphor, a catch-phrase or other 
symbolic devices. These devices11 help in coding each package 
under a relevant tag in a package index. A frame need not be 
developed in detail or even with reference to all its main 
components to become visible. A message may be characterised by 
one specific frame but may also be organised around competing or 
converging frames. Such a co-occurrence highlights specific 
features of the discourse between specific actors or indicates 
links between symbols or representations that were not expected 
initially.
6.5 A discursive syntax for the socio-psychological
analysis of political discourse
The discursive syntax includes the analysis of the message 
in socio-psychological terms. The syntax of each discursive unit 
is further developed to account for the styles of behaviour and 
the strategies of influence as categories for the analysis of 
party discourse. The extended scheme applied in this study is 
represented in figure 6.2. The sources and objects of the text 
are political parties and the sub-actors within them, eg. the 
party rank-and-file, the local party committees, the party as 
organisation and the party leadership or the party supporters to 
the extent that they appear explicitly as sources or objects of 
the textual messages12. The thematic and socio-cognitive
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analysis of the message is based on pre-def'.ned indexes of issues 
and of 'framing' packages.13 Spare open categories are provided 
within each index for new options to be specified, if necessary, 
during the coding.
Figure 6 .2
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Two sets of analytical categories have been added to the 
coding scheme (see figure 6.2 supra) in order to analyse the 
party discourse in socio-psychological terms: the styles of
behaviour applied by the parties in the course of their pre­
election propaganda or post-election bargaining and the 
strategies used by the parties to confront one another14. These 
categories have been added to the scheme because of the specific 
interest of the study in the socio-psychological features and 
mechanisms underlying party discourse. They do not alter the 
fundamental structure by means of which the texts are read and 
coded. If the research involves different analytical concepts 
than those introduced above, these can be substituted. As long 
as the discursive nature of the text is respected, the syntax 
provides a flexible methodological scheme for the analysis of 
texts.
6.5.1 The computer-assisted application : Matching
quantity with quality
The coding scheme used by this research has been 
incorporated into a computing application on a database 
management system. This was necessary because of the large size 
of the database to be processed and in order to prepare the data 
for quantitative analysis. The application programme
distinguishes between three levels of coding : (1) the article
as aggregate unit, (2 ) the paragraph as the main unit of coding 
and analysis and (3) the sub-unit of comments which provides a 
direct link to the raw data.
The article is the aggregate level which organises the 
paragraphs within the database. Identifying information and the 
title of the article are included in this level. The paragraph 
is selected as the basic unit of analysis because it is coherent 
with regard to the topics and actors referred to within it. It 
is indeed rare to find that more than one actor addresses 
different messages to another actor within the confines of a
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single paragraph15. For the sake of clarity c.nd reliability of 
data, when more than one party-source is included in one 
paragraph the latter is coded as if it were comprised of two 
separate units.
The coding scheme is applied to each paragraph and the 
elements found in the text are retained by typing in the relevant 
codes. The coding is divided into sections and the relationship 
between the sections is specified. Thus, the coder has simply 
to identify the elements fitting into the sections and enter them 
by assigning them numbers, namely the coding values. The program 
provides the coder with the opportunity to enter a small segment 
of the original text, a comment, whenever a coding value is typed 
in. Thus, the raw text is incorporated into the coding and 
coding values are linked to the lower-level data.
The three-level structure of the scheme preserves the 
hierarchical links within the original text while allowing for 
an explicit definition of the relationships between the elements 
coded. The segments of the raw data which are entered offer the 
possibility of quick validation tests without the need to go back 
to the newspapers. Even though the data which were coded were 
complex and rich, the application of the database management 
system to the discursive syntax made the data easy to handle.
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A P P E N D I X  I
T h e c o d in g  sch em e c o n s t r u c t e d  f o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s  
o f  p a r t y  c a m p a ig n in g  d i s c o u r s e  i n  t h e  P r e s s .
(The research concerned the three larger political parties in Greece in the 
period between April 1989 and April 1990)
ARTICLE
I d e n t i f i e r s  : Newspaper (2 col.) 1.1 Epikerotita
1.2 Avrianl
2.1 Apogevmatini
2.2 Eleftheros Tipos 
3.1 Rizosg&stis
Date (8 col.) - acceptable values between 01.06.89 and 10.04.90 
Page (2 col.)
Type (2 col.) - Type of article:
01 Event report
02 Editorial
03 Letter by or interview of a reader
04 Headline/Short article introducing article on another 
page
05 Commentary (general or with reference to specific 
events)
06 (Report of) interview or speech of party leadership or 
candidates
07 Party or candidate advertisement
08 Photos or graphs
Notes (40 col.) - Title of the article or comments (up to 40 
chars.)
PARAGRAPH 
Identifiers :
Article (4 col.) - article number
Paragraph (2 col.) - paragraph number within each article
Actors-sources of the message (18 col.) (variables AS1-AS18, values 1 or 2): 
Parties: PA.SO.K. Sub-agents: leadership
New Democracy 
Synaspismos
candidates
supporters
journalists-commentators 
government
party as organization
value: (1) explicit reference to the actor-source 
value: (2) implicit reference to the actor-source
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A c t o r - o b j e c t  o f  t h e  m e s s a g e  (2 col.) (variables 01 & 02 - values 1-3 & 1-6 
respectively): (categories same as for the actors-sources of the message)
value: (1) PA.SO.K.
value: (2) N.D.
value: (3) SYN.
(1) leader
(2) candidate(s)
(3) supporter(s)
(4) journalist(s)-commentator(s )
(5) party as government
(6) party as organization
S t y l e s  o f  b e h a v i o u r  (2 col.) (variables SI & S2, values 1-5): 
Stability —  Instability 
Rigidity - Flexibility
five degree coding scale: value (1) very stable (1) very rigid
value (2) stable (2) rigid
value (3) neutral (3) neutral
value (4) unstable (4) flexible
value (5) very unstable (5) very flexible
S t r a t e g i e s  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  (3 col.) (variables ST1-ST5, values 1-5) : 
Categorisation 
Psychologisation 
Denial 
Affirmation
five degree coding scale: value (1) very positive
value (5) very negative 
connotation in the use of the strategy towards some agent.
F r a m in g  p a c k a g e s  (28 col.) (variables F1-F28, values 1 or 2) : an index of
interpretive schemes is derived from a pilot-study of the data - five options 
are initially left open for eventual additions.
value: (1) positive aspect of the frame used
value: (2) negative aspect of the frame used
I s s u e s  (29 col.) (variables 11-129, values 1-6) : an agenda of policy issues 
is constructed through a pilot study on the data and with the help of general
background information on the pre- or post-election circumstances.
value: (1) supportive - retrospective reference to the issue
value (2) positive 
value (3) neutral 
value (4) negative
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value: (2) supportive - programmatic reference to the issue 
value: (3) criticising - retrospective reference to the issue 
value: (4) criticising - programmatic reference to the issue 
value: (5) neutral - retrospective reference to the issue 
value: (6) neutral - programmatic reference to the issue
A P P E N D I X  I I  
In d e x  o f  t h e  f r a m in g  p a c k a g e s
01 Health - Illness : eg, ill, old, unable, weak
02 Sexuality (positive or negative connotation): private life, sexism, 
abnormal couple, political anomaly, sharing one's life, caring
03 Catharsis - corruption (as state of affairs in society): eg. need 
for catharsis, purification of the polity,transparency in public 
actions -contrasted to- embezzling money, theft, illegal practices, 
falsification of the elections
04 Social justice, leftness - Frugality, exploitation, capitalism:
social justice, equity - capitalist exploitation, pseudo­
socialists
05 Real Left - Pseudo Right: honest consistent Left, historical
credits (past class struggles) -contrasted to- dogmatic Left, 
supporting the return to conservatism
06 Governmental power - Lack of power and office: speaking as if one 
were already elected, programmatic discourse before one enters office -
confessing inability to influence decision making, distancing from the 
power positions
07 Realism - Unrealistic attitude: realistic strategy, brought
Socialism to power - losing the historical opportunity, stuck to
unrealistic ideas
08 Success - Failure, winners - Losers
09 Future - Past
10 Development, prosperity - Crisis, calamity: development, progress, 
prosperity - crisis, underdevelopment, decline, economic or political 
or governmental chaos
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11 Patriotic, national reconciliation - anti-patriotic, national
discord: national pride, defense of the nacional interest and
independence - reference to past political events, deserter, 
unfaith£ul> traitor
12 Democratic - Authoritarian: individual freedom, democratization of 
the State, democratic practices within the party, democratic tradition
- dogmatic political beliefs, authoritarian attitude and practices in 
government or within the party
13 Morality, honesty - Immorality, dishonesty: honest, sincere -
immoral, lowest, hypocritical attitude
14 Stability, consistency - Instability, inconsistency (as a political
behaviour and/or personality feature): trustworthy^ responsible -
unstable, changing opinion all the time, inconsistent, irresponsible 
attitude
15 Balanced, reserved - Unbalanced, confused (as emotional state or 
personality feature): calm, clear, balanced - fear, disillusionment, 
panicking, extreme spontaneity, exaggerated enthusiasm, los, insane, 
unhappy
16 Impartiality, objectivity - Revengeful attitude (as political
principle or personality feature): government of and for all Greek
citizens, objective judgement - revengeful, mean person or behaviour
17 Altruism - Egoism: sacrificing personal interest for the common
interest - extreme ambition, power obsession, self-centred person
18 Peaceful - Violent (behaviour or person) : peaceful demonstration, 
calm climate in the campaign aggressiveness, vandalism
19 Politicized - 'de-politicized': thinking citizens, political
argumentation - de-politicized manifestation, like a "fiesta“, shouting 
crowd
20 Clever - Stupid, foolish (person)
21 Separation of party and State mechanisms and functions - Partyism, 
nepotism : correct, impartial governing practices - abuse of the State 
apparatus, mandarins of the administration, extreme partyism
22 Participation in the commons, courage - Absence, cowards: active, 
involved in politics, criticising, proposing, indicating ideas/policies
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- absent, afraid to criticise, afraid to contradict the government / 
ehe majority
23 Dignity - Vulgarity (as political attitude/practice)
24 Reference to animals, positive - negative (metaphors referring to 
animals as a means to emphasise personality traits and specific 
behaviours)
25 Progressive - Conservative (use of the traditional political 
cleavage): a majority of the progressive democratic forces, progressive 
policies - conservatism
T h e i s s u e  i n d e x
01 'Catharsis'
02 Military in politics
03 Scandals (private life of politicians)
04 Scandals (embezzlement of public money)
05 Environment
06 Foreign policies
07 Education, culture, sports
08 Ideology/political values
09 National reconciliation
10 Social health and welfare
11 Economic policies and finance
12 Peace
13 New elections
14 Class distinction and opposition
15 Electoral law
16 Democratization
17 Health and private life of A.Papandreou
18 Popular sovereignty
19 Single-party majority government
20 Election campaigning - OR - Reactions to government formation,
plans/actions *
21 PASOK intra-party politics
22 ND intra-party politics
23 SYN intra-party politics
24 Formation of government after the elections
25 Feminist issues
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N O T E S
1. Examples of widely used dictionaries of this type are the Harvard Social- 
psychological dictionary (Stone et al. 1966, 1974) , the Lasswell Value 
dictionary (Peterson and Brewer 1965, Lasswell 1968), the Institutional 
Rhetorics dictionary (Cleveland 1972, and others) and the Verbal Style 
dictionary (Hart 1984).
2. Textpack, University of Mannheim, Germany; Spad.t, C.I.S.I.A., Fontenay-St- 
Cloud, France, MCCA 8.3, Minnessota Contextual Content Analysis Computer 
Program, University of Minnessota, Twin Cities, U.S. are the computer 
programs most widely used.
3. Holsti proposes the notion of evaluative assertion analysis as this was 
developed in Osgood 1959.
4. See Gerbner G. (1969) Toward "cultural indicators“: the analysis of mass 
mediated public message systems, in Gerbner G. et al. (eds), The analysis of 
communication content. N.York: Free Press, p. 123-132. An application of the 
concept is made by Gerbner himself in Gerbner G., Gross L., Signorielli N., 
Morgan M. and Jackson-Beeck M. (1979) Violence Profile no 10: trends in 
network television drama and view conceptions of social reality, 1967-1978. 
Annenberg School of Communications, University of Pennsylvania.
5. "Le bus de cette phase de l'étude était de dépasser le niveau des 
répresentations et de l'ideologie atteint avec les entretiens, pour essayer 
de préciser comment les étudiants... vivaient et se situaient par rapport aux 
principaux aspects de la rélation" (Ghiglione, Beauvois, Chabrol & Trognon 
1980: 68).
6. Phrase structure is the syntax at the core of each language which provides 
the transformation rules which allow us to infer from different surface 
structures the common deep structure underlying them and, thus, to rewrite 
and code various complex structures according to a basic scheme.
7. An argument followed by many linguists; see in particular Lyons 1970 for 
a discussion of the generation of phrases in a language.
8. "Simple structures such as the canonical noun phrase/verb phrase form can 
adequately represent the syntactical constructs of factual stories (..) The 
canonical form, however performs quite poorly in representing the more complex 
syntactical constructs likely to be found in verbal reactions and comments." 
(Franzosi 1989: 275-276, emphasis in the original).
9. The term universe refers to a set of conditions, actors and relationships 
which characterise a specific situation. A discursive universe refers more 
specifically to the communication and interaction process within a specific 
situation. It indicates that communication and interaction take place under 
a particular set of circumstances which involves specific actors playing
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socially defined roles.
10. HA goal of well written text is to assure that only allowable mappings are 
attempted. Such text is sprinkled with various cues to guide the reference 
processes.” (Metzing 1980: 96)
11. Gamson and Modigliani provide a typology of devices used to give
prominence to various framing packages. They distinguish between framing 
devices: a) metaphors, b)exemplars, c) catch-phrases, d) depictions and e) 
visual images and reasoning devices: a) roots (causal analysis), b)
consequences (a particular type of effect) and c) appeals to principle (a set 
of moral claims) (Gamson & Lasch 1983; Gamson & Modigliani 1989).
12. See in appendix I , under the title "paragraph" the description of "Actors- 
sources of the message’* and of "Actors-objects of the message.*1
13. See appendix I under “Issues” and under "Framing packages" about the 
coding procedure followed in respective cases. See also appendix II for the 
issue index and the framing package index used in the coding.
14. The relevant theoretical concepts are developed in Chapter three.
15. For the paragraphs as units of discourse see Dijk Van 1982.
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CHAPTER VIIs
The impact of the party power position on the evolution of its
styles of behaviour
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Presentation of the data: Sources of data,
division into periods of analysis, the raw 
textual material
In this chapter, our attempt to highlight the advantages and 
disadvantages of a socio-psychological analysis of party behaviour 
will be applied to a case study. The behaviour of the three major 
Greek parties, namely the Socialist (PA.SO.K.), the Conservative 
(N.D.) and the extreme leftist party (Alliance of the Left or 
SYN.), in the period between June 1989 and April 19901 constitutes a 
suitable case to be investigated.
The analysis of party behaviour to be undertaken is based on 
the party discourse in the media, in the daily press in particular. 
The articles published in the partisan press are analysed as 
messages by which a party expresses its opinions and seeks to 
influence others. The party that a specific newspaper supports is 
deemed to be the author of political articles in that newspaper. A 
number of sub-actors are identified within each party. These 
include the party leadership, the party candidates for Parliament, 
the members or supporters of the party, the journalists or other 
political commentators, the party as government and the party as 
political organisation.2 It may be argued that the party is not the 
actual author of the newspaper articles; nonetheless, parties 
control to a large extent the content and the style of their 
partisan newspapers, especially during election campaign. Moreover, 
partisan newspapers are commonly regarded as echoing the views of a 
particular party.
The styles of party behaviour as they are expressed through 
the party discourse in the press relate to the concrete actions of
the parties but they are not identified with these actions. Let us 
assume for the sake of analytical clarity that the party behaves in 
a unitary manner during the election campaign or the post-election 
negotiation3. The party takes decisions which it may realise 
through concrete actions. A decision to participate in a coalition 
government, for instance, is realised through the participation in 
government of the party leadership and candidates to the Cabinet 
and their involvement in government decision making.
On the other hand, the party also engages in various forms of 
communication which make up part of its effort to influence the 
voters. These forms play a complementary role with respect to 
party action. Party public communication and propaganda and the 
specific actions that the party undertakes are interrelated and 
reciprocally influence one another. A party supports its actions 
through its discourse but it also may (re)construct the meaning of 
these actions. The newspaper discourse of a party is a means of 
public communication among the parties and between a party and the 
electorate. This discourse may refer to the single party or to its 
opponents. A message sent by a party which concerns the party 
itself constitutes a style of behaviour adopted by the given party. 
Messages referring to a rival party constitute strategies of 
influence and resistance that the parties apply to one another.
The political discourse in the press has been selected as an 
important field in which attitudes and beliefs are communicated. 
This choice is based on the fact that media discourse is the 
prevailing communication 'arena' in which political beliefs are 
expressed, public issues are discussed and attempts at persuading 
people take place. Newspapers play an important part as a medium of 
political communication and are sometimes used in the dissemination 
of party propaganda. This does not mean that television or radio 
play a less important part in public communication; but in the 
period under examination, it is difficult to identify television or 
radio channels overtly supporting a specific party which could be 
used as sources of information about the styles of behaviour and 
strategies of that party. Besides, the study of audio-visual media 
requires technical facilities to which is not possible to have 
access. Partisan newspapers have therefore been selected as a 
primary channel that Greek parties use to put forward their own 
positions and ideas and to discredit those of rival parties.
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a) The newspapers
Two newspapers have been selected for each of the larger 
parties; "Eleftheros Tipos" and "Apogevmatini" for the Conservative 
party (N.D.) and “Avriani" and "Epikerotita" for the Socialists 
(PA.SO.K.). All these newspapers are published in Athens, have a 
nation-wide circulation and have explicitly supported their 
respective parties in the period under study. Figure 1 shows the 
national monthly circulation of each newspaper.
F i g u r e  1
National newspaper circulation: total of copies/per month
□  Total
■  Rizospostts
□  Epikerotita
■  Avriani
S  Etofttwos Tipos
■  Apogevmatini
Note: The newspaper "Rizospastis" is the only morning edition newspaper among the 
five newspapers represented in the graph. The total national circulation provided 
here includes both the morning and afternoon editions. The national newspaper 
circulation for each edition separately is represented in the following two 
graphs (figure la and figure lb)
Source: E.I.H.E.A. (National Foundation of Athens Daily Press), monthly
circulation bulletin.
The newspapers "Eleftheros Tipos" and "Avriani", despite their 
commercial character gave explicit support to the N.D. and the 
PA.SO.K. respectively.4 Furthermore, the owners of the newspaper
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"Avriani" were candidates for Parliament for the Socialist party 
and were thus directly involved in the election campaign. The 
owner of "Eleftheros Tipos", on the other hand, had close personal 
and political links with the rank-and-file of New Democracy. These 
two newspapers have been selected as suitable sources of 
information concerning the styles of behaviour and the strategies 
of influence and resistance adopted by the N.D. and the PA.SO.K.
F i g u r e  la
National newspaper circulation: afternoon edition
■  Total (afternoon edition)
□  Epikerotita
■  Avriani
□  Eleftheros Tipos
■  Apogevmatini
Data has also been collected from the newspapers
"Apogevmatini" and "Epikerotita". These have a relatively large
circulation (see figures 1 and la) but are to a certain extent
financially dependent on the N.D. or on the PA.SO.K. The newspaper
"Epikerotita" was founded under the auspices of the organisation
of the Socialist party and was indirectly managed by the latter5.
"Apogevmatini” is a traditional right-wing newspaper which has
suffered from a declining circulation. Nonetheless, it occupies an
important position as a 'transmitter' of Conservative party
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positions in the period exaiuined.6
F i g u r e  lbNational newspaper circulation: morning edition
The behaviour of the Alliance of the Left (SYN.) has been 
investigated by reference to the discourse of the party in the 
newspaper "Rizospastis." The latter is the major morning newspaper7 
in Greece (see figure lb) and has functioned as the traditional 
organ of the Greek Communist Party. The formation of the Alliance 
of the Left (SYN.), which brought together the Greek Communist 
Party (K.K.E.), the E.AR. (i.e. what might be called the "Euro- 
communist" party) and other minor left-wing forces in January 1989, 
transformed "Rizospastis" into the official 'voice' of the Alliance 
(SYN.). The partisan character of this newspaper is indisputable, 
"Rizospastis" has also been the only explicitly left-wing newspaper 
with a significant and stable circulation (approx. 3.5%-4% of the 
total, see also figures 1 and lb) . This newspaper is thus a good 
data source for the analysis of the styles of behaviour and 
strategies of influence of the Alliance of the Left.
b) The periods of the analysis
The textual material is divided into three sub-sets of data 
corresponding to three periods of analysis.8 Each period is
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organised around the main events of the case study. During the
overall period examined three national elections took place (June 
18, 1989; November 5, 1989 and April 8, 1990) and two provisional
coalition governments were formed (July-October 1989 and November 
1989-March 1990). The first period covers the styles of behaviour 
and the strategies followed by the parties with respect to the 
first electoral contest. The party campaigning and interaction 
before the election as well as their reactions immediately
following the election outcome are investigated. The data set 
concerning the first period comprises a total of 355 articles (1310 
paragraphs) published on June 16 and on June 20, 1989.
The definition of this first set of newspaper material is
based on two criteria. First, the first election is a typical 
electoral contest after the four-year administration of a single­
party government. The Socialists had won two consecutive 
governmental mandates in the periods 1981-1985 and 1985-1989. The 
election campaign of June 1989 took place therefore under normal 
circumstances. Second, the outcome of the same election led to the 
alternation of power positions between the two major parties, while 
the outsider party, the Alliance of the Left, retained 
approximately its electoral strength.
The first period is used as a control set against which change 
in the following periods can be tested. The analysis of this sub­
set of data provides an initial indication of the effect of the 
party power character on the styles of behaviour adopted by each 
party. Party relationships in the first period are organised along 
traditional ideological and political cleavages, namely left-right 
or progressive-conservative. The SYN. and the PA.SO.K. may be 
regarded as belonging to the same super-ordinate political 
' family, ' "the Left," since they share a significant part of their 
ideology and political tradition. A number of the leading 
political figures of the Socialist party (PA.SO.K.) originate from 
the Communist and other radical left-wing parties. Greek political 
hi«tory also confirms the joint participation of members or 
supporters of the PA.SO.K. and the SYN. in resistance organisations 
that opposed the Colonels' regime (1967-1974). Despite these common 
elements, differences did exist between the ideas of the two 
parties as well as between their programme declarations. Indeed, 
the Socialist party and the Alliance of the Left differed in most 
of their policy positions.
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Tiie ideological orientation, the leadi ig personalities, the 
practices and symbols of the N.D. were regarded as opposed to those 
of 'the Left.' Such a left-right cleavage originates from the 
Civil War in the period 1945-1948 and has characterised Greek 
politics in the post-war period. The dominance of the two super­
ordinate political 'families' in Greek politics is reflected in 
party interaction and in strategies used by competing parties in 
the first period of the analysis.
The second set of data refers to the formation of a 
provisional government between the N.D. and the Alliance of the 
Left in the summer of 1989 and also to the following pre-election 
campaign in November 1989. This set of data includes the inter­
party negotiation for the formation of a coalition government given 
that the outcome of the election of June 1989 did not yield a 
parliamentary majority to any party. The relevant articles have 
been retrieved from the newspapers published on June 27, July 1 and 
July 5. The same period also comprises the election campaign of 
the parties after the dissolution of the provisional government. 
For this reason, all relevant newspaper articles published on 
November 3, 1989 have been coded and analysed. The second set of
data is constituted by a total of 283 articles which consist of 755 
paragraphs-units of analysis.
A third set of data refers to the styles of behaviour and the 
strategies of the parties in the period before and immediately 
after the formation of the national unity government in November 
1989 and also to the party campaigning before the electoral contest 
on April 8 , 1990. The styles of behaviour and the strategies of
influence adopted by the parties in this period are investigated 
through the newspaper articles published on November 21st and 
November 25th, 1989, namely a few days before and a few days after 
the formation of the government. The pre-election campaigning of 
April 1990 is analysed by reference to data collected from 
newspapers published on April 6th, 1990, i.e. two days before the 
election. The data coded and analysed with reference to the third 
period of the analysis consist of 578 paragraphs derived from 258 
articles.
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c) The textual material and the data produced
The material from the newspapers includes different types of 
articles and other types of published material, e.g. political 
advertisements or photos. The coding category "Type" specifies the 
following options: reports of events, headlines or short abstracts 
which introduce an article on a different page, editorials, various 
types of commentaries on politics, public speeches or interviews 
delivered by party leaders or candidates and letters by or 
interviews of the readership. During the coding, two further 
options were added; the party or candidate advertisements and the 
photos or graphs published independently from relevant articles. 
The vast majority of political advertisements have been collected 
from the newspapers "Eleftheros Tipos" and "Apogevmatini" and to a 
lesser extent from the newspapers "Avriani" and "Epikerotita". The 
newspaper "Rizospastis" did not publish any party or candidate 
advertisements.
The distribution of the different types of articles within 
each period of analysis is represented in figure 2 (infra).
Political commentaries represent the dominant type of articles 
in the whole database. They alone account for approximately fifty 
per cent of all articles coded in each period (see figure 2). This 
predominance of political commentaries is in part due to the 
strategy followed in the collection of the material. Articles 
which were mere citations or announcements of an event, lists of 
the candidates in a specific constituency or simple announcements 
of party activities have been omitted from the data set. Their 
exclusion is based on the fact that these are informative texts 
that do not express a style of behaviour or a strategy of the 
relevant party. These types of reports provide topical information 
to the readership. Clearly, purely informative articles can be 
regarded as a means of advertising party activities or party 
candidates; yet they have been excluded from the data set because 
they do not express opinions, evaluations or any type of comments 
with respect to any party. Articles which reported events and also 
offered a short comment or an evaluative hint in the introduction 
to the report have been included in the database.
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F i g u r e  2Distribution of types of articles within each period of analysis
period period period
■  Photos/Graphs
■  Party/Candidate 
advertisement
S  (Report of)
interview/speech of party 
leadership
■  Commentary
□  Headtftie/short abstract
■  Letter or interview from 
reader
■  Editorial
■  Event report
The interviews or public speeches (reported in full or in 
abstract form) delivered by party leaders or candidates and 
political advertisements of parties or of individual candidates 
make up a significant part of the data set. Headlines or short 
introductory abstracts, the majority of which are front-page 
articles, event reports and editorials also account for a large 
part of the data coded. With the exception of political 
advertisements which, at times, included very short propaganda 
statements related to the specific candidate, and also excluding
some event reports which offered little information about the view
of the party with respect to a specific event, all other articles
have proved to be valuable sources of information about party 
behaviour.
The articles selected have been divided into paragraphs 
following the structure of the original text. In some paragraph- 
units of coding, and mostly in those with a descriptive content, no 
style of behaviour could be identified in relation to the party- 
source of the message. The percentage of these paragraphs remains, 
however, low with respect to the overall data coded and analysed
(see figures 3a, 3b and 3c)10.
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F i g u r e  3a
Total number of paragraphs in which the PA.SO.K. has been coded as the party- 
source of the message and total number of paragraphs in which at least one style 
of behaviour or strategy has been coded with respect to that message and its 
source.
1400 t
1 st period 2nd period 3rd period
■  Total of paragraphs coded
Q PA.SO.K. * Forty-source of 
the m essage
■  PA.SO.K. a Party-source and 
applies a  style of behaviour 
or a strategy
F i g u r e  3b
Total number of paragraphs in which the M .D . has been coded as the party-source 
of the message and total number of paragraphs in which at least one style of 
behaviour or strategy has been coded with respect to that message and its 
source.
1 st period 2nd period 3rd period
■  Total of paragraphs coded  
□  N.D. = Party-source of the
m essage
■  N.D. = Party-source of the 
m essage and applies a style 
of behaviour or strategy
More than one framing package may be associated with the style 
of behaviour or strategy coded. Multiple coding of framing 
packages is often necessary in order to include all relevant, 
complementary or contradictory, social representations mobilised in 
the party discourse. The policy issue(s) discussed within each 
paragraph are also included in the coding.11
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F i g u r e  3c
Total number of paragraphs in which the SYH. has been coded as the party-source 
of the message and total number of paragraphs in which at least one style of 
behaviour or strategy have been coded with respect to that message and its source
1st period 2nd period 3rd period
■  Total of paragraphs coded
■  SYN. = Party-source of the 
m essoge
■  SYN. = Party-source and 
applies a style of behaviour 
or a strategy
The database consists of a total of 896 articles divided into 
2643 paragraphs-units of coding and analysis. The distribution of 
the data, articles and paragraphs separately, into the three 
periods of analysis and related to the specific dates of 
publication is represented schematically in figures 4a, 4b and 4c.
F i g u r e  4a
Distribution of the data in the three periods of analysis
Note: Each period includes the following dates:
1st period: June 16, June 20, 1989
2nd period: June 27, July 1, July 5, Nov. 3, 1989
3rd period: Nov. 21, Nov. 25, 1989, April 6, 1990
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F i g u r e  4b
Graphic representation of the distribution of articles coded per date
■ 16-Jun-89
■  20-Ju*.89
■  27-Jun-#9 
□  1-Jul-89■ »-Jul-89
■ ¿-Nov-89
■ 21-Nov-89
■ 2S-Nov-89
■ 6-Apf-90
The concentration of the data on some specific dates (see 
figure 4b and 4c) and the general decrease in total number of 
articles/paragraphs coded in the second and third period with 
respect to the first (see figure 4a) are random since the 
collection and coding of texts has been based on selected dates 
(see chapter 7.1.1.b) and has included all articles relevant to 
party behaviour.
F i g u r e  4c
Graphic representation of the distribution of paragraphs coded per date
17%
■ 16-Jun-8?
□ 20-Jun-89
■ 27-Jun-89
□ 1-Jul-89
a S-Jut-89
□ y Nov-89
■ 21 -Nov-89
■ »N ov-«9
■ 6-Apr-90
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7.1.2 Clustering of the framing packages
A set of options has been specified in the coding scheme with 
reference to the coding category of 'framing' packages. Three 
additional options have been introduced to the original set during 
the coding in order to account for framing packages that did not 
fit into the existing options. The complete index of framing 
packages (see appendix) includes 25 different options which have 
been grouped into ten clusters. Each cluster either accounts for a 
specific social representation or for more than one social 
representation which are closely interrelated.
The clustering occurs around two axes. The first refers to 
the political or non-political character of a framing package and 
to the relevant social representation that this produces. Thus, 
framing packages that relate to psychological, emotional or 
physical features are distinguished from those that stress 
political values, ideas or public issues.
The second axis distinguishes between concrete vs. abstract
'objects' to which the framing packages refer. Three levels of
this axis may be identified: (1) concrete situations or problems,
(2 ) attitudes or practices concerning political or social 'objects’
and (3) abstract notions. Framing packages that concentrate on
situational factors and concrete issues focus on the specific
problems through a lens that perceives and understands politics in
general. The scandal concerning the Bank of Crete, for instance, in
which the Socialist government appeared to be involved, was related
to the more general problem of public fraud and mismanagement of
public finance. This eventually emphasised the problem of moral
and honest administration vs. immoral and corrupted people or
practices in government as the main issue that the voter should
consider. Framing packages that refer to concrete problems or
situations also include pragmatic factors that condition the human
organism, e.g. age or health. Reference to attitudes or practices
as framing packages within party discourse distinguishes between
attitudes towards political and towards social objects. The
packages referring to abstract notions may stress a politic31 value
or a belief. They may also include heuristic cues to understand
behaviour or events. These cues relate to pure propaganda, e.g.
"We are the winners, you are the losers" or "You are the past, we
are the future", or to non-political heuristic cues such as
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psychological predispositions.
The intersection of these two axes produces the following 
matrix:
P o l i t i c a l N o n - p o l i t i c a l
P r o b l e a s / S i t u a t i o n s P u b l i c  i s s u e s  
r e l a t e d  t o  
p o l i t i c a l  v a l u e s
r e f e r e n c e s  t o  t h e  human 
c o n d i t i o n
A t t  i t u d e s / p r a c t i c e s a t t i t u d e s  t o w a r d s  
p o l i t i c a l  *o b j e c t s '
a t t i t u d e s  t o w a r d s  
s o c i e t y  a n d  o t h e r  p e o p le
A b s t r a c t  n o t i o n s p o l i t i c a l  
v a l u e s  a n d / o r  
p r o p a g a n d a
P s y c h o l o g i c a l  f e a t u r e s  
o r  p e r s o n a l i t y  t r a i t s
Different clusters of framing packages are specified within 
each cell of the matrix. The cell of public problems related to 
political values includes two different clusters of framing 
packages; the cluster of " 'catharsis' vs. corruption" (F3, F13)12 
as a concrete situation and as a general question about 
(im)morality a«d (dis)honesty in government13 and also the cluster 
of "national development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation" 
(F10, Fll) which relates the problem of prosperity and growth vs. 
underdevelopment to patriotism and national reconciliation 
contrasted with national conflict. Only one cluster falls into the 
cell which refers to the human condition. This cluster includes 
the framing packages of health vs. illness (FI), of sexuality (F2) 
and of animals (F24) used as metaphors in the party discourse.
#Two clusters of framing packages fall into the cell which 
refers to attitudes towards political 'objects.' The "dignity vs. 
vulgarity" (F2 3) cluster deals with dignity or vulgarity as 
political attitudes and practices that one follows when one 
participates in politics. The cluster of "citizen attitudes 
towards participation in politics" relates to modes of 
participation, e.g. "peaceful vs. violent" (F18) or " ’thinking 
citizens' vs. 'shouting crowd' " (F19) and also to "attitudes
towards political participation" (F22), namely involvement in 
politics, partisan attitude, courage contrasted to indifference,
176
reluctance to participate and fsar to raise one's own voice. The 
adjacent cell which includes attitudes towards society and 'others' 
is represented by the cluster of "self vs. others". This cluster 
comprises the framing packages of "impartiality, objectivity vs. 
revengeful attitudes" (F16) and "altruist vs. egoist attitude" 
(F17)..
The cell labelled "political values and/or propaganda" 
comprises the relevant cluster of framing packages which refer to 
political values or principles and ideology. The framing packages 
included in this cluster are the following: "social
justice/equality vs. capitalism/exploitation of labour" (F4), 
"democratic vs. authoritarian regime" (F12), "separation of the 
mechanisms of the governing party and the State, meritocracy vs. 
partyism, nepotism and abuse of the State apparatus" (F21) and 
"progressive vs. conservative ideology and policies" (F25). A 
purely ideological framing package falls into the same cell of the 
matrix. It is the framing package of " 'real' Left vs. pseudo 
Right" (F5) which refers to a supposed distinction and 
differentiation between 'genuine' or 'true' left-wing ideas or 
policy positions and beliefs which are presented as left-wing but 
which express conservative, right-wing positions.
The same cell also comprises a cluster of framing packages 
related to propaganda, namely that of "power/future vs. 
failure/past". The framing packages that constitute this cluster 
are "governmental power vs. lack of power and authority" (F6 ), 
"winners vs. losers" (F8 ) and "we are the future vs. you are the 
past" (F9). This last framing package implies electoral success 
contrasted to failure since a party that has electoral success will 
govern the country in the future while a party said to belong to 
the "past" is characterised as obsolete and deprived of power.
The non-political notions used as heuristic cues in the party 
discourse are represented by the cluster of "psychological 
characteristics/personality traits." The framing packages involved 
in this cluster are "realistic or unrealistic attitudes" (F7) as a 
psychological predisposition, "consistent/responsible vs.
inconsistent/unstable personality" (F14), "balanced/reserved vs. 
psychologically unbalanced/confused personality" (F15) and "clever 
vs. stupid person" as a mental ability pre-defined by nature (F20).
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Political Non-political
Probleas/Situations 'catharsis vs. corruption* 
(F3, F 13 )
'national development vs. 
chaos/conflict within 
the nation' (F10, Fll)
' human condition ' 
(F I , F2, F24)
Att itudes/practices 'd ignity  vs. vulgarity '
( F23 )
'c it ize n  attitudes towards 
p olitical p a rtic ipatio n ' 
(F18, F19, F22)
's e l f  vs. others' 
(F 16 , F 17 )
Abstract notions ' p o l i t i c a l  v a l u e s  an d  
i d e o l o g y ’
(F4, F12, F21, F25)
' r e a l  L e f t  v s .  p s e u d o  R ig h t *  
(F5)
’ p o w e r / f u t u r e  v s .  f a i l u r e /  
p a s t '  (F6, F8, F9)
’ psychological 
characteristics and 
personality t r a it s ’ 
(F 7 , F 14 , F15, F 20 )
The classification of the framing packages into ten clusters 
serves two purposes. First, it reduces the number of variables 
specified within the same analytical category. Thus the discourse 
of different parties may be analysed on the basis of the 
association of a style of behaviour or strategy with specific 
framing packages. This association is used to highlight the meaning 
assigned to each style of behaviour or strategy by each party and 
the way in which this meaning contributes to the organisation of 
the party styles of behaviour and strategies. Second, the division 
into ten clusters illustrates the variety of framing packages
•#included in the party discourse.
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7.2 The power position of the party as a determinant of
the styles of behaviour that the party adopts
7.2.1 The measurement of the styles of behaviour
The first hypothesis of this research concerns the impact that 
the power position of a party has on the styles of behaviour that a 
party adopts in campaigning or negotiation. A score has been 
computed from the coded data which indicates the degree of 
consistency or inconsistency and of rigidity or flexibility for 
each type of party in each period of the analysis.
T h is  score has been  c a lc u la t e d  on the  b a s is  of the  freq u en cy  of
o c c u r r e n c e  o f  a s p e c i f i c  s t y le  o f  b e h a v io u r  for  each  p arty  in  each
p e r i o d .  S t y le s  o f  b e h a v io u r  are  coded  on the  b a s is  of a s c a l e ,
a c c o r d in g  to  w hich  c o d in g  v a lu e s  ra n g in g  from 1 to  5 in d ic a t e  degrees  
o f  c o n s is t e n c y /in c o n s is t e n c y  (1 very  c o n s is t e n t  - 5 very  in c o n s is t e n t )  
an d  r i g i d i t y / f l e x i b i l i t y  (1  very  r i g i d  - 5 very  f l e x i b l e ) .  Each
o c c u r r e n c e  is  a s s ig n e d  a r e l a t i v e  w eig h t  on the  b a s is  of i t s  coded
v a l u e .  R e la t iv e  w e ig h t s  are  a s s ig n e d  v a lu e s  from  (-2) to  (2 )  so th at  a 
v a lu e  e q u a l  to  (0 )  w o u ld  in d ic a t e  p a r ty  n e u t r a l i t y  on the s p e c i f ic  s t y le  
o f  b e h a v io u r . P o s it iv e  scores  dem onstrate  r e le v a n t  deg rees  o f
c o n s is t e n c y  or r i g i d i t y  w h ile  n e g a t iv e  scores  show r e le v a n t  deg rees  of 
in c o n s is t e n c y  or f l e x i b i l i t y .
The v a lu es  o f the  c o n s is te n c y  s c a le  re p re se n t  the  fo llo w in g  
s t y l e s  o f  b e h a v io u r : (2 )  v ery  c o n s is t e n t , (1 )  c o n s is t e n t , (0 )  n e u t r a l ,
(- 1) i n c o n s is t e n t ,  (-2) very  in c o n s is t e n t .  The r i g i d i t y  s c a le  i s :  (2 )
v e r y  f l e x i b l e ,  (1 )  f l e x i b l e ,  (0 )  n e u t r a l , (-1) r i g i d ,  (-2) very  r i g i d .  
Thus the  number o f o c c u rre n c e s  of each  v a lu e  o f the s c a le  are m u lt ip l ie d  
by th e s e  v alu es  ( e . g .  -1 fo r  in c o n s is t e n t  s t y le  of b eh av io u r  or 2 for
v e r y  c o n s is t e n t  s t y l e  o f  b e h a v io u r  e t c . ) .  T h is  product is  d iv id e d  by 
th e  t o t a l  number o f  o c c u rre n c e s  of the  s p e c i f i c  s t y le  of b e h a v io u r . The 
q u o t ie n t  o f  the d i v i s i o n ,  t h u s , ranges  from 2 to  -2 and re p re se n ts  the 
s c o r e  o f c o n s is t e n c y  or o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  of the  s p e c i f i c  p a rty  in  a g iv e n  
p e r i o d .
L e t  us p r ese n t  an exam ple w hich  i l l u s t r a t e s  the p rocedure  a p p lie d
in  th e  com putation  of th e  scores  : L e t  us c a l c u l a t e  the  f l e x i b i l i t y
score of a party for which in the first period 40 occurrences of a rigid
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or f l e x i b l e  s t y l e  o f  b e h a v io u r  have  been  c o d ed . T h e se  40 o c c u rre n c e s  
in c l u d e d  16 o c c u rre n c e s  o f  a very  r i g i d  b e h a v io u r , 6 o f  a r i g i d  
b e h a v io u r , none o f  n e u t r a l  b e h a v io u r , 17 of a f l e x i b l e  s t y le  o f  
b e h a v io u r  and  1 o f  a v ery  f l e x i b l e  s t y le  o f  b e h a v io u r . The score  i s  
c a l c u l a t e d  as f o l l o w s :
16x2  + 6x1 + 0x0 + 1 7 x ( -1) + lx (- 2 )
---------------------------------  = 0 .4 7
40
W it h in  a ran g e  o f  p o s s ib l e  v a lu es  betw een  2 (v e r y  r i g i d )  and -2 
(v e r y  f l e x i b l e ) ,  t h i s  p a r ty  o b t a in s  a f l e x i b i l i t y  sc o re  of 0 .4 7  w hich  
r e p r e s e n t s  a r i g i d  s t y l e  o f  b e h a v io u r .
7.2.2 Discussion of the results on consistency and
inconsistency as styles of behaviour of different 
types of parties.
The results on consistency or inconsistency in line with our 
hypothesis, are characterised by highly positive scores for 
consistency for all parties in all three periods analysed. 
Inconsistency as a style of behaviour for political parties appears 
only infrequently. This does not imply that parties are indeed 
highly stable and consistent in their ideas and policy positions. 
It means, however, that parties maintain that they are consistent 
and coherent in their ideas and practices. The instances of 
inconsistent styles of behaviour displayed by parties range between 
none and one in each period of analysis (see data in the appendix 
II).
The consistency scores computed for each type of party in the 
three periods of analysis are given in table 1.
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Table 1 
Consistency/Inconsistency
Periods of analysis
1 s t 2nd 3rd
Incumbent 1 .96 1.79
C h a l l e n g e r 1 .95 1.86 1.87
O u t s i d e r 1 .97 1.89 2
Note: Consistency/Inconsistency score=n, maxn = 2, rainn = -2.
Overall the consistency scores for all three types of parties 
are remarkably high. Our hypotheses are thus fully supported. In 
the first period of analysis parties obtain consistency scores very 
close to the maximum score. A slight decline is registered in the 
second period for all three types of parties (see table 1). The 
incumbent and the challenger party maintain the same level of 
consistency in the third period; they show an increase of 0.01 with 
respect to the score of the second period. The outsider party, on 
the other hand, reaches the maximum value on the consistency score 
in the third period (see table 1).
The results support our hypotheses that all parties, 
irrespective of their power character, tend to adopt a consistent 
style of behaviour. Moreover, the outsider party displays the 
highest degree of consistency of all parties in every period. This 
finding is in line with the relevant prediction that the outsider 
party which disposes of the lowest symbolic and pragmatic status 
among the three makes itself visible in the pre-election 
campaigning and post-election negotiation by emphasising its 
consistency.
This finding also conforms with the assumptions of the active 
minority theory. Experimental research has demonstrated that a 
style of behaviour which is consistent, or is perceived as such, is
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a sine qua non for an active minority to exei.t some influence 
(Moscovici 1979). Indeed the outsider party accentuates its 
coherent, stable and resolute behaviour in the course of the three 
election campaigns and two post-election negotiations.
The slight decrease in the consistency scores of all parties 
in the second period, a decrease which persists also in the third 
period for the incumbent and the challenger party, may be 
attributed to the governmental instability that characterised both 
periods. The lack of a single party parliamentary majority during 
the second and the third period created a fluid political climate. 
Furthermore, the chance of the incumbent or the challenger party 
acquiring governmental office was contingent upon them negotiating 
a governmental coalition with the outsider party. The small decline 
of their consistency score may, therefore, be explained by 
reference to the fact that governmental power was contingent upon 
negotiation more than upon electoral success.
On the other hand, the incumbent and the challenger party have 
at their disposal large symbolic and practical resources which make 
their positions salient. Consistent behaviour is desirable because 
it is assumed that voters tend to reward it but, according to the 
genetic model of influence, it is not essential to a majority
group, e.g. an incumbent or a challenger party, in order for it to 
exercise influence on a population, e.g. the voters.
Overall the results on consistency confirm the relevant 
hypotheses. However, the extreme positive character of the 
consistency scores and the small differences between the different 
types of parties do not offer a clear view of the role that
consistency plays in party behaviour. These findings suggest that 
all parties demonstrate high levels of consistency irrespective of 
their power character. Therefore, an analysis of the meaning
assigned to party consistency has been undertaken. The framing
packages that the parties relate to their consistent style of 
behaviour are examined in an effort to understand better the ways 
in which different types of parties organise their behaviour. The 
analysis seeks to highlight the implicit meanings embodied in the 
style of behaviour by mobilising specific framing packages14.
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Figure 5,1
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages in relation to 
c o n s i s t e n c y  as a style of behaviour adopted by the in c u m b e n t  party
S 1>0 
3rd p
■  'self vs. others1
■  'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation*
■  psychological 
features / pers on a I it y 
traits'
■  'dignity vs. vulgarity 
E3 'political values ond
ideology'
■  'real Left vs. pseudo  
R ight'
□  'national development vs. 
ch aos/conflict within the 
nationa'
■  'power/future vs. 
failure/past'
B 'catharsis vs. corruption1
■  'human condition1
Note: The symbol si represents the consistency score computed for each party in 
each period of analysis . The value of 's i '  ranges between -2 and 2. Values are 
grouped into three groups: consistent, neutral and inconsistent. A consistent 
style of behaviour is related to a positive score on the consistency variable 
(s l> 0 ); a neutral style of behaviour is related to a score which equals zero 
(sl^O) and an inconsistent style of behaviour, fin a lly , is related to a negative 
score in terms of consistency (s l< 0 ).
The values s l=0 , i . e .  a neutral score of consistency and sl<0, namely a negative 
score of consistency have been omitted from this and also from the following two 
graphs because they have extremely low frequency of occurrence (equal to 0 or 1 ). 
The symbols '1st  p ' ,  '2nd p' and '3rd  p ‘ refer to the first , second and third 
period respectively .
Figures 5.1 (see supra), 5.2 and 5.3 (see infra) show the 
distribution of framing packages related to a consistent style of 
behaviour. Each figure represents the distribution for each type of 
party, i.e. incumbent, challenger and outsider in the three periods 
under analysis.
Four clusters of framing packages are primarily related to the 
consistent style of behaviour of the incumbent party (see figure 
5.1). These account for approximately 75% of the occurrences of 
incumbent party consistency. Among these four framing packages, 
the 'psychological features/personality traits' and the 'political 
values and ideology* are most prominent.
The prevalence of the ‘psychological features' frame indicates
that the consistent style of behaviour of the incumbent party is
embodied in a psychologising context. The party stresses the
qualities of its leadership and of its members in terms of realism
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(F7), stability and consistency (F14), calm and sangfroid (F15) and 
competence (F20). The incumbent party relates its claims of 
consistent behaviour to these intrinsic psychological properties. 
In the first period, the incumbent party also emphasises its 
consistency in relation to its beliefs and ideology. The party 
stresses its consistency in terms of its left or right-wing 
policies (F4), its progressive or conservative ideology (F25), its 
democratic or authoritarian practices and beliefs (F12) and its 
respect for the principle of meritocracy in public administration 
as contrasted to partyism and abuse of the State apparatus (F21). 
The increase in prominence of the 'psychological features and 
personality traits' framing package after the first period 
corresponds to a relative decrease in the use of the 'political 
values and ideology' frame.
Overall, these two framing packages have compatible and even 
complementary meanings. They suggest that the consistent style of 
behaviour of the incumbent party embraces not only political values 
and beliefs but also psychological features. The incumbent party, 
more specifically the incumbent party leadership is not only 
ideologically consistent but also psychologically balanced.
The prevalence of the psychological features as factors which 
highlight the consistent style of behaviour of the incumbent party 
in the second and third periods of the analysis may also be related 
to the exceptional circumstances of these periods. The incumbent 
party spent a short time in office in each of the two periods. Its 
mandate was provisional and its stay in office seemed unstable. 
Government was formed on the basis of provisional coalitions 
grounded on 'exceptional' conditions. Under these circumstances,♦the framing of consistency in terms of psychological qualities 
stressed the determination of the party leadership to establish a 
stable government. Under normal circumstances, namely during the 
first period, consistency in terms of ideological orientation was 
accentuated (see figure 5.1, 1st period).
The consistent style of behaviour of the incumbent party is 
related also to the 'national development vs. chaos/conflict within 
the nation' and the 'power/future vs. failure/past' framing 
packages (see figure 5.1). These account for approximately 1/3 of 
the occurrences of a consistent style of behaviour adopted by the
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incumbent party in each period. These framing packages have a 
common reference to the future and to the development of the 
country as a function of the party that comes in power. One may 
argue that this is a commonplace assumption, namely that the 
development and prosperity of a country is contingent upon its 
government. It is worth noting, however, that the incumbent party 
thus creates an image of itself as a powerful party that guarantees 
a prosperous future to the nation.
The framing packages related to the consistent style of 
behaviour of the challenger party are represented in figure 5 .2 .
Figure 5.2
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages related to 
c o n s i s t e n c y  as a style of behaviour adopted by a c h a l l e n g e r  party
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□  'national development vs. 
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■  'power/future vs. 
failure/past*
□ 'catharsis vs. corruption'
■  'human condition'
The challenger party relates its consistent style of behaviour
to the framing package of 'psychological features and personality
traits' in all three periods in a regular way. It also stresses the
'power/future vs. failure/past' framing package during the first
and third periods in particular. It appears, therefore, that
consistency is, qji the one hand, adopted as a psychological feature
of the party leadership or of the party members and, on the other
hand, it is embedded in the representation of the party as the
winner of the election and future government of the country.
However, the reduced significance of the 'power/future vs.
failure/past' framing package in the second period (see figure 5.2)
demonstrates the insecure power character of the challenger party
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during that period in wftich it remains isolated ;.n the opposition.
The second and third periods are characterised by an 
increasing emphasis on consistency in terms of ideology and 
policies. This tendency suggests that the challenger party seeks 
to establish itself as a valid alternative for government. Under 
conditions of governmental crisis and political instability, its 
consistency focuses on a distinctive ideological and policy 
orientation.
It is worth noting the difference between the incumbent and 
the challenger party in their framing of a consistent style of 
behaviour. Under conditions of governmental instability, namely 
during the second and third period, the incumbent party stresses 
the psychological background of its consistency and seeks to 
reassure its voters by representing itself as the guarantor of 
national security and prosperity. In contrast, the challenger 
party emphasises its political and ideological consistency as the 
main component of its style of behaviour. It thus represents 
itself as a valid alternative to the incumbent party and as the 
solution to the governmental crisis.
During the third period, the framing packages of 'power/future 
vs. failure/past' and 'national development vs. chaos/conflict 
within the country’ are embodied in the consistent style of 
behaviour of the challenger party. Thus, the challenger party 
relates its consistent behaviour to the future of the country and 
to its governmental incumbency in a similar way as does the 
incumbent party.
■#
The meanings assigned to consistency as a style of behaviour
by the incumbent or challenger party appear similar. A main feature
of consistency for both types of parties is the intertwining of the
ideological and psychological framing packages. Psychological
factors and political beliefs seem to be integral parts of the
representation of the incumbent and challenger parties as
consistent. The incumbent appears stable and determined in its use
of metaphors such as 'power,' 'future,' 'the Nation' or
'development.' These metaphors are in conformity with its dominant
position in terms of power and size. The challenger party, on the
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other hand, assigns a more diversified meaning to its consistent 
behaviour. The 'power' and 'national prosperity' metaphors are 
sometimes replaced by marginal15 framing packages (see figure 5.2) 
such as 'catharsis vs. corruption,' the ’human condition' or the 
’real Left vs. pseudo Right.' There is no clear organising pattern 
in the way the challenger 'frames' its consistency.
Overall, the different power positions of the incumbent and
challenger party do not seem to affect significantly the content of 
their consistent style of behaviour. Thus an alternative hypothesis 
is tested. It is hypothesised that the consistent style of 
behaviour of an incumbent or challenger party is vested in a party- 
specific set of framing packages irrespective of the changes in the 
power character of each party. Indeed, the Conservative party 
(N.D.) regularly applied the 'psychological features/ personality 
traits' and the 'political values and ideology' framing packages. 
It also stressed the 'national development vs. chaos/conflict 
within the nation', the 'power/ future vs. failure/past' and the 
'catharsis vs. corruption* frames. These framing packages are
embodied in its consistent style of behaviour in a regular and 
constant manner in all three periods studied (see figure 5.1, 2nd & 
3rd period in which the N.D. is the incumbent party and figure 5.2, 
1st period in which the party occupies a challenger position). The 
continuous reference to the 'catharsis' framing package is 
attributed to the topical nature of the issue and also to the fact 
that this frame had a particularly negative effect on the opponent 
Socialist party which had been accused of public fraud. Some
variation in the use of the other framing packages, namely the 
relative decrease in the 'power/future vs. failure/past' frame 
which is counterbalanced by an increase in the use of the 'national 
development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation,' does not modify 
significantly the framing pattern of the consistent style of
behaviour of the N.D. during the three periods studied. The 
'psychological features' frame has a predominant position in tlie 
framing of consistency of the Conservative party. Its frequent and 
systematic use may be contrasted with the scarce reference to 
'political values and ideology' (see figure 5.1, 2nd and 3rd 
periods and figure 5.2, 1st period).
Indeed, this seems to be the main point of differentiation
between the framing pattern of consistency adopted by the
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Conservcitive party and that adopted by the Socialist party. 
Irrespective of the alternation of the two parties in power, the 
Socialists seemed to prefer the importance of beliefs and political 
principles as matters to be related to their consistent and stable 
behaviour (see figure 5.1, 1st period in which the Socialist party 
is the incumbent one and figure 5.2, 2nd and 3rd period in which it 
occupies the challenger position ) while the Conservatives 
accentuated either psychological stability and balance or their 
moderate and responsible attitudes as the main frame to be related 
to their consistent style of behaviour.
This finding, namely that the framing of consistency by the 
two major parties follows a party-specific pattern and is not bound 
to, or at least it is not explicitly conditioned by, the power 
position of the party, raises several questions. On the one hand, 
it indicates that, throughout the whole period studied, the 
Socialist party stressed its partisan identity. The party 
represented its positions as ideologically grounded, contingent 
upon its overall political orientation (i.e. progressive party 
(F25), democratic (F12) party struggling for social justice (F4)). 
The Conservative party, in contrast, emphasised some inherent 
qualities of its leadership and/or rank-and-file as important 
factors that conditioned its consistent and coherent behaviour. 
Whether challenger or incumbent, the N.D. emphasised the importance 
of psychological properties more than ideology with respect to its 
consistent behaviour.
It may be argued that the difference in the framing of 
consistency by the two parties is related to their opposed 
ideological orientations, namely progressive, socialist vs. 
conservative, neo-liberal. However, two elements contradict this 
explanation. First, if this was an element intrinsic to parties 
with left-wing ideology, the 'political values and ideology' 
framing package should prevail also in the press discourse of the 
Alliance of the Left, i.e. the outsider party. However, this party 
does not particularly prefer references to ideology among the 
various framing packages associated with its consistent style of 
behaviour.
Second, both the N.D. and the PA.SO.K. are large parties.
Both have spent a number of years in government. The divergent
representations seem related to the fact that the Socialist party
had spent the previous eight years in government and, therefore,
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opted to stress its consistency over time. The N.D. accentuated its 
synchronic consistency given that the party had undergone important 
changes in leadership and in organisation in the previous years16.
Furthermore, the PA.SO.K. had to differentiate itself in terms 
of policy and ideology from its left-wing opponent, i.e. the 
Alliance of the Left (SYN.). Thus, the PA.SO.K. sought to make its 
ideas and policy positions stand out distinctively on the left-wing 
ideological canvas17. It raised the social representations of 
social justice and equality, progressive positions and 'the Left' 
as a socio-political group. Thus it appealed to left-wing voters, 
representing itself as the government that had always represented 
and still represented them. The N.D., on the contrary, had no 
significant right-of-centre rival except for the DI.ANA. The 
latter is a small party that was created as a result of a split of 
the N.D.. The DI.ANA. withdrew its candidates from the November 
1989 election and supported the N.D. in order to help the latter 
gain an absolute majority in Parliament. Thus, the N.D., was the 
de facto incumbent party that represented right-wing voters. No
competing party was in a position to cast doubt on the symbolic and 
pragmatic weight of the N.D. in the right-of-centre part of the
Greek political spectrum.
The party-specific framing of consistency as a style of
behaviour of an incumbent or of a challenger party brings into
question the hypothesised relationship with the party power
character. It may be assumed that power incumbency does not affect
the ways in which large parties frame their consistency. Given
that both parties have a large electoral support and defend ideas
congruent with the established order, the meaning assigned to their
consistent behaviour is conditioned by different factors. These
may be internal to the party (e.g. intraparty change in leadership
or in organisational forms) or external, namely a particular
conjuncture in |^0p£MM.gning or in government formation. The
specific circumstances of the period under study and, particularly,
the predominance during this period of the problem of corruption in
government, led the governmental policies of the Socialists to come
to be examined thoroughly by public opinion; this became a central
theme of election campaign. Thus the Socialist party sought to
react to the unfavourable situation by stressing ideological
considerations and traditional political cleavages, e.g. left-wing
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vs. right-wing policies.
Figure 5.3
Graphic representation of the distribution  of framing packages related to 
consistency as a style of behaviour adopted by the outsider party
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The consistent style of behaviour of the outsider party is 
embodied in a different set of framing packages (see figure 5.3, 
supra). Surprisingly, 'political values and ideology’ played a 
secondary role in contextualising the outsider consistency. The 
’real Left vs. pseudo Right' framing package was only marginally 
applied in the first period. In contrast, the outsider party 
framed its consistent behaviour by reference to the realistic (F7), 
trustworthy, responsible, moderate and balanced (FI5) attitudes of 
its leadership and of its members (i.e. 'psychological features' 
framing package). The consistent style^ of the outsider was 
complemented by the framing package regarding 'citizen attitudes 
towards participation in politics'. Thus representations of 
citizens engaging in peaceful demonstrations (F18) as 'thinking' 
individuals and of people actively involved in politics (F22) 
complemented the representation of the outsider party leader and 
supporter.
These framing packages demonstrate that the outsider party
does not assign a primarily ideological content to its consistent
style of behaviour. Consistency is applied in relation to a set of
attitudes and psychological features. These suggest a specific
type of citizen who supports the outsider party beliefs and also
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adopts a specific pattern of behaviour, name j.y that of a moderate, 
balanced, thoughtful though active citizen.
On the other hand, the outsider consistency is linked to 
’power’ (F6 ), 'success' (F8 ) and 'the future' (F9) (see figure 5.3, 
the 'power/future vs. failure/past' framing package). These 
demonstrate clearly that consistency is related to the power 
potential of the outsider party. Indeed, consistency, according to 
active minority theory, functions as the main source of power for 
the outsider party.
The relevant large increase in the use of the 'catharsis vs. 
corruption' framing package (F3, F13) in the second period (see
figure 5.3) suggests a shift in the representation of the outsider 
party. Its participation in the governmental coalition during that 
period was manifested in its styles of behaviour. The party 
associated its consistency with its determination to investigate 
public fraud. The significance of the power potential of the party 
('power/future vs. failure/past' framing package) was, therefore, 
overshadowed. This implies that the outsider party sought to avoid 
the interpretation of its participation in the coalition as a 
power-seeking behaviour. The 'self vs. others' framing package 
(see figure 5.3) complements and further supports the 
representation of the outsider party behaviour as impartial (F16) 
dedicated to the common interest more than to canvassing (F17).
During the third period, the emphasis on the 'catharsis vs. 
corruption' framing package decreases while the share of the 
'power/future vs. failure/past' frame increases. This change in 
the representation of the outsider party's consistent behaviour is 
related to its participation in the national «mity government. The 
exaltation of the national emergency and the fact that the party 
remained in office despite its outsider character lead to an 
accentuation of references to the success and power (potential) of 
the party.
In conclusion, it appears that the outsider party applies 
consistency within a general 'framework' which includes a variety 
of framing packages. Consistent behaviour conveys meaning to the 
positions of the party and embodies them with a distinctive pattern 
of behaviour. However, it does not stress their conflictual
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character. The outsider relates consistency to the representation 
of itself as a group of people who hold stable and moderate beliefs 
and who demonstrate responsible, balanced and even altruist and 
impartial political behaviour.
7.2.3 Some additional remarks concerning consistency as a
style of behaviour of political parties
The 'framing' of consistency has been investigated in order to
explore the meaning assigned to consistent behaviour by the
different types of parties. However, the exceptionally high level
of consistency registered in party behaviour in pre-election
campaigning and post-election negotiation give rise to several
questions. It casts doubt on the validity of consistency vs.
inconsistency as a suitable concept for the analysis of party
behaviour. The high scores for consistency indicate that all
parties under all circumstances maintain that they are stable and
coherent in their positions. This implies that either they are
indeed consistent or that they pretend to be. In either case
analysis could start with the assumption that parties seek to show
a consistent behaviour in order to attract votes or to negotiate
their way into governmental office.
Before accepting such a generalisation, we will explore
possible alternative explanations of the role that a consistent
style of behaviour plays in party campaigning and negotiation. The
qualitative analysis of consistency shows that differentiation in
the meaning assigned to consistency is contingent upon the minority
or majority character of the parties as social groups. Therefore,
the outsider party organises its consistent style of behaviour in a
different way than an incumbent or a challenger does. In contrast,
the element of office incumbency, which distinguishes an incumbent
from a challenger party, is not a valid predictor of the framing
pattern related to consistency. Specific campaigning and
negotiation circumstances or iutraparty factors seem to affect the
meaning vested in the consistent style of behaviour of the
incumbent and challenger parties.
In conclusion, -on the one hand, consistency as such seems to
be adopted always and generally by parties in their campaigning
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tehaviour. Therefore, it is not a distinctive element that 
characterises the behaviour of different types of parties. On the 
other hand, external factors may influence the character given to 
consistency. Parties adopt their styles of behaviour under 
changing conditions. Thus, the campaigning style of the party and 
consequently, its consistency, are subject to changes according to 
the needs of the party under different circumstances.
The conditions in which situational factors prevail over the 
power position of the party should be investigated in future 
research. Outsider parties seem to follow a specific pattern of 
global consistency which stresses a specific representation of the 
party. In contrast, challenger and incumbent parties tend to 
respond promptly to external conditions and do not seem to adopt a 
specific framing strategy in relation to their consistent style of 
behaviour. These conclusions require further investigation in order 
to be confirmed.
7.2.4 Findings concerning rigidity and flexibility as
styles of behaviour of different types of parties.
Parties generally demonstrate the consistency and firmness of
their positions. However, consistent parties may also adopt a 
flexible or rigid style of behaviour when they negotiate their 
positions. Official negotiation takes place when an inter-party 
agreement needs to be reached and, in particular, if an electoral 
or governmental coalition needs to be formed. A party may also use 
a rigid or flexible style of behaviour as a strategy to reach the 
electorate.
It is hypothesised that parties adopt either a flexible or
rigid style of behaviour depending upon their power position. The
results obtained with respect to this- hypothesis are presented in 
the following table. The rigidity (n>0) or flexibility (n<0) 
scores of each party in each of the periods analysed are
represented in table 2 (see infid).
The findings with respect to the more or less flexible
behaviour of each type of party in the first period support the
relevant hypotheses. The incumbent and the outsider party register
a relatively high score for rigidity; the challenger party
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demonstrates a flexible style of behaviour.
Table _ 2
R i g i d i t y / F l e x i b i l i t y  
Periods of analysis 
1 s t  2 n d  3 r d
In c u m b e n t 0-47 0 .7 6  0 .7 7
C h a l l e n g e r
or-iO1oinoI
O u t s i d e r 0 .73  0 .0 4  0 .03
Note: R ig id ity /F le x ib ility  score=n, maxn *  2 , minn = -2.
The polarising effect foreseen with respect to the second 
period is confirmed by the rigidity scores of the incumbent and 
challenger party. The incumbent further accentuates its rigid 
style of behaviour while the challenger reduces its flexibility to 
the level of absolute neutrality. The relevant data (see appendix 
II) on the rigid and flexible styles of behaviour adopted by the 
challenger party demonstrate that the neutral score does not mean 
neutrality in negotiation. Rather it indicates thet instances of 
extreme rigidity and extreme flexibility in the challenger's 
behaviour counterbalance one another.
The change in the rigidity and flexibility scores of the 
incumbent and challenger party may also be telated to the specific 
parties that occupy the relevant positions in each period. The 
Socialist party (incumbent in the first period) displayed a rigid 
style of behaviour in the first period. However, it became more 
flexible in the second period once it became a challenger. This 
finding confirms the hypothesis that a challenger party tends to 
adopt a flexible style of behaviour. This hypothesis is confirmed 
also by the finding regarding the Conservative party. The N.D. 
adopted a rather flexible style of behaviour in the first period 
during which it was the challenger; it adopted a more rigid 
attitude in the second period in which it became incumbent.
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According to the hypothesis, there is also a polarising effect 
in the second period caused by the fact that a party adopts 
strategic decisions that are or are not consistent with its power 
position. Thus, as predicted, the incumbent party accentuated its 
rigidity in the second period. As a matter of fact, it adopted a 
style of behaviour more rigid than that of the incumbent party in 
the first period (see table 2). The challenger party, on the other 
hand, adopted a neutral style of behaviour (n=0). The Socialist 
party, which occupied the challenger position in the second period 
adopted a less rigid style of behaviour than it did in the first 
period when it was the incumbent party. Moreover, its behaviour 
was more rigid than that of the challenger party in the first 
period since its decision to remain in the opposition was 
consistent with its challenger character.
As hypothesised, the incumbent party maintained a high 
rigidity score during the third period of the analysis (see table 
2). The challenger, as predicted, displayed slightly flexible 
behaviour. The data reveal that this marginal flexibility is 
related to a variability in the negotiation style of the challenger 
party. The party seems to oscillate between very rigid, rigid, 
flexible and very flexible styles of behaviour (see chart 1, 
infra) .
As hypothesised, the outsider party adopted a milder form of 
behaviour during the second period than it did in the first. It 
registered a slightly positive rigidity score. Not surprisingly, 
the same score was maintained during the third period of the 
analysis (see table 2). The hypothesis that the outsider party 
modified its intransigent and conflictual character after the first 
period is thus supported: the outsider party displayed responsive
behaviour in these periods. It stressed its open-mindedness and 
its flexible attitude. According to the hypothesis, the outsider 
party made a shift towards flexibility in order to justify its 
participation in the coalition government. However, the argument 
requires further analysis of the framing packages in which the 
rigid or flexible styles of behaviour of the outsider party are 
embodied.
Chart 1
Graphic representation of the distribution  of instances of rig id ity  and
195
f le x ib i l it y  in the behaviour adopted by the challenger party in each of the 
periods studied
period period
— ♦ —-  very rigid
-  rigid
— ÉT--  neutral
— * - -  flexible
— * - - very flexible
Notez The chart is based on the data quoted in appendix I I .
The analysis of the rigid or flexible style of behaviour is 
not limited to computation of the relevant scores. These simply 
represent the general tendency of the party behaviour. They do 
not, however, express the variation and the different meanings 
assigned to flexible and rigid styles of behaviour by each party.
Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of the framing packages 
related to the rigid (s2>0) and flexible (s2<0) styles of behaviour 
adopted by the incumbent party.
Figure 6.1
Graphic representation of the distribution  of framing packages related to 
r ig id it y /f le x ib i l it y  as a style of behaviour adopted by the incumbent party
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Note: The symbol 's2* represents the score for r ig id it y /f le x ib il it y  as a style
of behaviour assigned to a party during a period of analysis . 's 2 ' has values 
ranging from 1 to 5. These values are grouped into three groups: r ig id , neutral 
and f le x ib le . A rig id  style of behaviour is related to a positive score on the
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r ig id it y /f le x ib il it y  variable (s2> 0 ). A neutral style of behaviour in terms of 
x ig id ity /f le x ib il it y  is expressed as s2=0. A flexible  style of behaviour is 
related to a negative score on the r ig id it y /fle x ib ilit y  variable (s2< 0 ). Values 
of s2=0 have been omitted from this and the following graphs because of their low 
frequency of occurrence (see appendix I I ) .
The symbols '1st  p ' ,  '2nd p ' and '3rd  p' refer to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd period 
respectively
The 'framing' of rigidity and flexibility by the incumbent 
party appears diversified within each period and discontinuous in 
its evolution over time. There seems to be no clear pattern of 
framing packages that organise rigidity and flexibility as styles 
of behaviour and negotiation of the incumbent party. The incumbent 
party follows an increasingly rigid style of behaviour along the 
three periods (see table 2, supra) but the meaning of flexibility 
and rigidity as styles of behaviour of the incumbent party is 
(re)constructed within each period separately.
During the first period, the incumbent party stresses its 
intransigence in terms of political attitudes and practices (see 
figure 6.1, the 'citizen attitudes towards political participation' 
frame). The party accentuates its uncompromising attitude with 
respect to political principles. The focus is on participation in 
politics (F22) and on peaceful campaigning (F18) based on political 
argumentation (F19). Ideological intransigence, however, is not a 
leading frame. The rigidity of the incumbent party is related to 
its determination to win power. Furthermore, the party embodies 
its rigidity in a representation of prosperity and development. 
The 'power/success vs. failure/past' (F6, F8 and F9) and the 
'national prosperity vs. chaos/conflict within the nation' (F10 and 
Fll) framing packages emphasise its high power position and its 
resolution to maintain its governmental office.
Finally, the 'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package 
appears relevant to a rigid style of behaviour of the incumbent 
party in all three periods (see figure 6.1). The topical and 
controversial character of this framing package calls for 
particular caution in its interpretation. In the context of an 
intransigent style of behaviour, the 'catharsis vs. corruption' 
frame emphasises the determination of the incumbent party to deal 
with the problem when it enters office. It thus emphasises further 
the power character of the party.
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The combined occurrence of the 'psychological features/ 
personality traits' and of the 'political values and ideology' (F4, 
F12, F21 and F25) packages in relation to both flexibility and
rigidity of the incumbent party in the first period suggests that 
they do not represent the core of either a rigid or a flexible
style of behaviour. They are adaptable to the style of behaviour 
instead of imposing a specific meaning on it. This is indeed 
revealing of the nature of rigidity and flexibility as a style of 
behaviour. Neither of them refers to the beliefs of the party as 
such. These may be moderate or extreme, progressive or
conservative. Rigidity and flexibility concern the representation 
and interpretation of these beliefs.
The 'power/future vs. failure/past' framing package covers 
more than fifty per cent of the overall occurrences of a rigid
style of behaviour of the incumbent party in the second period.
This indicates that the power character of the party is highly
emphasised. The intransigence in its negotiation is associated 
with its high electoral percentage and governmental authority.
This in fact confirms the hypothesis that an incumbent party 
emphasises its rigid style of behaviour in order to make salient 
its governmental authority.
The flexible style of behaviour of the incumbent party in the 
same period is, on the other hand, dominated by the 'self vs.
others’ framing package. The party stresses that it is impartial 
in its behaviour towards citizens (F16) and that it gives absolute 
priority to the common good even if it stands in cbntrast to the
party interest (F17). The flexibility of the incumbent party is,
thus, presented as objectivity. The flexible style of behaviour is 
further framed in terms of ‘national development vs. chaos/conflict 
within the nation'. Thus the flexibility of the incumbent party is 
also related to its patriotism and reconciliatory attitudes (Fll) 
and to its struggle for national development (F10).
The rigid style of behaviour of the incumbent party is
embodied in references to power. It 'frames' rigidity with
dichotomies such as success-failure, winners-losers or power-lack
of power. The substance of its incumbency, however, i.e. its
policies, is linked to a flexible style of behaviour. Thus, it
appears that the incumbent party uses a double communication
strategy to pass its message through. The party members may be
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touched by the image of the strong, powerful, winning party. The 
non-partisan voters, on the other hand, may be reached by 
references to the prosperous future that lies ahead if the party 
gains office. This future is a common, national future independent 
of party affiliations ('self vs. others' framing package, see 
figure 6.1).
Rigidity and flexibility as styles of behaviour adopted by the 
incumbent party, appear interrelated in the third period (see 
figure 6.1). Their framing is identical with the exception of the 
'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package that appears only in 
relation to rigidity. The party however demonstrates a high 
rigidity score (see table 2) which indicates that it uses 
flexibility with a much lower frequency than it applies rigidity 
during that period.
The distribution of framing packages with respect to rigidity 
and flexibility in the third period indicates a homogenisation of 
the behaviour of the incumbent party. In contrast to the findings 
concerning the first and the second period, the party assigns a 
similar meaning to both styles of behaviour in the third period. 
This may be related to the formation of the national unity 
government during the same period. The cooperation of three 
parties with contradictory ideas and policies provoked a certain 
symbolic and ideological confusion from the parties themselves and 
from the party supporters. Party leaders who had bitterly fought 
each other until a few weeks earlier, sat at regular meetings and 
made decisions together. Thus, the distinctive meaning of rigidity 
and flexibility loses its reference points. The association of 
rigidity or flexibility with symbolic references to power, to the 
future of the nation or to ideology may thus make no difference. 
It seems that the different styles of behaviour are reduced to 
different linguistic expressions of the same content. 'Catharsis 
vs. corruption' remains, however, the only framing package which 
differentiates the incumbent party's rigid style of behaviour from 
its flexible style during the third period. This finding may, 
however, be attributed to the particularly topical character of 
this package.
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Figure 6.2 represents the distribution of the framing packages 
with reference to the rigidity or flexibility demonstrated by the 
challenger party in the three periods analysed.
Figure 6.2
Graphic representation of the distribution  of framing packages related to 
r ig id it y /f le x ib il it y  as a style of behaviour of the challenger party
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The 'political values and ideology* framing package appears to 
dominate in instances of both flexible and rigid behaviour (see 
figure 6.2). This frame covers between approximately twenty and 
fifty per cent of the rigidity or flexibility occurrences during 
each period. This reveals an internal contradiction in party 
behaviour. It seems that a party expresses its intransigence in 
relation to its ideology and to given political principles. 
Nonetheless, at the same time, the party demonstrates its 
flexibility with respect to the same subjects. It is argued that 
this contradiction reflects the ambivalent position of the 
challenger party. The party accentuates its distinctiveness and 
differentiates itself from the incumbent by means of firm and rigid 
ideological and policy orientation. However, the challenger party 
seeks also to create the image of a large and secure governing 
party. Consequently, it needs to display responsive open-minded 
behaviour with respect to ideological and political conflicts.
The rigid and flexible instances of behaviour of the
challenger party in the first period present no significant
peculiarities. The party adopts moderately flexible behaviour (see
table 2 supra) although instances of rigidity are not totally
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absent. Its rigidity is related to the 'catharsis vs. corruption' 
framing package which is highly topical in that period.
The flexibility of the challenger party in the same period is 
related to various framing packages. The 'psychological features' 
and the 'political values' framing packages seem, however, to 
predominate in the discourse. The party builds its flexible style 
on the basis of its realistic (F7) and trustworthy (FI4) character 
and of its clear and balanced (F15) behaviour. It also stresses its 
flexibility in terms of policy and ideology. The 'catharsis vs. 
corruption' frame is the main element that differentiates between 
the flexible and the rigid style of behaviour of the challenger 
party in the first period (see figure 6.2). The rigid style of 
behaviour adopted by the challenger party concentrates on topical 
issues, namely the salience of the governmental scandals during 
that period.
The challenger party registers a neutral score for rigidity/ 
flexibility in the second and third periods (see table 2 supra). 
As noted earlier, the data point to the existence of a high level 
of variance in the rigid and flexible styles of behaviour. The 
behaviour varies from extreme rigidity to extreme flexibility and 
eventually counterbalance each other (see chart 1, supra). These 
contradictory styles of behaviour are based on different framing 
packages. With the exception of the 'political values and 
ideology' frame which is related in a regular manner to both rigid 
and flexible behaviour during the second and third period (see 
figure 6.2), the distribution of framing packages changes 
dramatically from rigidity to flexibility.
The rigid style of behaviour of the challenger party is
related to its representation as the powerful party (F6), the
winner of the election (F8) and the future government of the
country (F9) and also to its ideology ('political values and
ideology' framing package). On the contrary, flexibility is
assigned a variety of meanings. The challenger party shows a
flexible attitude in relation to 'human condition' questions, to
the problem of 'catharsis vs. corruption' and to the issue of
'national development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation.' It
adopts a flexible style of behaviour on 'political values and
ideology' matters as well as on questions related to political
participation ('citizen attitudes towards participation in
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politics'). The flexibility of the challenger party is also 
related to its impartial attitude (F16) and to its respect for the 
common interest (F17) (’self vs. others' framing package). In 
conclusion, the challenger party 'frames' its flexibility in a 
variety of packages while it concentrates its rigidity on political 
values or ideas and on electoral success or governmental power.
The relationship between these two framing packages, namely 
'political values and ideology' and 'power/future vs. failure/past’ 
and the challenger's rigid style of behaviour seems, however, to be 
contingent upon situational factors or, more specifically, to 
general events that take place during the second period. The 
formation of the governmental coalition by the incumbent and 
outsider party and their joint opposition against the challenger 
made the latter accentuate its distinctiveness in terms of 
ideology. The ideological rigidity of the challenger party was 
opposed to the mixing of right and left-wing ideas and policies in 
government. On the other hand, the fact that this party was the 
only party of significant size remaining in the opposition lead to 
its focusing its rigidity on symbolic references to power and 
success.
It may be argued that the change in the framing packages 
associated with the challenger party’s flexibility or rigidity 
between the first and the second period is related to the fact that 
different parties occupy the challenger position in each of these 
periods (N.D. holds a challenger position in the first period while 
in the second period the Socialists become the challenger party). 
However, this explanation seems inadequate. On the one hand, the 
distribution of the framing packages related to the rigidity or 
flexibility of the challenger party in the third period is 
dissimilar to that of the second period (see figure 6.2). Neither 
is the distribution of framing packages linked to rigidity or 
flexibility of the incumbent party in the third period similar to 
that of the second period (see figure 6.1). Therefore, the framing 
of rigidity or flexibility cannot be related to the specific party, 
namely the Socialists or the Conservatives, which occupies the 
relevant position during the second and third period.
During the third period, the two styles of behaviour share a
set of common references to 'national development vs.
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chaos/conflict within the nation' and to political values and 
ideology'. However, the 'political values and ideology' frame 
accounts for more than fifty per cent of the instances of rigid 
styles of behaviour. The coverage of the same frame with respect 
to flexibility is in contrast limited (see figure 6.2). This shows 
that the challenger party, in spite of its participation in the 
national unity government, framed its rigidity prevalently in terms 
of ideas and policy positions. It thus sought to maintain its 
distinctive position as an alternative to the incumbent party.
Indeed, the party's flexible style of behaviour is embedded in 
the ’psychological features and personality traits' framing 
package. The party represents its comprehensive and open-minded 
attitude as having its roots in a stable, responsible (F14) and 
calm, moderate (F15) character and in a realistic attitude (F7). 
The rigidity of the challenger party is also related to the 
'power/future vs. failure/past' framing package and to the 
'catharsis vs. corruption' and 'human condition' frames. Rigidity 
is, therefore, framed prevalently in terms of political problems or 
questions while flexibility draws upon non-political elements, 
namely supposed psychological features of the party leadership or 
of the party members.
Not surprisingly, the frame which refers to ’national 
development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation' plays a neutral 
role regarding the rigid or flexible behaviour of the challenger 
party. The pivotal position of the frame is in conformity with the 
fact that it is explicitly related to the so-called 'mission' of 
the national unity government, namely to relieve the country from 
its economic and political crisis. Consequently, the 'national 
development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation' framing package, 
although it is particularly salient during the third period, is not 
typical of the behaviour of one party in contrast to the behaviour 
of its coalition partners.
In conclusion, the framing of rigid or flexible styles of
behaviour of the challenger party does not follow a party-specific
pattern. The challenger party seems to have followed situational
factors in the organisation of its rigid or flexible style of
behaviour. It accentuated its intransigence on the question of
'catharsis' during the first period when the subject was highly
topical. When the party was confronted with the governmental
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coalition of the incumbent and the outsider, it stressed its
ideological intransigence and framed its rigidity in terms of
electoral success and governmental power. Finally, in the third
period, during which time co-operative action was counteracted by 
divergent beliefs, the challenger party stressed its rigidity in 
political values and ideas while at the same time supporting its 
flexible style of behaviour with a psychological background.
The fact that the responsiveness of the challenger party to 
situational factors conditioned its rigid or flexible styles of 
behaviour may be explained by reference to its high but insecure 
power position. The party had a large percentage of the vote but 
did not possess governmental office. Consequently, it sought to
exploit conjectural factors in order to cover the small but
critical distance that separated it from office incumbency.
In contrast to the incumbent and the challenger parties, the 
rigid and flexible behaviour of the outsider party is embedded in a 
relatively uniform pattern of framing packages (see figure 6.3).
In spite of the relevant changes in the rigidity/flexibility
score of the outsider party, a common set of five framing packages
organises its flexible and rigid styles of behaviour in all three 
periods. The 'power/future vs. failure/past’, the 'political 
values and ideology', the 'psychological features and personality 
traits' and the 'citizen attitudes towards political participation' 
framing packages are related to instances of both flexible and
intransigent behaviour of the outsider party (see figure 6.3,
*
infra).
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Figure 6.3
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages related to 
r i g i d i t y / f l e x i b i l i t y  as a style of behaviour of the o u t s i d e r  party
■  'self vs. others'
■  'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation'
■  psychological
features TpersonaTHy traits *
■  'dignity vs. vulgarity*
B 'political values and 
Ideology
B rea‘ Left vs. pseudo R ight1
□  'national developm ent vs. 
chaos /conflict within the 
nation'
B 'power/future vs. 
failure/past1
□  'catharsis vs. corruption*
B 'human condition*
A specific framing pattern underlies the rigidity or 
flexibility of the outsider party in all periods irrespective of 
the eventual prevalence of a flexible or rigid style of behaviour. 
The outsider party uses multiple framing packages with respect to 
both styles of behaviour. Framing packages that are based on 
concrete problems such as 'catharsis vs. corruption' are related to 
both flexible and rigid styles of behaviour. The 'psychological 
features' and 'political values and ideology' framing packages are 
also applied to both styles of behaviour in a constant and regular 
manner.
The set of framing packages related to rigidity and 
flexibility demonstrates a coherent organisation of outsider party 
behaviour. The variation in rigidity or flexibility may be 
regarded as a global strategy of negotiation which is expressed by 
a stable set of framing packages used in the party discourse. 
Consequently, it is assumed that the rigidity or flexibility scores 
of the party reflect actual overall shifts in the party style of 
behaviour.
Nonetheless, some irregularities in this uniform pattern of 
frames highlight the meaning behind the outsider’s shift towards 
less rigid behaviour in the second and third periods. Consistent 
with the hypothesis that the outsider seeks to organise the meaning 
of its actions on the basis of its flexibility and sensitiveness to
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the common interest, two framing packages which are 
underrepresented in the first period acquire importance during the 
second one, namely the 'national development vs. chaos/conflict 
within the nation' and the 'self vs. others’ framing packages (see 
figure 6.3, second period). These frames are equally related to 
rigid and flexible styles of behaviour. This shows that the party 
stresses the importance of its decision in terms of progress and 
prosperity of the country (F10) and national reconciliation (Fll). 
The outsider party accentuates its impartial attitudes (F16) and 
its attachment to the common national interest instead of its 
party-specific temporary gains in votes (FI7) in instances of both
rigid and flexible behaviour. 'Political values and ideology’ and 
power and electoral success considerations ('power/future vs. 
failure/past framing package) are relatively under-emphasised (see
figure 6.3, 2nd period). On the other hand, psychological
qualities such as consistency and reliability (F14), sangfroid, 
calm (F15) and realism (F7) are stressed with particular reference 
to flexibility.
Instances of rigidity and flexibility of the outsider party 
are counterbalanced and, therefore, also produce a neutral 
rigidity/flexibility score in the third period. The linking of the 
’self vs. others' framing package to the flexible behaviour seems 
to confirm the hypothesis that the outsider party mediates the 
interpretation of its actions through its non-rigid18 behaviour. 
The party embodies its flexibility in the framing package of 
impartiality and objectivity (F16). It also relates flexible
behaviour to altruist views of the world, namely to the normative 
prevalence of the collective over the private good (F17).
In the same period, the outsider party appears to emphasise
more the relationship between its views of 'citizen attitudes
towards participation in politics' and its rigidity more than it
emphasises its flexibility (see figure 6.3). This indicates that
the rigidity of the outsider party is meant to be peaceful and calm
(F18) and based on political argument instead of party 'fiestas'
and "shouting crowds" (F19). Furthermore, its rigidity is embodied
in a representation of courageous and active involvement in
politics and in an effort to resolve problems (F22). The use of
these framing packages is consistent with the hypothesis that the
outsider party adopts a less rigid style of behaviour in order to
avoid the interpretation of its actions as ideologically
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inconsistent and power-driven.
7.2.5 Conclusions
The findings concerning rigidity and flexibility as styles of 
party behaviour support the relevant hypotheses. Indeed, during 
the first period, parties with extreme power positions, namely 
incumbent and outsider parties adopt a rigid style of behaviour 
while parties with an intermediate power character, i.e. challenger 
parties, show a more flexible style of behaviour. Conform with our 
second hypothesis, during the second and third period, parties 
which act in a manner consistent with their power position (i.e. an 
incumbent party that is in government or a challenger or outsider 
party that remain in the opposition) support their decisions by a 
more rigid/less flexible style of behaviour. Conversely, parties 
which take strategic decisions incongruent with their power 
position (e.g. an outsider party that participates in coalition 
government) mediate their behaviour by means of more flexible/less 
rigid styles of behaviour.
Moreover, there seems to be a qualitative difference between 
the ways in which different types of parties relate their rigid or 
flexible behaviour to specific framing packages. First, both rigid 
and flexible styles of behaviour of the incumbent party are related 
to its ideology and policies and also to psychological 
characteristics. On the other hand, the incumbent party focuses 
its rigid behaviour on general political norms, regarding political 
participation for instance, and on symbolic elements like power, 
success or future which contrast with its flexible style embodied 
in claims of objectivity, altruist attitude and the common national 
good. This selective emphasis has not been detected in the 
challenger party behaviour. The behaviour of this party seems to be 
influenced by changes in situational factors. The modification of 
the political situation is reflected in the framing of the rigid or 
flexible behaviour of the challenger party. This indicates a high 
degree of adaptability to changes in external conditions.
The main characteristics that organise rigidity and
flexibility as styles of behaviour of the incumbent and challenger
party confirm the power position of each of them. The dominant
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position of the incumbent party is in conformity with the selective 
framing of its rigidity and flexibility. The party frames its 
rigidity in terms of power and/or political principles. On the 
other hand, its rare displays of a flexible behaviour are embedded 
in a representation of the just governing party which looks after 
the national good. Reference« to oc-^pychological
features play a pivotal role in relation to the incumbent party's 
rigidity and flexibility.
The challenger party congruent with its large symbolic but 
limited practical power, seems to adapt its behaviour to the 
changing circumstances. On the one hand, the challenger party most 
often relates both rigid and flexible styles of behaviour to its 
ideology and policy positions. On the other hand, the framing of 
its rigidity seems to be conditioned by situational factors in all 
periods. In the first period, it relates its uncompromising 
attitude to the governmental corruption which is a topical subject 
in that period. During the second period, it emphasises its 
ideological intransigence and links its rigidity with references to 
power and success. Finally, in the third period, the challenger 
party stresses its ideological intransigence and thus its 
distinctiveness despite its participation in the national unity 
government.
Overall the framing of rigid and flexible styles of behaviour 
seems to be conditioned by the power position of each party, namely 
its incumbent or challenger position. No party-specific pattern of 
rigidity or flexibility is detected in our data. Furthermore, the 
'political values and ideology' framing packages which refer to the 
ideological and political orientation of each party and, therefore, 
might be linked to the specific party identity, are used by the 
Conservative and Socialist parties in different ways when the 
parties occupy different power positions.
The outsider party frames its rigidity and flexibility in a
way consistent with the theoretical assumptions about its power
character and in line with the relevant predictions regarding its
rigid or flexible style of behaviour. The organisation of its
rigidity and flexibility follows a different pattern than that of
the other two parties just as the power character of the outsider
party is qualitatively different than that of the incumbent or
challenger party. Their qualitative difference lies in the fact
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that the outsider party is not only small but also deviates from 
the established norms. Its rigidity is related to various social 
representations. It is not mainly or solely expressed through 
ideology, political values or the problem of catharsis. It is 
related to different pragmatic and symbolic aspects of politics.
The outsider party has been hypothesised to mediate its 
decision to participate in a coalition government through its shift 
towards a less rigid style of behaviour during the second and third 
periods of the analysis. Indeed, this hypothesis is confirmed by 
relevant changes in the framing packages linked with the outsider 
party behaviour in these periods. The relative increase in the use 
of the 'self vs. others' and 'citizen attitudes towards political 
participation' framing packages emphasises the altruist orientation 
of the party which claims to look after the common good. On the 
other hand, the decreasing significance of the 'political values 
and ideology' and of the 'catharsis vs. corruption' frames 
indicates a moderation of the conflictual behaviour of the outsider 
party. The use of these framing packages confirms that the 
outsider party moderates its rigidity in order to negotiate its 
actual behaviour.
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A P P E N D I X  I  
I n d e x  o f  c l u s t e r s  o f  f r a m in g  p a c k a g e s
________* Human condition *
FI Health - Illness  : e .g .  i l l ,  old, unable, weak
F2 Sexuality (positive or negative connotation): private l i f e , sexism,
abnormal couple, p o litical anomaly, sharing one 's  l i f e ,  caring 
F24 Reference to animals positive - negative (metaphors using animals to 
accentuate personality traits  and specific  behaviours)
 ’ Catharsis vs. corruption1
F3 Catharsis - corruption (as state of a ffa irs  in so ciety ): e .g .  need for 
catharsis, purification  of the polity , transparency in public actions - 
contrasted to- embezzling money, theft, illegal practices, fa lsificatio n  of 
the elections
F13 Morality, honesty - Immorality, dishonesty: honest, sincere
immoral, liar , hypocritical attitude
i . ______’Power/future vs . fa ilu re /p ast '
F6 Governmental power - Lack of power and o ffic e : speaking as if  one were 
already elected, programmatic discourse before one enters office  
confessing inability  to influence decision making, distancing from the 
power positions
F8 Success - Failure, Winners - Losers 
F9 Future - Past
4.______N atio n a l  development vs, chaos/conflict within the nation*
F10 Development, prosperity - C risis , calamity: development, progress,
prosperity - c r is is , underdevelopment, decline, economic or political or 
governmental chaos
F I 1 Patriotic , national reconciliation - anti-patriotic, national discord: 
national pride, defence of the national interest and independence 
reference to past po litical events, deserter, unfaithful, traitor
5-:______’Real Left vs. pseudo Right'
F5 Real Left - Pseudo Right: honest consistent Left, h istorical credits 
(past class struggles) -contrasted to- dogmatic Left , supporting the return 
of conservatism
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______ ’P o litica l values and ideology1
F4 Social ju s t ic e , leftness - Frugality, exploitation, capitalism : social
justice , equity - capitalist exploitation, pseudo-socialists
F12 Democratic - Authoritarian: individual freedom, démocratisation of the
State, democratic practices within the party, democratic tradition 
dogmatic po litical belie fs , authoritarian attitude and practices in 
government or w ithin the party
F21 Separation of party and State mechanisms and functions - Partyism, 
nepotism : correct, impartial governing practices - abuse of the State
apparatus, mandarins of the administration, extreme partyism 
F25 Progressive - Conservative (use of the traditional political 
c leavage): a majority of the progressive democratic forces, progressive
policies - conservatism
7 .______' Diçnitv v s . vulgarity *
F23 Dignity - Vulgarity (as political attitude/practice)
8 . 'Psychological features/personality traits '
F7 Realism - Unrealistic attitude: realistic  strategy, brought Socialism 
to power -contrasted to- losing the historical opportunity, stuck to 
unrealistic  ideas
F14 Stab ility , consistency - Instability , inconsistency (as political 
behaviour and/or a personality feature): trustworthy, responsible
unstable, changing opinion all the time, inconsistent, irresponsible 
attitude
F15 Balanced, reserved - Unbalanced, confused (as emotional state or 
personality feature): calm, clear, balanced - fear, disillusionment,
panicking, extreme spontaneity, exaggerated enthusiasm, embarrassment, 
insane, unhappy
F20 Clever - Stupid, foolish (person)
9 . 'C itizen  attitudes towards political partic ipatio n '
F18 Peaceful - Violent (behaviour or person) : peaceful demonstration,
calm climate in the campaign, aggressiveness, vandalism
F19 Thinking c it izen s , political argumentation contrasted to public rally 
sim ilar to popular "f ie s t a ” , shouting crowd
F22 Participation in the commons, courage - Absence, cowardliness: active,
involved in p o lit ic s , c r itic is in g , proposing, indicating ideas/policies -
211
absent, afraid  to c r it ic is e , afraid  to contradict the government/the 
m ajority
lQ->_____^Self vs . others *
F16 Im partiality , objectivity  - Revengeful attitude (as political 
principle  or personality feature ): government of and for all Greek
c it ize n s , objective judgement - revengeful, mean person or behaviour 
F17 Altruism - Egoism: sacrificing  personal interest for the common
interest - extreme ambition, power obsession, self-centred attitude
A P P E N D I X  II
Data on the frequencies of occurrence of styles of behaviour for each type of 
party in each period
Data on the first  period of analysis
P arties : Incumbent Challenger Outsider
( P A . SO . K . ) ( N . D . ) (S Y N • )
Styles of behaviour
Consistency/Inconsistency
total 49 101 79
very consistent 47 96 77
consistent 2 5 2
neutral 0 0 0
inconsistent 0 0 0
very inconsistent 0 0 0
R ig id ity /F le x ib ility
total 40 35 56
very rig id 16 4 29
rig id 6 7 7
neutral 0 0 0
flexible 17 14 16
very flex ib le 1 10 4
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Data on the second period of analysis
P a r t i e s :  In c u m b e n t C h a l l e n g e r O u t s id e r
( N .D .) ( P A .S O .K .) ( S Y N .)
S t y l e s  o f  b e h a v i o u r
C o n s i s t e n c y / I n c o n s i s t e n c y
total 24 36 48
very consistent 22 34 46
consistent 1 1 1
neutral 0 0 0
inconsistent 0 0 0
very inconsistent 1 1 1
R i g i d i t y / F l e x i b i l i t y
total 17 28 50
very rig id  10 10 11
rigid  0 0 10
neutral 1 4 6 1
flexible  5 8 16 |
very flexible  5 6 7 1 
1 
1
Data on the third period of analysis
P a r t i e s :  In c u m b e n t C h a l l e n g e r O u t s i d e r
( H .D .) (P A . SO »1C« ) ( S Y N .)
S t y l e s  o f  b e h a v i o u r
C o n s i s t e n c y / I n c o n s i s t e n c y
total 20 31 26
very consistent 19 30 26 ,
consistent 0 0 0
neutral 0 0 0
inconsistent 0 0 0
very inconsistent 1 1 0
R i g i d i t y / F l e x i b i l i t y
total 18 19 26 I
very rigid  10 4 8 Ì
rigid  2 4 4 1
neutral 0 0 0 !
flexible  4 8 9
very flexible  2 3 5
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N O T E S
1 The reasons for choosing this specific  case study and further particulars on 
the most significant events of the period studied are given in Chapters one and 
two.
2 See also the coding scheme appended to Chapter s ix .
3 This assumption is made in order to clarify  the purposes of this study. The 
author does not claim that intraparty politics are irrelevant for the analysis of 
party decision making and behaviour. The assumption that parties behave in a 
unitary  manner serves only to delineate the subject of the research, i .e .  the 
inter-party behaviour.
4 The newspapers MEleftheros Tipos" and "Avriani" adopted, during that period, 
the typical style of the ’yellow P r e s s . ’
5 It  is  worth noting that "Epikerotita" has been the only newspaper founded by 
the So cialist  party which showed a certain level of continuity matched with a 
s ig n ific a n t  circulation , namely between 7% and 8% of the national daily 
c irculation  of Athens newspapers. After the elections of June 1989 the Socialist 
party founded a new partisan newspaper called "N ik e ."  The latter achieved higher 
circulation  percentages than did "E p ikero tita ." However, the circulation  of 
"N ike " after a peak period (October-November 1989) during which it accounted for 
between 10% and 12% of the daily  circulation of Athens newspapers at a national 
le v e l , dropped to approximately 5% in March 1989 (data provided by the archive of 
the E . I .H .E .A .  (National Foundation of the Athens Daily Press) on monthly 
newspaper c ircu latio n ). The late appearance of "Nike" and its fluctuating 
c ircu lation  made it  unsuitable for the purposes of this research.
There are no o ff ic ia l  data available  on financial aid from the Conservative 
party to this  specific  newspaper. However, there have been explicit  and close 
p o lit ic a l  and personal links between the party organisation and the newspaper 
management in the period under examination.
7 The largest Greek newspapers which have a national circulation  make up part of
the afternoon edition . The morning edition includes four or five daily  newspapers 
which account for approximately 7 .5%  of the total (morning and afternoon) daily 
c irculation  of Athens newspapers.
8 See also Chapter fiv e .
9
See variable "Type” under the headline "A rticle " in the coding scheme appended 
to chapter 6.
10 The following table includes the number of paragraphs in which a specific
party has been coded as the source of the message and those in which it also
applied a style of behaviour or a strategy of influence and resistance.
Number of paragraphs in which the party 
is the source is the source
of the message of the message
and applies a style of 
behaviour or strategy
1 s t  p e r i o d
P A .S O .K . 340 282
N .D . 519 411
SYN. 460 300
2 n d  p e r i o d
P A .S O .K . 251 209
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N.D. 283 203
SYN 221 201
3 r d  p e r i o d
PA .SO .K 199 138
N.D 244 184
SYN 135 108
These data are represented schematically in figures 4 a , 4b and 4c.
11 The decision to specify a coding category of "issues" aimed mainly at 
acquiring some concrete knowledge about the thematic structure of the newspaper 
discourse. The category of "issues" has not however been used in the analysis of 
party behaviour and inter-party relations.
12 The symbols " F . . "  refer to the number assigned to the specific  package in the 
index of framing packages found in the appendix.
13 With reference to the use of the 'catharsis vs. corruption’ framing
package, the following remark should be made. The problem of corruption in the 
public administration dominated the political debate in Greece during the period 
1989-1990. Therefore, the relevant framing package reflects the topicality of
the issue. Furthermore, the whole question about public fraud was addressed 
against the departing Socialist party government. Therefore, the 'catharsis vs. 
corruption' framing package is most likely  to be taken up by the N.D and by the 
Alliance of the Left , irrespective of their power character.
14 The terms 'fram e*, 'framing package' or 'interpretive package' are used
interchangeably.
15 The term "marginal" here refers to the low frequency of use of these framing
packages. It  does not imply that the content of these framing packages is
extremist or deviant.
16See Chapter two for further details .
17 The ways in which the Socialist party (P A .S O .K .) seeks to differentiate itself 
from the Alliance of the Left (SYN.) are investigated in the following chapter 
(Chapter e ig h t).
18
The behaviour of the outsider party cannot be characterised as flexible  since 
its r ig id it y /f le x ib il it y  score in the second and third period is very close to 
zero (see table 2 ) .  However, it is not rigid either. Given the conflictual 
character of the party, its style of behaviour in terms of r ig id ity /fle x ib ility  
may be characterised as ’ non-rigid,'
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CHAPTER VIII:
Analysing the dynamics of inter-party behaviour: Strategies of 
influence applied between parties with different power 
positions and with common or opposed super-ordinate identities
8.1 Introduction
The second set of hypotheses investigates the interaction 
between rival parties. This interaction takes the form of 
strategies of influence and resistance pursued by each party toward 
its rivals. Three of these strategies, namely categorisation, 
psychologisation and denial, are based on socio-psychological 
concepts that have been developed by experimental studies1. This 
study examines the function of these strategies in a real-life 
context: the campaigning and negotiation of political parties. The 
extent to which the strategies are applicable in non-experimental 
settings and additional factors which may interfere with their 
application in politics are investigated. The fourth strategy, 
i.e. affirmation, is a new concept which it is hoped to integrate 
into the socio-psychological analysis of party behaviour. The 
findings concerning this strategy offer a first insight to the role 
played by affirmation in party communication and interaction.
It is hypothesised that the application of the four strategies 
is affected by the power position of each party and by the links 
existing between the competing parties. The power position is 
important in relative terms, namely to the extent that one party 
has a stronger or weaker power position than the opponent against 
whom it addresses a strategy. The common or opposed super-ordinate 
political or instrumental identity is the second independent 
variable which affects the application of the strategies within 
each pair of interacting parties.
The results regarding the use of each strategy by two 
interacting parties are expressed in percentage that each strategy 
occupies within the total instances of communication addressed by a 
given party against an opponent. Thus, the findings refer to the 
preference of a party to use one specific strategy out of the total
munte r of strategies available.
8.2 Categorisation: quantitative and qualitative effects
The findings regarding the use of categorisation strategy 
between pairs of parties are presented in the following table 
(table 1):
Table 1: C A T E G O R I S A T I O N
h y p o t h e s i s  I
In c u m b e n t
C h a l l e n g e r
n. a.
In c u m b e n t
O u t s i d e r
confirmed
h y p o t h e s i s  I I
a .  
b*  
c .
h y p o t h e s i s  I I I
confirmed
n.a.
n.a.
partially
confirmed
confirmed
confirmed
n.a.
unconfirmed
C h a l l e n g e r
O u t s id e r
confirmed 
with respect 
to challenger 
uconfirmed 
with respect 
to outsider
n.a.
n.a.
partially
confirmed
unconfirmed
N O TES:
h y p o t h e s i s  I :  Parties that share a common super-ordinate political identity 
will categorise more vis-à-vis one another than parties with opposed super­
ordinate identities
h y p o t h e s i s  I I :  a. Parties that share a common instrumental super-ordinate
identity will relate categorisation to dimensions relevant to political, 
values and/or policy questions concerning their interdependent goals ;
b . Parties that share a common political super-ordinate identity will!
categorise against one another along general political dimensions which doj 
not explicitly refer to their ideological affinity j
c. Parties that share both a political and an instrumental super-ordinatei
identity will categorise along political dimensions which, however, do notj 
r e f e r  explicitly to their ideological affinity, and will also categorise 
with reference to policy questions concerning their interdependent goals 
h y p o t h e s i s  I I I :  Parties with a high power position will direct
categorisation towards parties with a lower power position more frequently 
than the latter are likely to do against the former.
n.a. = non applicable_______________________________________________________ i
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8.2.1 The effect of the party power position on the use of
categorisation by the parties
The findings suggest that the power relations between the 
interacting parties, namely the higher or lower power character of 
each party, is not a consistent predictor of categorisation 
strategy use. Our hypothesis that a party which enjoys a high 
power position uses the strategy of categorisation against a party 
with a weaker power position more often than the latter does 
against the former is supported only to a very limited extent.
In the second and third period, the results regarding the use 
of categorisation as a strategy between the incumbent and the 
challenger party confirm the hypothesis that the incumbent party 
categorises against its lower status rival, the challenger party in 
this case, more than the latter does against the former (see 
figures 8.1 and 8.2). In contrast the results regarding the first 
period show a converse tendency, namely the challenger party 
applies categorisation against the incumbent party more often than 
the latter does against the former. During the first period, 
practically every second statement of the challenger party in its 
partisan newspapers consists of an attempt to emphasise the 
negative socio-political features of the opponent incumbent party. 
Indeed, categorisation between the incumbent and the challenger 
party seems to follow a party-specific pattern. The Conservative 
party (N.D.), which had a challenger power character in the first 
period but occupied the incumbent position in the second and third 
period, uses categorisation against the Socialists (PA.SO.K.) more 
often than the latter do against the former (see figures 8.1 and 
8.2) .
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Figure 8•1
Graphic representation of the distribution of socio-psychological strategies used 
b y  t h e  in c u m b e n t  a g a i n s t  t h e  c h a l l e n g e r  p a r t y
1st 2nd 3rd
period period period
□  Affirmation
■ Denial
H Psychologization
■  Categorization
Note : the graph represents schematically the percentage covered by each strategy 
with  respect to the overall communication addressed by the incumbent party to the 
challengar party in each period under analysis. The relevant data on which the 
graph are based are appended to the end of this chapter.
Figure 8.2
Graphic representation of the distribution of the strategies addressed by t h e  
c h a l l e n g e r  a g a i n s t  t h e  in c u m b e n t  p a r t y
□ Affirmation
■  Denial
B Psychologization
■  Categorization
Note: the graph represents the percentage accounted for by each strategy with
respect to the overall communication addressed by the challenger party towards 
the incumbent party in each period under analysis. The relevant data on which 
the graph are based are given in the appendix.
The inconsistency of the results for the first period with 
respect to the hypothesis may be explained to an extent by a 
qualitative analysis of the categorising statements of the 
challenger party. As figure 8.7.2 (see infra) shows, the main 
dimension on which the challenger party categorises against the 
incumbent party in the first period is that of 'catharsis vs.
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corruption.' Discrimination against the incvunbent party is based 
on the framing packages of morality and honesty as political values 
(F13)2 and on their application in government and in society in 
general (F3). These packages are used in more than half the 
instances of categorisation coded (see figure 8.7.2). During the 
second and third periods, in contrast, the challenger party totally 
ignores the 'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package while it 
stresses the 'political values and ideology’, the ’self vs. others' 
and the 'citizen attitudes towards political participation' framing 
packages (see figure 8.7.2, infra).
This change in the framing of categorisation may seem to be 
related to the fact that the challenger position is assigned to the 
Conservative party (N.D.) during the first period while during the 
second and third period the challenger position is occupied by the 
Socialist party (PA.SO.K.): the analysis of the categorisation
strategy addressed by the incumbent against the challenger party 
rules out this explanation. The framing packages used by the 
PA.SO.K. during the first period differ from the framing packages 
which the same party uses to categorise the other party during the 
second and third periods (see figure 8.7.1). The 'catharsis vs. 
corruption' frame prevails in the first period while in the second 
and third periods it is neglected. References to the 'political 
values and ideology’ and the 'citizen attitudes towards political 
participation' packages, on the other hand, are limited in the 
first period; during the second and third periods they are used to 
a greater extent. Moreover, the 'self vs. others' framing package, 
hardly ever used in the first period, becomes salient in the other 
two periods. Consequently no party-specific set of framing packages 
is retained throughout the different periods independently from 
changes in the power position of the party.
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Figure 8.7.1
Distribution of framing packages when the strategy of categorisation is used by 
the incumbent against the challenger party
1 st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
■ 'self vs. of hers*
■ 'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation’
■ psychological
features/personality traits'
■ ‘dignity vs. vulgarity4
B  ‘political values and 
ideology4
■ 'real Left vs. pseudo 
Right4
□  'national development vs. 
chaos/conflict within the 
nation'
■ power/future vs. 
failure/ past'
El ‘catharsis vs. corruption'
■ 'human condition'
Figure 8.7.2
Distribution of framing packages when the strategy of categorisation is used by 
the challenger against the incumbent party*
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However, power and status differentials are to be seen as 
elements of the party interaction process. Under certain
circumstances, the advantage of a party's high power position may 
become a disadvantage: governmental power may be linked to
unfavourable social representations which cancel the relative 
advantage enjoyed by the incumbent. These social representations
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are easily used when controversial issues are at stake. The 
problem of political corruption, for instance, was a salient and 
highly controversial issue, especially during the first period. 
Thus, the challenger party introduced it as a relevant political- 
moral dimension along which to categorise against its incumbent 
opponent. Therefore, it may be argued that the challenger party 
uses categorisation against the incumbent party in the first period 
more than hypothesised because the 'catharsis vs. corruption' 
framing package offers a suitable dimension on which to use 
categorisation against its opponent incumbent party.
The outsider party (see figures 8.5 and 8.6) also applied 
categorisation against the challenger more often than was 
hypothesised (see table 1, hypothesis III) in all periods.
With respect to the third period, the inconsistency of the 
findings with the hypothesis may be explained by the fact that the 
two parties share a common super-ordinate political identity. 
Therefore, according to the first hypothesis (see table 1, 
hypothesis I), the challenger and the outsider party were likely to 
use categorisation more often in the third period than in the other 
periods during which their super-ordinate identities were opposed.
However, the results obtained with respect to the first and 
second periods cannot be explained by this hypothesis. Let us 
however examine the framing packages related to categorisation by 
the outsider party in these periods.
Figure 8.5
Graphic representation of the distribution of the strategies addressed by the 
challenger against the outsider party
□  Affirmation 
Denial
□  Psychologization 
Categorization
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Figure 8.6
Graphic representation of the distribution of the strategies addressed by the 
outsider against the challenger party
1st 2nd 3rd
period period period
Note: These graphs represent the percentage accounted for by each strategy with 
respect to the overall communication addressed by the challenger to the outsider 
party and vice versa in each period of analysis. The challenger and the outsider 
party have opposed super-ordinate political identities in the first and second 
period. During the third period they share a common political and functional 
super-ordinate identity. The data on which the graphs are based are given in the 
appendix to this chapter.
During the first period, the 'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation' was given particular attention as a 
relevant categorisation dimension, but its percentage of the 
overall coverage of the strategy decreased significantly during the 
subsequent periods. Thus the unexpectedly frequent use of 
categorisation in the first period seems related to the use of the 
'citizen attitudes towards political participation' framing 
package, which accounts for approximately thirty per cent of the 
categorising discourse of the outsider party during that period 
(see figure 8.7.6). The active but peaceful participation of the 
outsider party members in campaigning and their critical attitude 
towards government (F19) was contrasted with the aggressiveness and 
fanatism of the challenger party supporters (F18). The outsider 
party represented them as a "shouting crowd" (FI9) afraid of 
exercising criticism towards the government or their own party 
(F22). The outsider party discriminated against the challenger 
party along 'alternative' categorisation dimensions: it stressed
political principles with universal values such as active but 
critical participation in politics or peaceful campaigning.
During the second period, particular emphasis is given to the
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'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package. As argued earlier, 
this framing package is a highly relevant categorisation dimension 
against the Socialist party in particular (which occupies the 
challenger position in the second period). Therefore, the use of 
categorisation by the outsider against the challenger party in the 
second period may be, at least to a certain extent, related to the 
specific categorisation dimension.
Figure 8•7.6
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy 
of categorisation is used by an outsider against a challenger party
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Figure 8.3
Graphic representation of the distribution of strategies addressed by the 
incumbent against the outsider party
□  Psychologization
2nd 3rd
perioa period
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Figure 8.4
Graphic representation of the distribution of the strategies addressed by the 
outsider against the incumbent party
1 st 2nd 3rd
period period period
Note: These graphs represent the percentage accounted for by each strategy with 
respect to the overall communication addressed by the incumbent party to the 
outsider party and vice versa in each period of analysis. The relevant data on 
which the graphs are based, are appended at the end of this chapter.
Moreover, the outsider applied categorisation against the
incumbent party more frequently than had been hypothesised during 
the first and third period. The unexpectedly frequent use of 
categorisation by the outsider against the incumbent party in the 
first period may be attributed to their common political super­
ordinate identity. The significant increase in the use of the
categorisation strategy by the outsider party against the incumbent 
in the third period (see figure 8.3) cannot, however, be explained
by the hypothesis regarding the party super-ordinate identities 
since the incumbent and the outsider party do not share a common 
super-ordinate political identity in the third period.
An explanation for the unexpected increase in the use of
categorisation by the outsider party in the third period may be 
given by the frequent use of the "self vs. others" framing package 
during that period. The outsider stressed general political norms 
such as the prevalence of the common vs. the private interest and 
the impartiality of government contrasted to revanche politics 
('self vs. others' framing packages) as an alternative dimension by 
which it distinguished itself from its coalition partner. It thus 
represented the participation of the incumbent party in the 
coalition government as power-obsession and egocentrism.
The emphasis placed by the outsider party on the 'citizen
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attitudes towards political participation' framing package as a 
categorisation dimension towards the challenger party and the 'self 
vs. others' framing package as a relevant categorisation dimension 
against the incumbent party in the third period conforms with 
experimental findings on the alternative dimensions introduced by a 
group in judging its performance with respect to a given task 
(Sherif et al. 1961; Lemaine 1966). A group which is deprived of
the necessary means to accomplish a specific task introduces
alternative criteria for the evaluation of its work, e.g. aesthetic 
criteria or originality of the work effectuated. Similarly, the 
outsider party introduces the ’citizen attitudes towards political 
participation' or the 'self vs. others' framing package as an 
alternative criterion on which it rates better than its opponent 
challenger or incumbent party. Active involvement in politics, 
dedication to the common good or a reluctance to participate in 
revanche politics are issues relevant to politics but they are not 
contingent upon power. Thus, the outsider party uses them as a 
favourable categorisation dimension between itself and the
challenger or the incumbent party.
Overall, the findings that differ from the hypothesis that a 
party which disposes of power categorises against a party with less 
power more often than the latter does against the former seem 
related to specific categorisation dimensions. An unexpected
increase in the use of categorisation by a given party seems linked 
with specific framing packages used as relevant categorisation 
dimensions during a given period. Furthermore, the behaviour of 
the outsider party suggests that, to some extent, power inequality 
between rival parties can be surmounted. The disadvantaged party, 
namely the outsider, may confront its opponent on 'new' dimensions, 
favourable to itself.
However, further evidence is needed for this alternative 
explanation to be confirmed. Moreover, further research is 
necessary in order to clarify the impact of party power relations 
on their use of categorisation against one another.
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8.2.2 Common or opposed super-ordinate identity: a frequent
predictor of the use of categorisation between parties
Common super-ordinate political identity has been shown to be 
a frequent predictor of quantitative and qualitative changes in the
use of categorisation. The increased use of categorisation
expected when the competing parties share a common super-ordinate 
political identity is confirmed, albeit with one exception (see 
table 1, supra, hypothesis I).
The incumbent and the outsider party opt for the
categorisation strategy more often when the two of them share a 
common super-ordinate political identity than when they share 
merely an instrumental one (see figures 8.3 and 8.4, supra). The
outsider party reduces, as hypothesised, the frequency of its 
categorising attempts in the second period since the incumbent is 
no longer a rival with a common super-ordinate political identity 
but only shares a common instrumental super-ordinate identity with 
the outsider party.
The data regarding the use of categorisation between the 
challenger and the outsider party confirm only partially the 
hypothesis however. The results regarding the use of
categorisation by the challenger party support the hypothesis (see 
figure 8.5) but the findings with regard to the outsider do not: 
the party uses categorisation less often in the second than in the 
first period although the two parties have opposed super-ordinate 
identities in both periods (see figure 8.6).
As noted earlier, this finding also is inconsistent with our
third hypothesis (see table 1, hypothesis III), according to which
the outsider party should adopt categorisation as a strategy
against the challenger less often than the challenger would against
the outsider. As noted earlier, a possible explanation may be given
by the salience of the 'catharsis' as a categorisation dimension.
During the second period, the outsider party uses the 'catharsis
vs. corruption' framing packages at forty per cent of the
categorisation instances while during the first period it uses the
same package at twenty five per cent of the categorisation
instances (see figure 8.7.6). However, the extent to which a
salient and topical matter can overrule the impact of the power
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position and/or of the party super-ordinate identity on the use of 
the categorisation strategy between rival parties is a question 
that needs to be further investigated.
Our predictions regarding the effect of a common or opposed 
super-ordinate identity of two parties on the categorisation 
dimensions that the parties stress (table 1, hypothesis II.a, b & 
c) have been to a large extent confirmed. Let us however examine 
each hypothesis separately.
First, parties which share a common instrumental and political 
super-ordinate identity, namely the outsider and the challenger 
party in the third period, (see table 1, hypothesis II.c), 
concentrate on policy questions and on general political 
dimensions. The distribution of framing packages (see figure 
8.7.5) in the challenger party discourse in the third period is in 
conformity with the hypothesis (table 1, hypothesis II.c) while the 
framing packages used by the outsider against the challenger party 
in the same period support the hypothesis only partially. Although 
it has been hypothesised that political beliefs are not stressed 
explicitly as relevant categorisation dimensions between parties 
that share a common super-ordinate political identity, the outsider 
party relates categorisation attempts against the challenger to the 
'political values and ideology' framing package. On the other 
hand, in conformity with the hypothesis the party stresses the 
'real Left vs. pseudo Right' framing package and also introduces 
general political values (i.e. the 'self vs. others' and the
'citizen attitudes towards political participation' frames) by 
which it differentiates itself from the challenger party.
On the other hand, the categorisation 'dimensions predicted to
be used only or mainly between parties that share a common
instrumental super-ordinate identity on policy questions for
instance (’catharsis vs. corruption’ framing package) are neglected
by the outsider party. The need to differentiate oneself from the
challenger in ideological and political terms dominates the
categorisation discourse of the outsider party in the third period.
Common instrumental super-ordinate identity seems thus to be
overshadowed by common political super-ordinate identity. The
prevalence of the political super-ordinate identity may be related
to its stable character over time as contrasted with the
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provisional character of goal interdependence between the two 
parties which was due to particular circumstances. An interesting 
question to be further examined regards, therefore, the conditions 
under which common political super-ordinate identity between two 
parties becomes a dominant categorisation dimension while their 
instrumental interdependence is downplayed.
Figure 8.7.5
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy 
of categorisation is used by a challenger against an outsider party
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Second, the hypothesis regarding the categorisation dimensions 
stressed by parties that share a common functional super-ordinate 
identity is supported by the results (table 1, hypothesis II.a). 
The incumbent and the challenger party, in conformity with the 
hypothesis, stress political values and attitudes and general 
policy questions (e.g. 'catharsis vs. corruption' or 'national 
development' frames) in their categorisation discourse with one 
another during the third period (see figures 8.7.1 and 8.7.2). The 
findings regarding the categorisation dimensions applied between 
the incumbent and the outsider party during the second and third 
period also support this hypothesis (table 1, hypothesis II.a).
A special remark is relevant with respect to the use of 
categorisation between the incumbent and the outsider party in the 
second period. Categorisation attempts of the outsider against the 
incumbent party and vice versa in the second period are extremely
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limited in number. As a matter of fact, categorisation is used by 
the outsider against the incumbent party only twice during this 
period. The incumbent party also only applies categorisation 
against the outsider in three instances. The fact that the two 
parties share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity seems 
to constrain their use of categorisation against one another. The 
total of items coded with respect to each pair of parties in the 
second period is given in table 1.1 (see infra).
The parties exchange fewer messages with one another than they 
do with the challenger party. It seems that both parties use 
categorisation to overemphasise their opposition to the challenger 
party. A supplementary hypothesis may thus be developed that 
parties which share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity 
focus their categorisation discourse on the non-collaborating 
parties more than on their partners. However, further research is 
needed to investigate this hypothesis.
TABLE 1.1
Strategies: Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial Affirm. Total
Interacting 
parties:
Inc. against Chall. 
Chall. against Inc.
.»Inc- «gainst Outs.
Inc.
Chall. against Outs. 
Outs, against Chall.
38 31 23 42 134
9 11 6 11 77 ii
3 2 5 5 15
a 5 4 5 1* J
é
24 11 15 16 66 i1
26 20 30 17 93 1
Third, parties which share a common super-ordinate political
identity consistent with our hypothesis (table 1, hypothesis II.b)
are relatively reluctant to emphasise ideology as a dimension along
which to differentiate themselves from their rivals. Mores
specifically, the incumbent and the outsider party during the first
period differentiate from and discriminate against one another
along dimensions that do not explicitly refer to their ideological
affinity. As hypothesised, they introduce alternative
categorisation dimensions of a political or even non-political
character (in particular, 'real Left vs. pseudo-Right' and 'human230
condition' frames, see figure 8.7*3 and 'catharsis vs. corruption*, 
’psychological features' and 'real Left vs. pseudo Right' framing 
packages, see figure 8.7,4).
Figure 8.7.3
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy 
of categorisation is used by an incumbent against an outsider party.
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Figure 8.7.4
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy 
of categorisation is used by an outsider against an incumbent party
1st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
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Overall, this study demonstrates that the common or opposed
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super-ordinate identity that two parties may have affects the use 
of the categorisation strategy both in terms of frequency and with 
respect to the categorisation dimensions emphasised by the parties. 
The power character of the interacting parties, in contrast, has 
been proved not to be a consistent predictor of the increased or 
reduced use of the strategy.
8.3 The use of psychologisation by parties
Results concerning the use of psychologisation fully support 
the hypothesis that parties which perceive themselves as 
ideologically 'close' or which have interdependent goals are 
reluctant to psychologise against one another (see table 2, infra).
Table 2: P S Y C H O L O G I S A T I O N
Incumbent Incumbent Challenger
Challenger Outsider Outsider
hypothesis I confirmed confirmed confirmed
N O TES:
hypothesis I: Psychologisation is used by sets of parties which perceive
themselves as being ideologically and politically distant from one another, 
i.e. by parties whose super-ordinate political identities are opposed. 
Parties that share a common super-ordinate, instrumental or political,! 
identity will use psychologisation against one another less frequently. j 
____________________________________________________________________________________ i
The incumbent and the challenger party, conform with the 
hypothesis, use psychologisation against one another less often in 
the third period during which they share a common instrumental 
super-ordinate identity, than in the previous periods <see figures
8.1 and 8.2). The incumbent and the outsider party, in accordance 
with the hypothesis, use psychologisation to a limited extent in 
all periods given that they share a common super-ordinate political 
identity in the first period and a common super-ordinate 
instrumental identity in the second and third periods.
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Psychologising statements account for less tnan ten per cent of the 
communication addressed by the incumbent party to the outsider in 
any of the periods studied (see figure 8.3). The outsider party 
applies the strategy of psychologisation also to a limited extent, 
in the first and third periods in particular.
The second period is characterised by an increase in the use 
of psychologisation between the outsider and the incumbent party. 
The significance of this result is, however, limited, given that 
the total number of messages in which the incumbent and the
outsider refer to one another during that period is limited (see
table 1.1, supra).
The data regarding the use of psychologisation between the 
challenger and the outsider party in the third period, during which 
the two parties share a common political and instrumental super­
ordinate identity, also support the hypothesis that parties that 
share a common super-ordinate identity apply this strategy to a 
lesser extent than parties which do not.
An exceptional instance of psychologisation is worth 
mentioning. The challenger party applies psychologisation against 
the incumbent party most frequently during the second period (see 
figure 8.2). Moreover, the strategy is embedded in a purely 
psychological framework composed of the 'psychological features', 
the 'self vs. others' and the 'human condition' framing packages
(see figure 8.8.2). The challenger party finds itself isolated and 
excluded from governmental office during that period. According to 
social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979; Turner 1982), the 
party seeks to achieve a positive social identity, namely to cancel 
the negative connotation of its exclusion. Therefore, it
attributes the decisions and actions of the opponent incumbent 
party to the personality traits of their leadership. Revengeful 
attitude, power obsession and dedication to the narrow party 
interest ('self vs. others’ framing package) characterise the 
opponent party leadership. Consequently, it is neither possible nor 
desirable for the challenger party to compromise or collaborate 
with them. Besides, the opponent party opinion is deprived of its 
validity because it is attributed to psychological predispositions 
instead of to political argumentation and/or to factual truth.
This finding suggests that psychologisation does not only
function as a strategy to discredit the beliefs and actions of the
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rival party. It is also a mechanism that re-constructs social 
reality. Altruism and egoism, dedication to the common or private 
interest or power obsession acquire specific value as alternative 
interpretations of political behaviour. Therefore, the use of 
psychologisation in party interaction and competition is an 
interesting subject to be further investigated.
Figure 8.8.2
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy 
of psychologisation is used by a challenger against an incumbent party
The framing packages embodied in psychologising discourse 
demonstrate the intertwining of psychologisation with politics. 
References to psychological features and emotional states are often 
associated with ideological and political framing packages. The 
beliefs of a rival party are discredited because they are 
attributed to the psychological features supposed to characterise 
whoever holds these beliefs. Thus, psychologisation is introduced 
as the key-element explaining incongruent beliefs.
Furthermore, the intertwining of psychologisation with a 
concrete political issue, governmental corruption and the relevant 
prosecution of members of the Cabinet for instance ('catharsis vs. 
corruption’ framing package), indicates that implicit 'theories' of 
personality are often mobilised to explain the mismanagement of 
public affairs. The governmental scandals are explained in terms 
of the immoral character of the Prime Minister and his intrinsic
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tendency towards illegal activities. Similarly, tackling these 
problems is deemed to be contingent upon honesty and sincerity as 
personality traits of the future head of government. The 
institutional setting, policy implementation and political values 
are, thus, factors irrelevant to dealing with public issues.
The same type of reasoning is developed with respect to the 
attitudes of the citizens towards politics ('citizen attitudes 
towards political participation' frame). Ultimately, participation 
in politics is a matter of courageous and dynamic personality. The 
functioning of the polity depends on the emotional involvement of 
the individuals. The role of democratic institutions such as the 
actual election or the parties themselves is thus neglected.
The argument here is not that emotive or psychological factors 
do not play a significant role in politics. Our main aim is to 
show the ways in which these factors are manipulated in party 
discourse so that rational accounts of public problems are avoided. 
The reduction of principles and systems of government to a number 
of psychological features supposedly inherent to the personality of 
one or other leading political figure goes further than a mere 
psychological insight into politics.
A significant amount of literature attributes historical 
events, e.g. the Nazi regime, to the personality traits of the 
relevant leader. According to Friedlander (1971), Adolf Hitler 
suffered from a psychological syndrome which led him to project his 
hatred for his father on Jewish people. The antisemitism of Hitler 
has also been attributed to traumatic psychological experiences he 
had suffered in the past (Binion 1982). However, the Nazi regime 
is not a unique example of the use of psychological factors in 
political history. The unsuccessful policy positions adopted by 
Woodrow Wilson, former President of the United States of America, 
have been explained in terms of a self-destroying behaviour which 
he supposedly adopted whenever facing an important but 
controversial issue (George & George 1964).3
A common element which characterises these studies is their
effort to provide an explanation for the occurrence of exceptional,
'abnormal' political situations. The Nazi regime is viewed as an
instance of pathology of political systems. Similarly, George and
George (ibid.) seek to explain the irregularities of the behaviour
of W.Wilson, his failure to promote the League of Nations for
instance. Thus, to the extent that their irregularity is
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recognised, explanation oy means of individual or collective 
psychological features is accepted. However, this research suggests 
that psychological factors are mobilised in the everyday political 
discourse within normal institutional settings and under regular 
circumstances in order to construct suitable explanations for 
and/or solutions to public problems.
Psychologisation provides heuristic cues for the understanding 
of complex social or economic problems. These emphasise
psychological factors to the detriment of political argumentation 
and thus disorient the electorate. The questions of national 
development, of economic growth or crisis and of corruption in 
public administration are related to psychologising discourse. It 
is thus suggested that there are explicit or implicit links between 
policy choices on these matters and psychological qualities of 
governors and the governed. In other words, psychologisation seems 
to propose an esoteric account of politics in which political 
values and beliefs and also governmental practices or political 
institutions have little significance.
8.4 The strategy of denial in party behaviour
The hypothesis that the strategy of denial is used more often 
by parties with higher power position against parties with lower 
power position than vice versa has been only partially supported 
(see table 3, infra).
Regarding the incumbent and challenger parties, the results 
support the hypothesis, namely the incumbent party uses denial 
against the challenger more frequently than vice versa. The 
difference is, however, limited (see figures 8.1 and 8.2 supra). 
The data regarding the use of denial between the incumbent and the 
outsider party during the first and second periods support 
marginally the hypothesis (see ngures 8.3 and 8.4 supra). On the 
contrary, the findings with regard to the challenger and the 
outsider party show that the outsider uses the denial strategy 
against the challenger party more often than vice versa and, 
therefore, do not support the hypothesis.
#
The overall findings with respect to the strategy of denial
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are presented schematically in the following table:
Table 3: D E N I A L
hypothesis I
Incumbent
Challenger
confirmed 
(but marginally)
Incumbent
Outsider
Challenger
Outsider
unconfirmedconfirmed 
marginally with 
respect to 
1st & 2nd period 
unconfirmed with 
respect to 3rd period
NOTES:
hypothesis Is The strategy of denial will be directed more often by a party 
with a high power position towards a party with a lower power position than 
vice versa.
During the third period, contrary to the hypothesis (see table 
3, hypothesis I), the outsider party uses denial against both the 
incumbent and the challenger party more often than they do against 
it (see figures 8.3, 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6).
This finding may be related to the conflictual character of 
the outsider party which seems to lead the party to reject the 
validity of the beliefs of its powerful rivals. It is worth noting 
that the increase in the use of denial by the outsider party is 
registered in the third period during which all three parties 
participate in a wide coalition government. Thus, the preference 
of the outsider party for the strategy ;of denial may be regarded as 
a means of stressing its different opinions within the national 
unity government. The specific weight of the outsider party within 
the coalition is limited because of its small size and marginal 
position. The use of denial may enable it, despite its limited 
power, to resist the pressure to conform that exists within the 
government.
The analysis of the framing packages related to denial by the 
outsider party seems to be in conformity with this argument. The 
prevalence of the 'political values and ideology', 'catharsis vs. 
corruption' and 'national development vs. chaos/conflict within the 
nation' framing package during the third period (see figures 8.9.4 
and 8.9.6) demonstrates that the outsider party uses denial against 
the incumbent and the challenger party as a means of ideological 
and political confrontation.4
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Figure 8.9.4
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy 
of denial is used by an outsider against an incumbent party
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Figure 8.9.6
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy 
of denial is used by an outsider against a challenger party
1st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
■  'self vs. others'
■  'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation'
■  'psychological 
features/personality traits’
■  'dignity vs. vulgarity
□  'political values and 
ideology
S P red  le f t  vs. pseudo  
R ight'
□  'national developm ent vs. 
ch aos/con flict within the 
nation*
■  'power/future vs. 
failure/past'
□  'catharsis vs. corruption'
f l  'human condition'
The argument that the outsider party used denial as a means of 
disrupting the consensus and resisting to conformity pressures that 
exist within a coalition government is consistent with the basic 
assumptions of active minority theory according to which a minority
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group is characterised by the conflict it introduces (Moscovici 
1979). This argument may lead to the alternative hypothesis that 
under conditions of high consensus and goal interdependence, an 
outsider party will use the denial strategy against a rival party 
even if the latter disposes of a higher power position. Clearly, 
further evidence is required in order to accept this alternative 
hypothesis.
On the other hand, the outsider party, contrary to the 
hypothesis (see table 3, hypothesis I), uses denial against the 
challenger more often than the latter does against the former in 
all three periods (see figures 8.5 and 8.6, supra). This 
difference may be related to the fact that the challenger party 
does not dispose of governmental power to impose its beliefs. Thus, 
the outsider party has more chances to dismiss the challenger ideas 
as unreasonable and contrary to factual truth than it has with 
respect to the incumbent party positions.
This interpretation of the results implicates a modification 
of the relevant hypothesis. The use of the denial strategy should 
be seen as conditioned by the incumbency of governmental office 
instead of the overall power position of the parties: a party which 
is in office would be expected to use denial against a party that 
is deprived of governmental power more often than the latter would 
against the former. The results regarding the use of the strategy 
of denial between the incumbent and the challenger parties support 
this hypothesis. The findings with respect to the use of denial 
between the incumbent and the outsider party also conform with this 
alternative hypothesis except for in the third period. Therefore, 
further research is needed in order to find evidence in support of 
this alternative hypothesis.
An unexpected yet interesting finding concerns the content of 
the denial strategy. The analysis of the framing packages related 
to denial by all parties suggests that statements which deny the 
truthfulness of the rival party beliefs are usually related to 
either 'subjective' or controversial issues. Psychological features 
and personality traits on the one hand and contested issues like 
economic scandals of the government, on the other hand, are 
embodied in the denial strategy.
Personality traits are features supposed to characterise an
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individual or a group. These features are externalised and become 
perceivable only through behaviour. Specific instances of
behaviour are meant to prove, or at least to indicate, whether an 
individual is psychologically balanced or not, whether s/he is 
reserved or impulsive, consistent or inconsistent and so on. 
However, the establishment of a link between behaviour and specific 
psychological characteristics is a matter of vague theoretical 
assumptions much more than a question of 'objective truth.' Thus, 
the framing of denial in psychological terms ('psychological 
features/personality traits' or 'self vs. others' framing packages) 
provides for impressive non-verifiable statements.
Programme positions, namely those regarding the tackling of 
public corruption or propaganda statements, e.g. estimations of the 
electoral force of each party ('power/future vs. failure/ past' 
frame), are of a controversial character. It is easy to reject the 
validity of the claims of the opponent that refer to these topics. 
There are no facts that can confirm or reject either assertion. 
The parties, thus, find fruitful ground on which to contradict one 
another without offering concrete arguments to support their 
claims.
The strategy of denial is most often and by all parties 
related to the 'catharsis vs. corruption' framing package^. The 
question of 'catharsis' is topical and highly controversial, thus, 
during the period studied the floor is open for each party to deny 
the validity of the positions and the truthfulness of the 
intentions of its rival parties on this topic.
In romt j.uai.oa# «cere is a generalised preference of all 
parties to associate their denying statements with elements which 
are not verifiable at the moment of their*denial because they are 
'subjective.' The framing packages embodied in the strategy of 
denial confirm that the aim of the strategy is to cast doubt on the 
validity of an opinion through an authoritative statement rather 
than to argue against a specific position.
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8.5 The use of affirmation in election campaign and post-election 
negotiation
The study of the use of affirmation as a strategy of influence 
and resistance between political parties is of an exploratory 
nature. False assertions about 'events' that have not happened are 
regarded as a specific strategy which competing parties apply 
against one another. The overall findings with respect to the 
strategy of affirmation are presented in the following table:
Table 4: A F F I R M A T I O N
hypothesis I 
hypothesis II
Incumbent
Challenger
confirmed
partially
confirmed
partially
Incumbent
Outsider
confirmed
confirmed
partially
Challenger
Outsider
confirmed
unconfirmed
N O T E S :
hypothesis I: A party that enjoys a high power position will apply
affirmation against its lower status rival more often than the latter is 
likely to do against the former,
hypothesis II: Affirmation is more likely to take place among parties that 
share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity than among parties that 
share a common political super-ordinate identity or parties with opposed 
super-ordinate identities.
8.5.1 The use of affirmation by parties with different power
positions
The findings regarding the use of the strategy of affirmation
between the incumbent and the outsider party support fully the
first hypothesis (see table 4, hypothesis I).
The incumbent party applies affirmation against the outsider
more often than the latter does against the former, in particular
during the first and third period. Affirmation accounts for
approximately fifty per cent of the communication addressed by the
incumbent towards the outsider party (see figure 8.3 supra) while
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the outsider party uses less often affirmation against the 
incumbent and during the third period does not use it at all.
The results regarding the use of affirmation between the 
challenger and the outsider in all three periods also support the 
hypothesis that parties with a stronger power position tend to use 
affirmation against their rivals with a weaker power position 
(table 4, hypothesis I). The challenger party expresses and 
affirms false statements which tend to discredit the outsider party 
more often than the latter does against the former (see figures 8.5 
and 8.6).
The results obtained with respect to the use of the strategy 
of affirmation between the incumbent and the challenger party are 
more complex. The first hypothesis, namely that affirmation is
applied less often by a party with a low power position against a 
party that enjoys a higher power position than vice versa is 
confirmed with respect to the first period of the analysis (see 
figures 8.1 and 8.2); but the challenger party directs the strategy 
of affirmation to the incumbent with increasing frequency.
Therefore, the findings regarding the use of affirmation between 
the incumbent and the challenger party during the second and third 
periods do not support the hypothesis.
The frequent use of the strategy during the third period, on 
the other hand, may be explained by the fact that the two parties 
acquire a common instrumental super-ordinate identity during that 
period and, therefore according to the second hypothesis (see table 
A f II) they are expected to use the strategy of
affirmation more frequently than when they had opposed super­
ordinate identities.
8.5.2 Affirmation and super-ordinate party identity
In conformity with the second hypothesis (see table 4,
hypothesis II), the challenger uses the strategy of affirmation
against the incumbent party more often in the third period, during
which a common instrumental super-ordinate identity links the two
parties, than in the previous periods. During the third period
affirmation accounts for approximately fifty per cent of the total
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communication addressed by the challenger to the incumbent party 
(see figure 8.2).
On the other hand, the incumbent party uses affirmation 
against the challenger at about the same rate (thirty per cent) 
during all three periods. Therefore, the second hypothesis (see 
table 4, hypothesis II) is partially sustained as the introduction 
of a common instrumental identity between parties which previously 
had opposite super-ordinate identities does not lead to an 
increased use of affirmation by the incumbent party.
The use of the strategy of affirmation between the incumbent 
and the outsider party supports is to a large extent inconsistent 
with the hypothesis that parties which share a common instrumental 
super-ordinate identity use affirmation more often that parties 
which do not. The incumbent party, contrary to what was 
hypothesised, uses affirmation against the outsider less often in 
the second period during which the two parties share a common 
instrumental super-ordinate identity than in the first period (see 
figure 8.3). Moreover, the outsider party totally neglects the 
strategy of affirmation during the third period despite the fact 
that the two parties have a common instrumental identity (see 
figure 8.4).
The results of the use of affirmation between the challenger 
and the outsider party do not support the second hypothesis either. 
The challenger party, contrary to the hypothesis, uses affirmation 
against the outsider less often in the third period, during which 
the parties Share a common super-ordinate instrumental identity 
than in the previous periods (see figure 8.5). The outsider party 
also in disagreement with the hypothesis uses affirmation equally 
often during the second and third periods (see figure 8.6).
An alternative explanation for this difference from the 
hypothesis is that the two parties share also a common super- 
ordinate political identity during the third period which 
instigates the use of other strategies, namely categorisation or 
denial. These strategies account for a much larger part of the 
conwmnication between the two parties than the strategy of 
affirmation (see figures 8.5 and 8.6).
Overall, these findings demonstrate that the common
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instrumental super-ordinate identity is not a consistent predictor 
of an increase in the use of the affirmation strategy. Thus, the 
relevant hypothesis (table 4, hypothesis II) is not confirmed. 
However, a qualitative effect has been observed. The framing
packages related to the strategy of affirmation seem to vary as a
function of changes in the super-ordinate identities of the 
parties.
More specifically, when two parties have a common political
super-ordinate identity or opposed super-ordinate identities, false 
statements refer to the power potential of the opponent party or 
directly to its ideology and policy positions. Thus, affirmation 
discredits explicitly the ideas and overall credibility of the 
opponent. On the contrary, if overt hostility is constrained 
because the parties have engaged in co-operative activity and, 
therefore, share a common instrumental super-ordinate identity, 
affirmation is mainly related to controversial or abstract
questions. In this context, affirmation seems to undermine 
implicitly the overall credibility of the rival party.
Evidence for this qualitative effect of a common instrumental 
super-ordinate identity on the use of affirmation is found in most 
pairs of parties.
First, a change in the framing packages related to affirmation 
used between the incumbent and the challenger party is observed in 
the third period during which a common instrumental super-ordinate 
identity is introduced between the two parties. The frequent use 
of the ‘power/future vs. failure/past' framing package by the 
incumbent party in the first and second periods is reduced in the 
third period while the 'psychological features' and the 'national 
development vs. chaos/conflict within the nation' framing packages 
become dominant in that period (see figure 8.10.1).
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Figure 8.10.1
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy 
of affirmation is used by an incumbent against a challenger party
1st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
■  'self vs. others'
■  'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation'
■  'psychological 
features/personality traits'
■  dignity vs. vulgarity1
□  political values and 
ideology'
■  'real Left vs. pseudo  
R ight*
□  'national development vs. 
chaos /conflict within the 
nation'
■  ‘power/future vs. 
failure/ past'
□  'catharsis vs. corruption'
■  'human condition'
Second, the framing packages related to affirmation by the 
incumbent and the outsider party change when a common instrumental 
super-ordinate identity is imposed on these parties (see figures
8.10.3 and 8.10.4). During the first period, in which the two 
parties have a ccpmmon political super-ordinate identity, the 
'power/future vs. failure/ past', the 'political values and 
ideology' and the 'real Left vs. pseudo Right' framing packages are 
prevalent. However, the use of these framing packages is reduced 
or they are not used at all in the second and third periods during 
which the two parties share a common instrumental super-ordinate 
identity. During the second and third periods, affirmation is 
embodied in the 'catharsis vs. corruption’ and the 'psychological 
features/personality traits' framing packages.
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Figure 8.10.3
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy
of affirmation is used by an incumbent against an outsider party
100% -
80%-
60%-
40%-
20% '
0%-
ls t  per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
■ 'self vs. others'
■ citizen attitudes towards 
political participation'
■ 'psychological
features/personality traits'
■ 'dignity vs. vulgarity*
B  'political values and 
ideology*
■ real Left vs. pseudo 
R ighf
□  national development vs. 
chaos/conflict within the 
nation'
■ power/future vs. 
failure/past'
B  'catharsis vs. corruption*
B 'human condition*
Figure 8.10.4
Graphic representation of the distribution  of framing packages when the strategy 
of denial is  used by an outsider against an incumbent party
1 st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
B 'self vs. others'
B 'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation'
B psychological
features/personality traits'
B 'dignity vs. vulgarity*
□  'political values and 
ideology'
B  'real Left vs. pseudo 
R ighf
□  'national development vs. 
chaos/conflict within the 
nation
B 'power/future vs. 
failure/past*
□  'catharsis vs. corruption'
B 'human condition'
Moreover, the framing packages related to affirmation by the 
challenger against the outsider party in the third period, during 
which the two parties share a common instrumental super-ordinate 
identity are different than those used in the first and second 
periods. During the third period, the challenger party relates a
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large part of the affirmation instances to the citizen attitudes 
towards political participation' and to the 'human condition' 
framing packages which were neglected or only marginally used in 
the previous periods.
Figure 8.10.5
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the strategy 
of denial is used by a challenger against an outsider party
100%-
90%-
80%-
70%-
60%-
50%-
40%-
30%-
20% -
10% -
0%-
1st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
■ 'self vs. others1
■ citizen attitudes towards 
political participation1
■ 'psychological
features/per son dit y traits'
■ dingrty vs. vulgarity4
El 'political values and 
ideology'
■ 'real Left vs. pseudo 
R ighf
□  nation» development vs. 
chaos /conflict within the 
nation'
•  ‘power/future vs. 
failure/past'
E! 'catharsis vs. corruption'
■ 'human condition'
In conclusion, the party super-ordinate identity seems to 
affect the use of the strategy of affirmation between opponent 
parties. However, the effect of changing super-ordinate identities 
seems to be expressed at the qualitative rather than at the
quantitative level as was initially hypothesised. The analysis of 
the framing packages related to affirmation has demonstrated that a 
change in the framing of affirmation is often, but not always,
provoked by the introduction of a common instrumental super­
ordinate identity between two parties. Further research is
necessary in order to corroborate this finding and also gain a
better insight into the socio-psychological mechanisms involved in 
the strategy of affirmation.
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N O T E S
* The concepts of all four strategies and the relevant literature are discussed 
in Chapter three.
* The symbols F I , F2, . . .  , F# refer to specific  framing packages included in the 
relevant c luster . The index of framing packages grouped in clusters is given in 
the appendix of chapter 7.
3 The nature and scope of psychologising explanations in history is discussed in
detail by Papastamou (1989b : 117-130).
 ^ Ideological matters are related to denial during the first  period also, albeit 
in a lower degree (see figure 8 .9 .4 ,  first  period).
5 See figures 8 .9 .1 ,  8 . 9 .2 ,  8 .9 .3 ,  8 . 9 .4 ,  8 .9 .5  and 8 . 9 .6 .  Figures 8 .9 .1 ,  8 .9 .2 ,
8 .9 .3  and 8 .9 .5  are given in the appendix of this chapter.
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A P P E N D I X  I
PSYCHOLOGISATION
Figure 8 .8 .1
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the 
strategy of psychologisation is used by an incumbent against a 
challenger party
100% -
90%«
80%-
70%-
60%-
50%-
40%-
30%-
20% -
10% -
0%-
1st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
■  'self vs. others4
■ 'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation'
■ 'psychological
features/personality traits*
■ 'dignity vs. vulgarity1
E3 'political values and 
ideology4
■ 'real Left vs. pseudo 
R ighf
□  'national development vs. 
chaos/conflict within the 
nation*
■ 'power/future vs. 
failure/ pas V
E3 'catharsis vs. corruption1
M 'human condition'___________
Figure 8 .8 .3
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the 
strategy of psychologisation is used by an incumbent against an outsider 
party
1 st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
E3 'self vs. others'
■ citizen attitudes towards 
political participation
■ 'psychological 
features /personality traits
■ dignity vs. vulgarity'
□  political values and 
ideology
S  real le ft vs. pseudo 
R ighf
□  national development vs. 
chaos/conflict within the 
nation'
■ power/future vs. 
failure/ past*
O catharsis vs. corruption’
B  human condition'
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Figure 8.8.4
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the
strategy of psychologisation is used by an outsider against an incumbent
party
■ 'self vs. others'
■ citizen attitudes towards 
political participation'
■ 'psychological 
features/personality traits'
■ dignity vs. vulgarity1
B  'political values and 
ideology4
■ 'real Left vs. pseudo 
Right'
□  'national development vs. 
chaos/conflict within the 
nation'
■ 'power/future vs. 
failure/ past'
G3 'catharsis vs. corruption'
H 'human condition
Figure 8 .8 .5
Graphic representation of the distribution  of framing packages when the 
strategy of psychologisation is used by a challenger against an outsider 
party
100%-.
90%-
80% a
70%*
60%-
50%-
40%-
30%-
20% -
10%-
0%-
1st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
■  'self vs. others'
■  'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation'
■  psychological 
features/personality traits'
■  'dignity vs. vulgarity'
□  'political values and 
ideology*
□  'real Left vs. pseudo  
R ight'
□  national developm ent vs. 
ch aos/con flic t within the 
nation'
■  ‘power/future vs. 
failure/past1
□  'catharsis vs. corruption
■  human condition1
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Figure 8.8.6
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the
strategy of psychologisation is used by an outsider against a challenger
party
100%-
90%-
80%-
70%-
60%-
50%-
40%-
30%*
20% -
10%-
0%-
1st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
■ 'self vs. others1
■ 'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation1
■ 'psychological 
features/personality trarts’
■  dignity vs. vulgarity
B  'political values and 
ideology4
B real Left vs. pseudo 
R ight
□  'national development vs. 
chaos /conflict within the 
nation'
fl 'power/future vs. 
failure/ past'
B 'catharsis vs. corruption
B 'human condition1____________
DENIAL
Figure 8 .9 .1
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the 
strategy of denial is used by an incumbent against a challenger party
100%-
90%-
80%-
70%-
60%-
50%-
40%-
30%-
20 % -
10%-
o%-
1st per. 2nd per. 3td per.
B  'self vs. others'
B 'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation'
B 'psychological
feat ures / pers on al it y traits '
B 'dignity vs. vulgarity
□  political values and 
ideology'
B  'real Left vs. pseudo 
R ight’
□  'national deve lopm ent vs. 
c h a o s / c o n flic t  within the  
nation*
B pow er/future  vs. 
failure/ past'
□  ca th a rs is  vs. corruption
B human co n d itio n ’
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Figure 8.9.2
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the
strategy of denial is used by a challenger against an incumbent party
1 st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
■ 'self vs. others'
■ 'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation'
■ 'psychological 
features/personality traits*
■ 'dignity vs. vulgarity*
B  'political values and 
ideology'
■ 'real Lett vs. pseudo 
R ight*
□  'national development vs. 
chaos/conflict within the 
nation1
■ 'power/future vs. 
failure/ past*
□  catharsis vs. corruption'
■ 'human condition'
Figure 8 .9 .3
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the 
strategy of denial is used by an incumbent against an outsider party
1 st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
■ 'self vs. others'
■ 'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation'
■ psychological 
features/personality traits'
■ 'dignity vs. vulgarity'
□  'political values and 
ideology1
■ 'real Left vs. pseudo 
R ight'
□  'national development vs. 
chaos/conflict within the 
nation'
■ power/future vs. 
failure / post'
□  'catharsis vs. corruption'
■ human condition1
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Figure 8.9.4
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the
strategy of denial is used by an outsider against an incumbent party
1st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
■ sett vs. others'
■ 'citizen attitudes towards 
poi it ic a I participation'
■ psychological
features/personality traits'
■ 'dignity vs« vulgarity'
S3 'political values and 
ideology1
■ 'real Left vs. pseudo 
R Ight'
□  'national development vs. 
chaos/conflict within the 
nation'
■ 'power/future vs. 
failure/ past'
@ 'catharsis vs. corruption'
■ 'human condition*
Figure 8 .9 .5
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the 
strategy of denial is used by a challenger against an outsider party
100%
80%
60%-
40%
S'r
-
1
1st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
'self vs. others1
'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation'
I 'psychological 
features/personality traits'
I dignity vs. vulgarity*
I 'political values and 
ideology'
I real Left vs. pseudo 
R ight'
I national development vs. 
chaos/conflict within the 
nation
I 'power/future vs. 
failure/past
1 'catharsis vs. corruption'
I 'human condition
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AFFIRMATION
Figure 8.10.2
Graphic representation of the distribution of framing packages when the
strategy of affirmation is used by a challenger against an incumbent
party
1st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
■ ‘self vs. others'
■ 'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation1
■ 'psychological 
features/personality traits1
■ dignity vs. vulgarity
0  'political values and 
ideology1
■ 'real Left vs. pseudo 
R ight*
□  'national development vs. 
chaos/conflict within the 
nation*
■ power/future vs. 
failure/past'
□  'catharsis vs. corruption' 
'human condition1
F i g u r e  8 . 1 0 . 6
Graphic representation of the distribution  of framing packages when the 
strategy of denial is used b y  a n  o u t s i d e r  a g a i n s t  a  c h a l l e n g e r  p a r t y
1st per. 2nd per. 3rd per.
■ 'self vs. others'
■ 'citizen attitudes towards 
political participation'
■ 'psychological
features personality traits'
■ 'dignity vs. vulgarity
□  'political values and 
ideology
B  'real Left vs. pseudo 
R ight'
□  ‘national development vs. 
chaos/conflict within the 
nation
■  'pow er/future vs. 
failure/ past'
□  ‘catharsis vs. corruption'
■ human condition*
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A P P E N D I X  II
The following tables represent the data regarding the use of each of the 
strategies by each pair of interacting parties. The data has been retrieved 
from the database created for the purposes of this research. This database 
is based on the codification of newspaper texts.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide the data regarding the first, second and third 
periods of analysis respectively. The data quoted represent the number of 
occurrences of each strategy in each period and for each pair of parties 
separately. The direction of the communication, namely which party adresses 
a strategy to which rival has been taken into account in the measurement. The 
following results have been produced:
TABLE 1
(Data regarding the first period of the analysis)
Strategies: Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial Affirm. Superordin.
IdentityInteracting
parties:
Inc. against Chall. 39 25 23 37 qpoasd
Chall. against Inc. 115 48 24 50 qçoæd
Inc. against Outs. 10 4 8 18 ccmnai
political
Outs, against Inc. 62 29 27 22 carmoii
political
Chall. against Outs. 6 3 4 5 qçœeri
Outs, against Chall. 24 12 16 8 qprrri
Note; During this period, the Socialist party (PA-SO.K.]1 is characterised as the
incumbent party, the Conservatives (N.D.) occupy the challenger position and the ! 
outsider power position is assigned to the Alliance of the Left (SYN.). *
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TABLE 2
(Data regarding the second period of the analysis)
Strategies : Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial
--------1
Affirm. Superordin. !
Identity jInteracting iparties:
Inc. against Chall. 38 31 23 42 qpoæd
Chall. against Inc. 9 11 6 11 qpcaad
Inc. against Outs. 3 2 5 5 carnai
instrunental
Outs, against Inc. 2 5 4 5 cannai
instrumental
Chall. against Outs. 24 11 15 16 qçœsd
Outs, against Chall. 26 20 30 17 cçpnaad ;
Note: During the second period of the analysis, the Conservative party acquires *
the incumbent power position, the Socialists shift to the challenger partyposition and the Alliance of the Left keeps its outsider character
TABLE 3
(Data regarding the third period of the analysis)
Strategies: Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial Affirm.. Superordin.Identity
Interacting
parties:
Inc. against Chall. 39 23 31 41 canrtn
instrumental
Chall. against Inc. 9 6 10 21 CXMUl
instrumental j
Inc. against Outs. 2 1 2 6 cannai
instrumental i
Outs, against Inc. 7 1 15 0 cornai
instrumental
Chall. against Outs. 10 0 9 5 icomía i
instrumental t
Outs, against Chall. 9 2 13 6 carnai
instrumental
Note: During the third period of
•
the analysis, the power position of the three
parties remains the same as in the second period •
Tables 4-10 provide the data on the distribution of the framing packages 
associated with the strategies applied by the parties. The data quoted
express the number of co-occurrences between each cluster of framing packages 
and the specific strategy applied within each pair of interacting parties in 
each period. A given strategy may be associated with one, more than one or
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with no framing packages. Therefore, the sum of the m-occurrences of each 
framing package with a strategy is often not equal to the total number of 
occurrences of the specific  strategy (quoted as "t o ta l ’*) in the given period 
between the given p a rties .
TABLE 4
T
INCUMBENT against CHALLENGER
A B L 
party
E 4 .1  
1st period
1
j
Strategies : Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial Affirmation
Clusters of 
framing packages:
'Human condition' 1 2 2 1
'C ath .vs . c o r r .' 9 5 6 10
'power/future 
vs. f a i l . /p a s t ' 2 1 1 12
' n at . developm. vs. 
chaos/conf1 . ' 4 0 0
»
5 1
'real L .v s . ps .R ight ' 0 0 0 0 !
'p o l i t . v a lu e s /id e o l .' 5 0 1 2
'd ig n .v s . v jlg a r ity ' 2 1 1 i ;
' psychol. features ' 5 7 8 3 ;
'c it ize n  attit .to w . 
polit - partic ipatio n ' 7 8 2
i
's e lf  vs. others' 1 2 0 2
Total 39 25 23 37
T A B L E  4.2 
INCUMBENT against CHALLENGER party - 2nd period
Strategies: Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial Affirmation
Clusters of 
framing packages:
'Human condition' 3 7 1 5
'Cath.vs. corr.' 
'power/future
15 6 11 17
vs. fail./past'
'nat.developm. vs.
3 3 10 16
chaos/confi.' 5 3 0 3
'real L.vs. ps.Right' 1 0 0 0
'polit.values/ideol. ' 9 0 0 0
'dign.vs. vulgarity' 1 0 0 0
'psychol.features ' 
'citizen attit.tow.
4 7 2 1
polit.participation' 6 7 0 4
'self vs. others' 0 2 1 4
Total 38 31 23 42
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TINCUMBENT against CHALLENGER
A B L
party
E 4 .3  
3rd period
i
i
i
Strategies: Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial Affirmation
Clusters of 
framing packages:
' Human condition' 3 4 2 0
'C a th .v s . c o r r . ' 11 3 11 15
'power/future 
v s . f a i l ./p a s t ' i 0 4 4
'nat.developm . vs. 
cfeaos/confl. ' 11 4 3 13
're a l  L .v s . ps .R ight ' 0 0 0 0 1
' p o l it .v a lu e s /id e o l .' 9 0 1 i !
'd ig n .v s . vulgarity ' 0 0 0 o !
' psychol. features' 6 10 11 il .
'c it ize n  attit .tow . 
p o lit .p a rtic ip a tio n ' 3 2 1 |
's e l f  vs. others' 4 4 2 i !
Total 39 23 31
!
41 j
11
1
TABLE 5
T A B L
CHALLENGER against INCUMBENT party
E 5. 
- 1st
1
period
Strategies : Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial Affirmation i
Clusters of 
framing packages:
'Human condition' 4 10 1
i11
\
2 !
'Cath.vs. corr.' 61 6 9 5
'power/future 
vs. fail./past' 16 0 1 29
'nat.developm. vs. 
chaos/conf1.' 15 0 0 3
| 'real L.vs. ps.Right' 0 0 0 0
1 'polit.values/ideol.' 20 3 m2 6
| 'dign.vs. vulgarity' 3 2 * 1 0
| 'psychol.features' 7 25 9 1
'citizen attit.tow. 
polit.partie ipation' 8 5 0 2
'self vs. others' 0 2 0 2
Total 115 48 24 50 i
l
258
T A B L E 5.2
1i1
CHALLENGER against INCUMBENT party - 2nd period
Strategies : Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial Affirmation
Clusters of
framing packages:
'Human condition' 1 0 0 0
'Cath.vs. corr.' 0 0 0 4
'power/future
vs. fail./past' 0 0 1 3
'nat.developm. vs.
chaos/conf1.' 1 0 0 1 !
'real L.vs. ps.Right' 0 0 0 0 i
'polit.values/ideol. ' 2 0 0 1 1'dign.vs. vulgarity' 0 1 1 0
'psychol.features' 0 3 3 2 j
'citizen attit.tow. 1polit.participation' 4 0 0 0 i
i'self vs. others' 2 7 0 0 1i1
Total 9 1 1 6 1 1
i
j
T1 A B L E 5.3 1
CHALLENGER against INCUMBENT party - 3rd period
Strategies: Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial Affirmation
Clusters of i
framing packages:
'Human condition' 0 1 0 0
'Cath.vs. corr.' 0 1 3 2 »
' power/future
vs. fail./past' 0 0 2 9
' nat.developm. vs.
chaos/conf1. ' 1 1 1 7
'real L.vs. ps.Right' 0 0 0 0
' polit.values/ideol. ' 4 1 1 2
'dign.vs. vulgarity' 1 0 0 0
' psychol.features ' 2 1 2 5
'citizen attit.tow.
polit.participation ' 1 0 0 1
'self vs. others'» 2 2 1 3
Total 9 6 1 0 2 1
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TABLE 6
T A B
INCUMBENT against OUTSIDER party
L E  6 
1st
.1
period
li
!
Strategies : Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial Affirmation
Clusters of 
framing packages:
'Human condition ' 2 0 0 1
'Cath.vs. corr.' 1 0 2 5
4 power/future 
vs. fail./past' 1 0 0 4 !
'nat.developm. vs. 
chaos/conf1.' 1 0 0
1I1
'real L.vs. ps.Right' 4 1 3 3
'polit.values/ideol.' 1 0 1 1
'dign.vs. vulgarity' 0 0 0 1 i
'psychol.features' 0 1 1 3
'c it ize n  attit .to w . 
p o l it .participation ' 1 1 0 0 !
's e l f  vs. others' 0 2 2 3
Total 10 4 8 18 !
T A B L E  6 .2
INCUMBENT against OUTSIDER party 2nd period !
Strategies: Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial
*
Affirmation
Clusters of
framing packages:
'Human condition' 0 0 0 0
'Cath.vs. corr.' 1 0 0 1
'power/future
vs. fail./past' 0 0 1 0
'nat.developm. vs.
chaos/conf1.' 0 0 0 0
'real L.vs. ps.Rightr 0 0 * 0 0
'polit.values/ideol.' 1 1 1 0
'dign.vs. vulgarity' 0 0 0 0
'psychol.features' 0 1 1 2
'citizen attit.tow. i
polit.participation' 1 0 1 1 '
'self vs. others' 0 0 1 I
Total 3 2 5 5 !
1
i
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T A B
INCUMBENT against OUTSIDER party
L E 6,3
3rd period
Strategies: Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial Affirmation
Clusters of 
framing packages:
'Human condition' 0 0 0 0
'Cath.vs. corr-' 0 0 1 3
'power/future 
vs, fail./past' 1 0 0 0
'nat.developm. vs. 
chaos/conf1.' 0 0 0 0
'real L.vs. ps.Right' 0 0 0 0
'polit.values/ideol.' 1 0 0 1 !
'dign.vs. vulgarity' 0 0 0 0 !
'psychol.features' 0 1 0 3 1'citizen attit.tow. 
polit.participation' 0 0 0
!
0 1
'self vs. others' 0 0 1 0 !
Total 2 1 2 6 ;
ii
TABLE 7
T A B L E  7 .1
i
OUTSIDER against INCUMBENT party - 1st period
Strategies: Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial A f f i r m a t i o n
Clusters of
framing packages: !
'Human condition' 3 4 0 o  i
'Cath.vs. corr. ' 2 8 7 1 1 5  \
' power/future *
vs. fail./past' 7 1 4 1 6  :
'nat.developm. vs.
chaos/conf 1 .# 5 1 1 0
'real L.vs. ps . Right' 9 2 2 1 s
' polit.values/ideol. ' 1 5 4 4 1
' dign.vs . vulgarity' 6 1 0 1
' psychol . features ' 1 2 1 7 9 5  :
'citizen attit.tow.
polit . participation ' 7 0 2 0  •
'self vs. others' 2 1 3 *  1
Total 6 2 2 9 2 7 22 :
i
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T A B L E  7.2
Affirmation
00
0
0
0
5
T A B L E  7,.3
--1
!
OUTSIDER against INCUMBENT party - 3rd period
Strategies: Categ/tion  Psych/tion Denial Affirmation
<
Clusters of
framing packages:
'Human condition' 0 0 0 0
'Cath.vs. corr. ' 1 0 3 0 1'power/future 1vs. fail./past' 1 0 3 0
' nat.developm. vs. 1
chaos/conf1 . ' 1 0 0 0
'real L.vs. ps.Right' 0 0 0
'polit.values/ideol.' 1 0 6 0 1
'dign.vs. vulgarity' 0 0 0
'psycho1.features ' 1 1 2 0
'citizen attit.tow.
polit.participation ' 1 0 1 0
'self vs. others' 3 0 1 0
Total
i
7 1 15 0
OUTSIDER against INCUMBENT party - 2nd period
Strategies: Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial
Clusters of 
framing packages:
'Human condition' 0 0 0
'C a th .v s , c o r r .' 
'power/future
0 1 0
vs. f a i l . /p a s t '
' n a t . developm. v s .
0 0 1
chaos/conf1 . ' 1 0 0
're a l  L .v s . ps .R ight ' 0 0 0
'p o l i t .v a l u e s /id e o l . ' 1 1 2
' d ig n . v s . vulg arity ' 0 0 0
' psychol. features ' 
'c it ize n  attit .to w .
0 2 0
p o lit .p artic ip a tio n ' 0 0 0
's e l f  vs. others' 0 0 0
Total 2 5 4
262
TABLE 8
T A B L E  8.. 1
ili
CHALLENGER a g a i n s t  OUTSIDER p a r t y - 1 s t p e r i o d
S t r a t e g i e s :  C a t e g / t i o n  P s y c h / t i o n
C l u s t e r s  o f  
f r a m i n g  p a c k a g e s :
D e n i a l A f f i r m a t i o n
'Human c o n d i t i o n ' 0 0 0 0
' C a t h . v s .  c o r r . '  
' p o w e r / f u t u r e
1 0 1 0
v s .  f a i l . / p a s t '
'n a t . d e v e l o p m . v s .
0 0 0 2
!
c h a o s / c o n f 1 . ' 0 0 0 0
' r e a l  L . v s .  p s . R i g h t ' 0 0 0 0
' p o l i t . v a l u e s / i d e o l . ' 0 0 0 1
'd i g n . v s . v u l g a r i t y ' 0 0 0 0
'psychol.features' 
'citizen attit.tow.
2 3 1 1
polit.participation' 0 0 0 0 1'self vs. others' 1 0 1 0 1
Total 6 3 4 5 !
i
i
T A B L E  8 «,2
CHALLENGER a g a i n s t  OUTSIDER p a r t y - 2nd  p e r i o d 4
S t r a t e g i e s :  C a t e g / t i o n P s y c h / t i o n D e n i a l A f f i r m a t i o n
C l u s t e r s  o f
f r a m i n g  p a c k a g e s : I
'Human c o n d i t i o n ' 1 0 0 0 !
' C a t h . v s . c o r r . ' 4 4 2 4 3'p o w e r / f u t u r e
v s .  f a i l . / p a s t ' 0 0 2 0
'n a t . d e v e lo p m .  v s . j
c h a o s / c o n f 1 . ' 0 1 1 1
' r e a l  L . v s .  p s . R i g h t ' 7 3 3 6 |'p o l i t . v a l u e s / i d e o l . ' 5 2 4 3
' d i g n . v s .  v u l g a r i t y ' 2 0 0 0 i
'p s y c h o l . f e a t u r e s ' 5 1 2 2 1
' c i t i z e n  a t t i t . t o w . I
polit.participation' 0 0 0 1
'self vs. others' 1 1 1 0
Total 24 11 15 16
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T A B L E  8.3
CHALLENGER against OUTSIDER party - 3rd period
Strategies: Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial Affirmation
Clusters of
framing packages:
'Human condition' 0 0 0 1 i'Cath.vs. corr.' 4 0 2 1 I<'power/future «ivs. fail./past' 2 0 0 0 Ii'nat.developm. vs. (chaos/confl.' 0 0 0 0 j
'real L.vs. ps.Right' 4 0 1 0 i'polit.values/ideol.' 0 0 0 0 1
'dign.vs. vulgarity' 0 0 1 0
'psychol.features' 5 0 5 1
'citizen attit.tow.
polit.participation' 0 0 1 1
'self vs. others' 1 0 1 0
Total 10 0 9 5
TABLE 9
T A B L E  9. 1
i
* OUTS ime* «MftuNWBft-part? - 1** period i
Strategies : Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial Affirmation
Clusters of i
framing packages: I
'Human condition' 1 1 0 0 •
'Cath.vs. corr.' 8 5 6 2
'power/future
vs. fail./past' 3 2 0 4
'nat.developm. vs.
chaos/confl.' 1 0 1 1
'real L.vs. ps.Right' 0 0 0 0
'polit.values/ideol. ' 7 0 1 0
'dign.vs. vulgarity' 1 0 0 0
'psychol.features' 1 4 9 2
'citizen attit.tow.
polit.participation ' 9 6 * 0 0
'self vs. others' 1 1 1 1
Total
i
1
24 12 16 8
11
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T A B L E 9 .2
i
¡
OUTSIDER against CHALLENGER party - 2nd period
i
Strategies : Categ/tion Psych/tion Denial Affirmation 1t
Clusters of I
framing packages:
j
'Human condition' 0 1 0 1
'Cath.vs. corr. ' 12 3 5 5 !'power/future
vs. fail./past' 0 1 2 2
' n a t.developm. vs.
chaos/conf1 . ' 2 1 3 3 «
'real L.vs. ps.Right' 2 0 3 1 i
'polit.values/ideol.' 9 3 2 2 !
'dign.vs. vulgarity' 2 2 1 0 •
' psychol.features ' 0 5 7 1 I
' citizen attit.tow. i1
polit.participation ' 2 1 1 0 1
'self vs. others' 0 4 4 2
Total 26 20 30 17
T A B L E  9. 3
OUTSIDER against CHALLENGER party - 3rd period j
Strategies: Categ/tI ion Psych/tion Denial Affirmation i
Clusters of
framing packages:
'Human condition' 0 0 0 0
'Cath.vs. corr.' 0 1 5 2 j
'power/future
vs. fail-/past' 1 0 1 1 !
'nat.developm. vs.
chaos/conf1 . ' 0 1 3 0
'real L.vs. ps.Right' 2 0 0 0
'polit.values/ideol.' 4 0 3 0
'dign.vs. vulgarity' 1 1 0 0
'psychol.features ' 0 1 2 1
'citizen attit.tow.
polit.participation' 1 0 0 0
'self vs. others' 2 0 3 4
Total 9 2 13 6
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CHAPTER IX
Social Psychology and the study of party behaviour
The main objectives of this research have been to test socio- 
psychological theory in a real-life setting, namely party 
campaigning and negotiation, and also to examine party politics 
from a socio-psychological perspective. For these purposes, an 
analytical model organised at two layers has been proposed. The 
first layer of the model has concentrated on the interaction of the 
parties with one another during election campaign and post-election 
negotiations. The party discourse has been analysed in terms of 
styles of behaviour, namely the ways in which each party introduces 
and represents itself in the field. Furthermore, party interaction 
and the mutual efforts of rival parties to confront and discredit 
one another have been analysed in terms of strategies of influence 
and resistance.
The second layer of the model has taken into account the 
impact of the common or opposed super-ordinate identities that two 
rival parties may have on the strategies they use to confront one 
another. Moreover, the second layer of the model has looked at the 
framing packages and, thus, at the social representations that are 
used in the campaigning and negotiation process. These have been 
considered in relation to party styles of behaviour or strategies 
of influence. Thereby, party interaction has been seen within its 
proper socio-political context. The latter includes the socio­
political, ideological or other features that are assumed to 
characterise party identity and the ways in which these 
characteristics interfere with the organisation of inter-party 
behaviour and discourse.
The elaboration of the theoretical concepts and the findings 
derived from the case-study suggest the following concluding 
remarks.
9.1 Incumbent, challenger and outsider parties and their 
styles of behaviour
The attempt to apply the active minority theoretical model on 
party behaviour has led to the need to define the concepts of 
incumbent, challenger and outsider party. The fundamental 
distinction that the active minority theory draws between minority 
and majority groups has been developed in order to include 
governmental office as a factor conditioning the power character of 
a party. Thus majority parties, namely large parties whose beliefs 
conform with the status quo of a society are assigned an incumbent 
or a challenger character according to their being in government or 
in the opposition. Minority parties whose electoral power is 
limited and whose beliefs are different from the established norms 
are assigned an outsider party character.
Party behaviour has, therefore, been related to the incumbent, 
challenger or outsider position of a party rather than to its 
majority or minority character. The concepts of consistency/ 
inconsistency and rigidity/flexibility that were introduced in 
social psychology as styles of behaviour of minority and majority 
groups have been used to analyse party behaviour. The hypothesis 
which has oriented the empirical research is that the incumbent, 
challenger or outsider character of a party conditions its styles 
of behaviour.
a) Consistency
The case-study undertaken (i.e. the analysis of the Greek 
party behaviour in the period between June 1989 and April 1990) has 
displayed some problematic aspects regarding the application of 
socio-psychological concepts on party behaviour. The validity of 
consistency as a suitable analytical category for the analysis of 
party behaviour has been called into question. The measurement of 
consistency as a style of behaviour adopted by a party has given
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extremely high consistency scores for all parties in all periods 
examined. The outsider has registered the highest score for 
consistency, however, overall, differences between the consistency 
scores of the different parties have been marginal.
These findings cast doubt on the significance of consistency 
as a feature typical of active minorities (Moscovici, Lage & 
Naffrechoux 1969; Nemeth 1974; Moscovici 1979; 1980 et al.). A
two-fold conclusion is derived from the findings concerning 
consistency. First, these findings suggest that consistency is 
essential for all typew-frf parties and, •therefore, it is not a 
feature typical of a specific type of party. Furthermore, the 
results of the research show that a consistent style of behaviour 
is not, or is only marginally, affected by the incumbent, 
challenger or outsider character of a party.
Nevertheless, the analysis of the framing packages related to 
consistent styles of behaviour has shown that the meaning assigned 
to consistent behaviour is influenced by the incumbent, challenger 
or outsider position of a party. More specifically, the consistent 
behaviour of the outsider party has been shown to be embedded in a 
specific set of framing packages which remained unchanged in all 
periods under examination. Consistency has, thereby, been 
associated with political attitudes, psychological features and 
ideology. Thus, a consistent outsider party was represented as a 
group of people who are stable and moderate in their beliefs and 
whose attitude towards politics is responsible and impartial.
However, the analysis of the incumbent and challenger party 
behaviour has shown that their power position did not affect the 
framing packages in which the consistency of these parties is 
embedded. A party-specific framing pattern has been found in the 
data. The Conservative party stressed the psychological qualities 
of its leadership as the main factor related to its consistent 
behaviour. The Socialists emphasised their consistency in terms of 
beliefs and political values. These tendencies were not related to 
the conservative or progressive ideology of each party but rather 
to their adaptation to intraparty (changes in leadership and party
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or9a .isation) or environmental (salience cf specific campaigning 
issues) conditions.
Consistency plays a different role in the organisation of 
minority (outsider) and majority (incumbent or challenger) party 
behaviour. An outsider party constructs a global consistency 
representation which organises the image of the party in election 
campaign and in coalition negotiations.
These findings confirm, however only at a qualitative level, 
that consistency is a style of behaviour which characterises active 
minorities, i.e. outsider parties. Indeed, outsider parties have 
been demonstrated to organise their consistent style of behaviour 
in a specific manner. On the other hand, further research is 
required to corroborate the finding that the framing of consistency 
by an incumbent or a challenger party is affected neither by office 
incumbency nor by party ideology. Indeed, alternative factors such 
as the intraparty organisational structure or the presence of a 
charismatic party leader which may influence the framing of 
consistent behaviour should be investigated.
b) Rigidity and Flexibility
The importance of rigidity and flexibility as styles of 
negotiation is shown by the study of party behaviour. Two 
complementary findings have highlighted the use of rigid and 
flexible styles in party interaction. On the one hand, rigidity 
and flexibility have been related to the power position of a party. 
Parties that hold extreme positions in terms of power, namely 
outsider and incumbent parties, tend to adopt a rigid style of 
behaviour while parties with an intermediate power position, namely 
a challenger party, demonstrate a more flexible and understanding 
attitude.
An incumbent party, that has governmental power at its 
disposal, stresses its intransigence and emphasises its prevalent 
position, whilst a challenger party tends to negotiate and display
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a.i open-minded attitude. On the other hand, the outsider party 
confirm adopts a rigid position striving to breakthrough the 
majority rule.
However, rigidity or flexibility in party behaviour is also 
affected by strategic decisions adopted by the parties. According 
to the findings, a party that takes decisions that are in 
accordance with its power position, namely an incumbent party that 
holds governmental power or a challenger or an outsider that remain 
in the opposition, adopts a rigid style of behaviour. Conversely, 
a party whose decisions are inconsistent with its power position, 
namely a challenger or an outsider that participate in government 
or an incumbent party that remains in the opposition, displays a 
more flexible/less rigid style of behaviour.
The analysis of the framing packages associated with rigid or 
flexible instances of behaviour has shown that, indeed, rigidity or 
flexibility are used to mediate the party decisions. The rigid or 
flexible style of behaviour of a party and the specific framing 
packages embodied in its discourse are used to assign meaning to 
its actual decisions. The participation of a party in a coalition 
government for instance, is represented in a positive way because 
it is related to the flexible and understanding attitude of the 
party and its dedication to the national good. Thus, the party 
stresses a positive interpretation of its actions.
Rigidity or flexibility have been proved to play a significant 
role as a means to negotiate party beliefs for both majority 
(incumbent, challenger) and minority (outsider) parties. Not only 
an outsider party supports its dissident ideas by means of its 
rigid or flexible behaviour, incumbent and challenger parties also 
use rigidity and flexibility in campaigning and negotiations. 
Furthermore, rigidity and flexibility have been shown to be related 
to the party strategic decisions. Parties adopt more or less rigid 
styles of behaviour in order to assign positive meaning to their 
actions. In summary, the styles of negotiation are categories
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useful for the analysis not only of minor‘ty but also of majority 
party (or group) behaviour.
c) Categorisation
Party super-ordinate identity has been shown to affect not 
only the use of the strategy of categorisation but also the 
categorisation dimensions rendered salient between rival parties. 
Parties that share a common political super-ordinate identity use 
categorisation to confront one another more often than parties 
whose super-ordinate identities are opposed. Indeed, parties that 
shared a common set of beliefs tended to use categorisation as a 
strategy against one another. Thus a party strived to achieve 
positive distinctiveness from a rival party with which it was 
ideologically 'close'.
The dimensions on which two parties categorised against one 
another were conditioned by the features that played an important 
role in the relationships between the two parties. They strived to
show themselves distinct on those features in which they were in
some way interrelated. Indeed, parties that shared a common
instrumental super-ordinate identity stressed political values and 
policy questions as relevant categorisation dimensions. On the 
other hand, parties with a common political super-ordinate identity 
categorised against one another with reference to political notions 
or psychological features. They did not, however, stress explicitly 
their ideological affinity but rather introduced 'new' or
alternative ideological dimensions on which to discriminate against 
one another. Finally, parties that shared both an instrumental and 
a political super-ordinate identity stressed policy questions that 
were relevant to their cooperative activity and also general 
political principles which did not touch directly upon their common 
beliefs.
The use of categorisation strategy is independent from the
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power character of the competing parties. Party identity seems to 
be the main determinant with respect to the use and the content of 
categorising statements.
d) Psychologisation
Parties that are ideologically close or instrumentally 
interdependent are reluctant to psychologise the beliefs of one 
another. Political values, ideology and policy positions, on the 
one hand, and psychological features and personality traits, on the 
other hand, are intertwined in the psychologising discourse of the 
parties. Ideas, beliefs or arguments are attributed to the 
psychological characteristics of the party that maintains them.
Psychologisation is often used in party campaigning and 
negotiation as a shorthand account for contested issues not only in 
exceptional circumstances or for unexpected behaviour but also in 
policy issues. These explanations stress the role played by 
psychological predispositions and emotive states instead of 
institutional factors and political norms. Psychologisation as a 
party strategy not only discredits the beliefs of the opponent but 
also reduces the significance of political norms.
However, psychologisation may also be seen as a media strategy 
for providing the public with simple and impressive explanations of 
complex problems. The use of psychologisation by the media as a 
means of interpretation of political behaviour is an interesting 
subject for future research.
e) Denial
Socio-psychological research regarding the strategy of denial 
has concentrated on the effects of the strategy on the minority 
influence potential. The fact that a minority also may use denial 
as a means to disrupt the social consensus and introduce conflict
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hc.s not been investigated in laboratory studies. This study, in 
contrast, has examined denial as a strategy used by minority 
(outsider) and majority (incumbent or challenger) parties in 
campaigning and negotiations.
Under conditions of general consensus and compliance, namely 
during the national unity government in which all three parties, 
the incumbent, the outsider party seems to have used denial to 
contradict the opinions of the incumbent and challenger party. The 
outsider seeks to disrupt the consensus within the government by 
rejecting the truthfulness of the policies and ideas of its 
partners. Denial seems thus to be used by the outsider party to 
introduce conflict.
The party power position does not condition the use of the 
strategy of denial between rival parties. The use of denial is 
affected but to a relatively limited extent by the office 
incumbency of a party or its being in the opposition.
It is worth noting that denial attempts are embedded in 
framing packages which refer to 'subjective' or contested issues. 
The strategy consists of non-verifiable statements. These 
statements are used as a means for negative propaganda against the 
adversaries. Indeed, the framing of denial confirms that the 
strategy discredits an idea by rejecting its validity, however, 
without offering argumentation against the specific idea.
f) Affirmation
Parties that share a common instrumental super-ordinate 
identity tend to relate their false statements to controversial or 
abstract issues. Cooperation in government, even though
provisional, appears to constrain the use of affirmation between 
coalition partners: these do not express overt hostility against 
one another but rather seek to undermine the overall credibility of
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their rival by reference to controversial or 'subjective' 
questions. Conversely, parties that have opposed super-ordinate 
identities use their false statements both to discredit the 
ideology and policy positions of the rival party and to undermine 
its overall power potential.
Under conditions of cooperation and interdependence between 
parties, affirmation may be used to discredit indirectly the image 
and credibility of an opponent, but it may also b« used in 
campaigning as a strategy of overt confrontation. On the other 
hand, the introduction of a common instrumental super-ordinate 
identity between interacting parties has no effect on the frequency 
of use of the strategy of affirmation between these parties.
The use of affirmation is conditioned by the power position of 
the competing parties. Parties with a high power character express 
false statements about their lower status opponents more Qften than 
the latter do against the former. Incumbent and challenggr parties 
seem to benefit from an objectivity norm according to which the 
'objective' truth regarding social phenomena is defined by the 
majority. Thus, in party campaigning and negotiation situations, 
in which competing definitions of social reality are maintained by 
each party, incumbent and challenger have a relative advantage with 
respect to the outsider in asserting that a false statement is 
true.
This study has sought to demonstrate that concepts originally 
developed in the field of Social Psychology and, more particularly, 
in experimental studies may be suitable and, indeed, very useful 
for the study of real-life settings such as political reality. 
Taking into account the particularities inherent in case-studies, 
we believe that much can be gained from the interaction between 
research in laboratory and in real-life situations. The latter may 
allow for the refinement of theoretical concepts developed in the 
former while also the former can serve as pioneers for Research
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that can subsequently be used to explain specific phenomena.
Furthermore, there is a lot to learn from the study of the 
socio-psychological mechanisms underlying political behaviour. The 
mechanisms of group formation and socio-psychological 
identification which underlie inter-group behaviour can be used to 
explain behaviour between parties in competitive or cooperative 
contexts. Thereby, a better insight into party campaigning and 
coalition negotiation is gained which may contribute to the 
prediction of party behaviour under different conditions. 
Knowledge of the mechanisms that condition party identity and the 
socio-psychological identification of the voter with a party may 
also be used in order to achieve better results in party 
campaigning.
The analytical category of majority or minority character of 
a group is used to explain party behaviour in relation to the 
incumbent, challenger or outsider position of. a party. Thus, the 
impact of governmental power, electoral strength and pro- or anti­
status quo ideology on party behaviour can be analysed. Moreover, 
the concept of active minorities helps us gain a better insight 
into the mechanisms that condition the behaviour of small parties 
and also the factors that enhance or impede their influence.
The investigation of social representations that are embodied 
in party discourse and of their relationship with specific 
campaigning strategies allows for a more in-depth analysis of party 
discourse. Social representations are used by parties as a means 
to support the ingroup opinion or as a means to discredit the 
ideology of the opponent party and distort its image. Therefore, 
the study of social representations offers a better insight into 
political rhetoric in election campaigns.
Inter-party behaviour is only one of the many fields of 
political behaviour on which social psychology can be applied.
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Indeed, socio-psychological analysis may be .:sed to understand and 
explain different sides of political reality such as intraparty 
relations, for instance, the role of leadership within a party or 
within a government and also relations between supporting parties 
in a coalition government.
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